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The work undertaken in this study empirically explores the determinants of regulatory
bank capital buffers, and how they influence bank decisions. Focusing on bank capital
management under the Basel I framework, this thesis serves to address some of the con-
cerns that have been voiced regarding the implementation of the new regulation (Basel
II) and the broader economic effects that could result.
In particular, the research chapters of this thesis examine the cyclical behavior of
European bank capital buffers, the long run relationship between bank capital buffers
and charter values, and the simultaneous adjustments of capital and risk. In each of
the research chapters, we acknowledge the endogenous nature of the capital decision of a
bank, and assume that banks will define an internally optimal probability of default (a
function of risk and capital) to be managed over the long term. Adjustment costs, illiquid
markets, together with the costs associated with a regulatory breach contribute as factors
in a banks internal decision when setting a target capital ratio. Treating capital in this
way, we note that it is the amount of capital held above the requirement that determines a
banks attitude towards risk. Importantly, this work has shown that excessive risk taking





Broadly speaking, there are two distinct ways that a bank can finance its operations;
either with borrowed money (debt) or with funds provided by its shareholders or owners
(equity). On the one hand, borrowing money generates contractual liabilities, which if
not paid when due can cause a bank to fail. On the other hand, investments made by its
owners can gain or lose value without any risk of the bank defaulting on its obligations.
Therefore, everything else equal, the greater the portion of capital contributed by its
owners, the safer the bank is in that it is less likely to default on its obligations in
periods of economic adversity. Bank regulators have therefore continuously placed a
strong emphasis on capital adequacy as a key element in ensuring safety and soundness
in banking institutions and in the financial system as a whole. For this reason, capital
regulation has become a dominant instrument in modern day banking regulation.
Despite the safety and soundness benefits associated with requiring banks to hold
larger portions of capital, capital adequacy regulation can impose important costs. As-
suming away capital market frictions, the Modigliani-Miller theorem states that the cost
of debt and the cost of equity are equal. However, as discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the
Modigliani-Miller theorem is not applicable to banks and moreover, banks do find that
holding equity capital is costly.
The costs and benefits of holding capital must be balanced by the bank. The banks
assessment of the associated costs and benefits may not however, necessarily correspond
directly to the social costs and benefits. In particular, banks may (i) anticipate support
from the public sector in the event of a failure, encouraging them to operate with relatively
little capital, or (ii) neglect entirely the social costs of failure, including the loss of output
when financial institutions are distressed, thereby holding less capital. It is therefore not
surprising that the unremitting question posed by bank regulators is “how much capital
is enough?”
Chapter 2 of this thesis will provide a review both of relevant literature, and also
of the institutional arrangements for bank capital regulation. This thesis is concerned
with understanding bank capital management decisions under Basel I, the regulatory
framework that has applied for all periods of observation studied. Traditionally, literature
analyzing bank capital decisions has focused on assessing the effects of minimum capital
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requirements on bank risk. The usual assumption is that bank capital is exogenous and
therefore determined by regulatory requirements. In this framework, banks will never
have an incentive to hold capital in excess of the regulatory minimum. This study takes
on a different view, a capital buffer view. That is, the endogenous role of bank capital is
acknowledged, and it is assumed that a bank will identify an internally optimal amount
of capital to target in the long run. The target amount of capital will be determined as
a trade-off of both implicit and explicit costs associated with a breach of regulation. In
this context, this thesis empirically tests several predictions of the capital buffer theory
outlined in Section 2.2. From here on, a capital buffer is defined as an amount of capital
held in excess of the regulatory required minimum.
Several studies that have provided evidence in favor of the capital buffer view show
that in practice, banks hold far more capital than regulation requires.1 Several reasons
have been suggested as to why a bank may chose to hold excess capital (see for example
Marcus, 1984; Berger et al., 1995; Jackson, 1999; Milne and Whalley, 2001; Milne, 2004;
Berger et al. (2008)). First, if banks have something to lose (eg. a large enough charter
value) then they may voluntarily hold a capital buffer as protection by reducing the
probability of failure. A banks charter value is defined as the net present value of future
cash flows that a bank earns when it stays in business. Since the charter value would be
lost in the case of failure, the charter value can be thought of the banks internal cost of
failure. Therefore, banks without a sufficiently valuable charter are no longer concerned
with future earnings and therefore have no incentive to hold capital as a protection.
Second, banks may hold excess capital to signal soundness to the market as a means to
obtain funds quickly and at a lower rate of interest in the event of unexpected profitable
investment opportunities. This is commonly referred to as the market discipline argument
for holding capital. Third, under asymmetric information, raising equity capital could be
interpreted as a negative signal about the banks value. Myers and Majluf (1984) contend
that the need to issue external equity sends a negative signal to investors to the effect that
the firm does not have sufficient cash or debt capacity to take up opportunities as they
appear. While their argument is applied to non-financial institutions, the same argument
should apply to banks, particularly due to the opaqueness of bank activities. A breach
of regulation triggers costly supervisory actions, possibly even leading to bank closure.
By holding excess capital, banks’ essentially insure themselves against costs related to
market discipline or supervisory intervention in the event of a breach of the requirements.
This incentive to hold additional capital increases with the probability of breaching the
regulatory minimum.
Despite the incentives that exist for banks to hold a buffer of capital, it is also very
costly to raise capital particularly when compared to raising insured deposits. The trade-
off between the cost of a breach of regulation and the cost of holding additional capital
will determine the optimum capital buffer (Marcus, 1984; Milne and Whalley 2001).
To summarize, the capital buffer of a bank serves as a cushion with which banks are
able to absorb costly unexpected shocks. This is particularly true if the financial distress
1See for example Flannery and Rangan (1997), Peura and Jokivuolle (2004) Barth et al. (2004), and
Berger et al. (2008), Brewer III et al. (2008).
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costs from low capital and the costs of accessing new capital are high. The incentive to
hold a capital buffer is even stronger in a dynamic multiperiod setting. Here, if adjustment
costs that prevent banks from altering either capital or risk exist, then a large enough
buffer, capable of absorbing several successive negative shocks, is required (Marcus, 1984;
Milne and Whalley, 2001).
Historically, two contending approaches to regulatory capital assessment have been
adopted. The first, more traditional approach, that was adopted in the US prior to the
introduction of Basel I in the 1990s, relies largely on banker and supervisor judgment,
resisting the need for specific numerical definitions of capital adequacy. This line of
thinking is based on the notion that each bank is unique in its risk structure. The
second, more modern approach, places far more emphasis on legislation drawn out in part
from lessons learnt during banking crises. This methodology imposes precise numerical
minimum capital standards on internationally active banking institutions as per Basel I.
Basel II, the new bank capital regulation set to replace the existing accord (Basel I2),
combines the traditional and modern approaches. Embedded within the structure of Basel
II are the numerical minimum capital requirements imposed via Basel I. The fundamental
difference between Basel I and Basel II is a structural change that emphasizes the range of
capital that may be required given the specific risks faced by each bank. Several important
rationales exist to explain the amendment of the regulatory framework. These include
pressure from banks for lower, more efficient regulatory capital requirements that align
better with their own assessments of risk. Moreover, quantitative risk modeling within
banks has grown significantly, increasing the desire of banks to have one system for risk
assessment. Basel I and its successor Basel II are reviewed in detail in Section 2.3.
European banks have already adopted the new rules while implementation in the
United States (US) is slightly lagging. Large banks in the US started implementing the
new regulation only in 2009.3
Concerns regarding the new regulation have however been voiced, in particular relating
to the broader economic effects resulting from its implementation (see for example Benink
et al., 2008). Since one of the primary aims of Basel II is to create a closer link between
capital and risks, the requirements have the potential to become more dependent economic
conditions.
In addition, it has been noted that a more risk sensitive capital adequacy regula-
tion may reduce a banks willingness to take risk or engage in transactions with riskier
counterparties particularly during adverse economic conditions. This in part is due to
the increased involvement of rating agencies in regulation but also due to greater trans-
parency through reporting and disclosure requirements. However, if banks already risk
adjust their total capital, i.e. minimum capital plus buffer capital, more than implied by
2The first Basel Committee consultative document, A New Capital Adequacy Framework, was issued
on June 3, 1999, and the second consultative document, The New Basel Capital accord, was issued in
January 2001. The documents are available through the website for the Bank for International Settlements
at www.bis.org.
3Small banks will not be required to comply with Basel II for several reasons. One view is that Basel
II would interfere with the existing FIDICIA legislation and prompt correctative action. In addition, it is
felt that compliance with Basel II would place them at a competitive disadvantage when compared with
larger rivals.
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Basel I, then replacing Basel I with Basel II may not affect the capital to asset ratio or
risk profile of banks portfolio as much as feared.
The research chapters of this study assess several outstanding issues by empirically
testing some of the main findings of the capital buffer theory introduced in Section 2.2.
The first of these, Chapter 3, examines the cyclical behavior of European bank capital
buffers. In particular, addressing the following question: “Do bank capital buffers vary
cyclically?” Our findings indicate that capital buffers move counter cyclically. Under the
Basel I regime, capital requirements remained constant over the cycle. Under Basel II
however, risk weights, and thus the capital requirements will fluctuate, increasing during
a cyclical downturn when bank exposures are downgraded by external agencies or internal
rating systems. Our findings therefore suggest that capital management will be especially
challenging under the new accord since it will lead to higher capital requirements precisely
at the time (the trough of the business cycle) when it is costly and difficult to access
capital.
The remaining research chapters of the thesis focus on United States (US) bank holding
company (BHC) and commercial bank balance sheet data. There are several reasons for
considering US data rather than European data as per Chapter 3. First, all insured
commercial banks have been required to submit Consolidated Report of Condition and
Income statements (Call reports) to the Fed since as far back as 1976 on a quarterly basis,
providing a rich cross section as well as time series dimension. Such detailed information
is not available as as far back for European banks. In addition, data on BHC Fed Funds
Y-9 reports provide balance sheet and income statement information on bank holding
companies, providing a tool for obtaining market data for our sample of publicly traded
banks. We make use of both the commercial bank and the holding company data so as
to extract as much information as possible for our estimations since commercial banks
report with fewer missing observations for variables employed as controls. Identifying the
high holder to which the commercial bank belongs allows us to merge these two data sets.
Appendices 4&5B explain the construction of the panel sample used in Chapters 4 and 5
of this thesis.
Chapter 4 specifically explores the long run relationship between bank capital buffers
and charter values. The aim of chapter 4 is to determine whether charter value plays a
significant disciplining role in bank capital management. In particular we ask: “At what
point does the expected loss from charter value outweigh the potential gain from deposit
insurance?” Our findings suggest that a high charter in itself does have a significant
disciplining effect on bank capital management. Banks appear to manage capital in such
a way so as to protect their valuable charter. Only once their charter value has fallen
below a certain threshold do banks change their behavior and become significantly more
risk loving. This finding is in line with concerns highlighted with regard to the market
disciplining effect that increased disclosure requirements will have. Since the finding
indicates that banks have already identified a natural disciplining effect which dictates
capital management and risk taking, it remains to be seen how the third pillar will affect
this disciplining mechanism.
The final research chapter, Chapter 5, addresses the following question: “How do short
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term adjustments in capital and risk affect each other?” Our results identify a two way
positive and significant relationship between the capital buffer and risk adjustments over
the 20 year sample period. Moreover, we show that the management of such adjustments
is dependent on the degree of bank capitalization. These findings have implications for
the changing regulatory framework in the US. The positive relationship between capital
and risk adjustments suggest that introducing a more risk sensitive capital regulation is
likely to affect US bank holding companies to a smaller extent than if capital were exoge-
nous as assumed in the more traditional literature. Essentially, what we see is that BHCs
do account for their risk when making capital buffer decisions. Our findings are in line
with the hypothesis that financial institutions throughout the world have been developing
frameworks for ‘economic capital management’ in response to the diversification of bank-
ing businesses, rapid progress in financial engineering, and the implementation of Basel
II. The objective has been to develop precise measures of the various risks that financial
institutions are exposed to, and to actively utilize such assessments in determining capital
adequacy and in formulating business strategies.






This chapter provides some of the background material necessary for reading the ana-
lytical chapters that follow. This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 provides a
review of the related literature. We start by briefly discussing the main differences that
exist between financial and non-financial firms. Section 2.1.1 discusses moral hazard in
banking and some of the associated literature in this field. Section 2.1.2 introduces bank
capital regulation and outlines research undertaken in this regard. Section 2.2 provides a
short discussion of the theory of bank capital buffers, which will subsequently be inves-
tigated empirically in the latter chapters of this thesis. Finally, Section 2.3 details the
regulation of bank capital, explaining differences between the Basel I and Basel II Ac-
cords, together with varying implementations of the regulations at an individual country
level.
2.1 Literature Review
The capital structure of a firm relates to the way in which a corporation finances its assets
through some combination of equity, debt, or hybrid securities. A firm’s capital structure
can thus be thought of as the structure of its liabilities.
The Modigliani-Miller1 theorem forms the basis for capital structure analysis, even if
it is generally viewed as a purely theoretical result since it assumes away many important
factors of capital structure decisions.2 The theorem states that in the absence of market
imperfections, the value of any firm is unaffected by how that firm is financed. This
theorem provides the foundation with which to assess why a company’s value is affected
by the capital structure it employs. If capital structure is irrelevant in a perfect market,
then imperfections which exist in the real world must be the cause of its relevance.
Subsequent research has dealt with understanding consequences of various deviations
from the conditions on which the Modigliani-Miller theorem is based with a view to
understanding the corporate structure decisions of firms. No single universal theory of
capital structure however exists, and, according to Myers (2001), there is no reason to
expect one. Rather, four contending conditional theories have been put forward to explain
1Modigliani and Miller (1958).
2These ‘other reasons’ include bankruptcy costs, agency costs and asymmetric information.
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corporate structure choices: the trade-off theory ; agency theory ; pecking order theory ; and
the theory of market timing.3
With regard to the determinants of capital structures of financial firms, until recently,
the standard view has been that no apparent need to investigate financing decisions exists.
This is partly due to the fact that capital regulation constitutes the overriding departure
from the Modigliani and Miller propositions:
“Banks also hold capital because they are required to do so by regulatory authorities. Be-
cause of the high costs of holding capital [...], bank managers often want to hold less bank
capital than is required by the regulatory authorities. In this case, the amount of bank
capital is determined by the bank capital requirements (Mishkin, 2000, p.227).”
This viewpoint, that the capital decision of a bank is exogenous is however, inconsis-
tent with the observation that almost all banks, all the time, hold a capital buffer. The
question whether capital requirements really play such a key role, since they are rarely
binding, therefore still remains. The research reported in this thesis helps to provide
some answers regarding the determinants of regulatory bank capital buffers, and how
they influence bank decisions.
2.1.1 Financial Firms
Financial vs. Non-Financial Firms
Financial firms have much in common with non-financial firms. They aim to maximize
profitability through the varying internal and external constraints placed on them, they
are faced with competition and hence the need to remain innovative to thrive in the market
place, and ultimately, they look to expand their business rapidly over time. If they are
publicly traded, they are judged by the total return they make for their stockholders, in
the same way other non-financial firms are.
Despite these similarities, several key differences between financial and non-financial
firms do exist. When we refer to capital for non-financial firms, we tend to refer to both
debt and equity. A firm raises funds from both equity investors and bond holders (and
banks) and uses these funds to make its investments. When we value a non-financial firm,
we consider the value of the assets owned by the firm, rather than just the value of its
equity. With a financial firm on the other hand, debt has a slightly different connotation.
Rather than viewing debt as a source of capital, financial firms view it as a kind of
raw material, something to be molded into other financial products which can then be
sold at a higher price to yield a profit. Consequently, capital in financial firms is more
narrowly defined, including only equity capital. This definition of capital is reinforced by
the regulatory authorities who evaluate the equity capital ratios of banks and insurance
firms.
Although banks have a slightly varied and unique capital structure whereby equity
capital is levered with demandable debt that is part of the economy’s payments system,
financial firms differ from non-financial firms in that they are far more regulated than
firms in any other industry. In general, these regulations take three forms. First, banks
3See Harris and Raviv, 1991 for a thorough analysis of these issues.
22
and insurance companies are required to maintain capital ratios to ensure that they do
not expand beyond their means and consequently put their claim holders or depositors at
risk. Second, financial firms are often constrained in terms of where they can invest their
funds. For instance, the Glass-Steagall Act in the United States separated commercial
banks from investment banking activities and restricted them from taking active equity
positions in manufacturing firms. Third, the entry of new financial firms into the business
is often restricted by regulatory authorities, as are mergers between existing financial
firms.
If financial markets are assumed to be complete and depositors are perfectly informed
about the failure risk of banks, then, similarly to non-financial firms, the Modigliani and
Miller (1958) theory applies. This, however, requires that the possibility of shareholders to
exploit depositors is removed. To illustrate this problem in a banking context, we assume
that managers act in the interest of its shareholders, who seek to maximize share value.
As banks are corporations, the owners’ liability is limited to their investment, meaning
that the shareholders’ loss is limited, but a gain greater than the fixed amount owed
to depositors fully falls to them. Due to the shareholders’ convex payoff function, banks
prefer risky to safe investments. This phenomenon is further highlighted within the option
pricing framework. The payoff of equity can be interpreted as the payoff of a call option on
the bank value with a strike price of the same value as the obligation towards depositors.
However, if depositors are perfectly informed about the bank’s investment strategies, they
will demand deposit rates which fully reflect the bank’s risk profile. Hence, shareholders
cannot exploit their controlling position, and maximizing the share value is equivalent
to the maximization of the bank’s total value. Thus, the value maximizing portfolio is
always chosen, and the market value of a bank is independent of its capital structure. In
this framework, banks would always choose socially optimal risk levels and, hence, there
would be no need for regulation.
Some authors have shown that the Modigliani-Miller theorem is however, not appli-
cable to banks (Sealey, 1985). In a world with complete markets and in the absence of
any frictions, there would not be a need for financial intermediaries. Information theories
suggest that a primary rationale for the existence of banks is that they have an informa-
tion advantage in monitoring firms (see Diamond, 1984). This information advantage of
banks gives rise to moral hazard.
Moral Hazard in Banking
Despite being a highly regulated industry, banking sector institutions are subject to the
same type of agency costs as firms in any other industry. Since banks play a crucial role in
providing credit to non-financial firms, in transmitting the effects of monetary policy, and
in providing stability to the economy as a whole, the agency problem has been repeatedly
addressed in the banking literature (Allen and Cebenoyan, 1991; Dewatripont and Tirole,
1994; Gorton and Rosen, 1995). While many authors have assumed that the moral hazard
problem affects banks in much the same way than non-financial firms, agency costs can
in fact be particularly high for banks since they are informationally opaque. A core
function of a bank is to hold information on their customers and other counterparties,
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as well as to monitor ongoing lending relationships. Without information asymmetries,
households would invest their entire savings directly through mutual funds rendering
banks unnecessary. It is therefore not possible to have banking with full transparency
(see Goodhart, 1988). As a result, depositors lack necessary information to fully assess
the riskiness of bank portfolios, and are unable to efficiently monitor and discipline banks.
Together with government deposit insurance and other safety net protections such
as government bailout schemes, asymmetric information may increase incentives for risk
shifting or lax risk management. This moral hazard problem, whereby banks view them-
selves as partly insulated from risk and will therefore not fully account for the negative
consequences in its actions, has been well documented in the banking literature (Kane,
1989; Barth, 1991; Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., 2004; Gropp et al., 2004; Erlend and Baumann,
2006). Here, depositors are unable to fully observe bank actions since interest rates do not
adequately reflect the probability of failure, giving banks the incentive to increase leverage
and risk. Similarly under deposit insurance where depositors are free from risk by de-
positing funds in a bank, their pay-off is independent of the riskiness of bank assets. The
incentive to monitor the bank is therefore removed. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2005)
explain how deposit insurance works to reduce the incentives of depositors to monitor
banks since part of their capital is protected. An extensive body of empirical literature
has confirmed the adverse incentive effects of deposit insurance (see for example Thies
and Gerlowski, 1989; Wheelock, 1992; Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache, 2000; Ioannidou
et al., 2008).
Moral hazard concerns are particularly high for larger banks, since to a greater extent
than their smaller counterparts, they are covered by the various government safety net
protections. In the event of difficulties, large, systemically important banks may expect
a greater degree of support from the government than small banks since a failure of a
large bank has the potential to create wide spread disruption in the economy. The moral
hazard problem can however be mitigated in banks with high prospects for future gains.
In banks with higher charter values, owners and managerial interests become most closely
aligned since both have much to lose if a risky business strategy leads to insolvency. In
this setting, high charter value banks act more prudently in order to protect the valuable
charter (see Marcus 1984, Keeley 1990, Demsetz et al. 1997, Galloway et al., 1997; Boot
and Greenbaum 1993; Hellman et al. 2000; Matutes and Vives 2000; Gonz‘alez, 2005;
Park and Peristiani, 2007).
Bank Capital Regulation
In order to offset risk increasing incentives, bank regulators directly affect capital struc-
ture by setting minimums for equity capital and other types of regulatory capital (Rochet,
1992; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). A growing body of theoretical work has focused
on assessing the effects of capital requirements both on bank capital as well as on their
risk appetite. Traditionally, a theory of moral hazard has dominated in which infor-
mation asymmetries and deposit insurance shield banks from the disciplining control of
depositors.
Studies assessing conditions, or regulatory set ups, that act to eliminate moral hazard
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in banking have considered the capital decision of a bank as being exogenous. Abstracting
from dividend and recapitalization preferences, this strand of literature analyzes incen-
tives in asset risk choice. Several studies have found that although capital adequacy
regulation may reduce the total volume of risky assets, the composition may be distorted
in the direction of more risky assets, and average risk may increase. Risk consistent
weights here are not sufficient to correct for this moral hazard effect in the limited lia-
bility of banks (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992;
and Freixas and Rochet, 1997). While the literature in this field tends to agree on the
fact that the probability of failure is excessively high due to adverse incentive effects of
mispriced deposit insurance, or the safety net in general, what is less clear is whether
capital regulation is effective in reducing the moral hazard problem. One set of authors
question the need for capital regulation if the correct pricing of deposit insurance can
eliminate moral hazard (Gennotte and Pyle, 1991 and Giammarino et al., 1993).
In a moral hazard framework, banks will never have an incentive to hold excess cap-
ital. In practice, however, banks may not be able to instantaneously adjust capital or
risk due either to adjustment costs, or illiquid markets. They therefore hold substantially
more capital than that required of them (Keeley, 1990). Furthermore, under asymmetric
information, raising equity capital could be interpreted as a negative signal with regard to
the bank’s value (Myers and Majluf, 1984), rendering banks unable or reluctant to react
to negative capital shocks instantaneously. However, a breach of the regulation triggers
costly supervisory actions, possibly even leading to the bank’s closure. Hence banks have
an incentive to hold more excess capital as an insurance against a breach of regulation.
This incentive increases with the probability of breaching the regulatory minimum and,
with the volatility of the capital ratio. The trade-off between costs associated with re-
capitalization and consequences of a breach of regulation determines the optimum capital
buffer (Marcus, 1984; Milne and Whalley, 2001; Brewer III et al., 2008).
The Contribution of this Study
The work undertaken in this study focuses on empirically testing various aspects of the
capital buffer theory (for statements of this theory see among others Milne and Whalley,
2001; Peura and Keppo, 2006; VanHoose, 2007). Analyzing bank capital decisions under
the Basel I regulatory framework, we contribute to the literature by providing empirical
analysis and evidence on a number of varying issues. In particular, we assess how, under
strict regulatory requirements, banks choose their internally optimal capital buffers. We
start by analyzing how these buffers have varied with the cycle over time in order to
contribute to the procyclicality debate of the Basel II rules. We additionally explore
the long run relationship between the capital buffer and the charter value of the bank,
focusing in particular on testing how capital buffers are managed as charter values change.
Finally, we assess the relationship between short term adjustments to capital and risk to
understand the interaction of capital and risk in bank capital management decisions.
While we acknowledge that in light of the current financial crisis these relationships have
the potential to become more complex in the future, the work undertaken here does
provide some evidence as to how banks managed capital in the run up to the crisis and
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what relationships between important variables looked like at this time.
2.2 The Theory
The empirical estimations in this study are based on the continuous time capital structure
trade-off model of Milne and Robertson (1996) with the assumption that regulators engage
in a Poisson audit, as in Merton (1977) and Marcus (1984). Moreover, if regulators
discover a breach of capital regulations during an audit, they require undercapitalized
banks either to issue new capital or to close down. The incentive based view of bank
capital regulation, developed in Milne and Whalley (2001), views the capital decision as
an endogenous response to the imposition of bank capital regulations.
The trade-off between costs of recapitalization and consequences of breaching the
regulatory minimum is the driving force behind the target level of buffer capital chosen
by the bank. The capital buffer therefore serves as a capital cushion, protecting against
negative unexpected shocks to the system.
The amount of non-tradable assets a bank holds at time t is a fixed amount A. The
capital of the bank is denoted by C and can be thought of as its book equity or net
worth. The balance of financing the holding of A is achieved by raising zero cost short
term deposits given by: D = A− C. Changes in bank capital can then be written as:
dC = (RA− θ)dt + σdz = −dD (2.1)
where RA is the constant expected cash flow generated by A per unit time; θ is the divi-
dend paid to the shareholder; σ ∈ [σ1, σ2] is a choice the bank faces over the uncertainty
of cash flows. The value of the bank to its shareholders, or the market value of the banks
shares, is then given by:








here ρ denotes the discount factor, as well as the cost of equity relative to debt since
depositors are unremunerated.
Regulation occurs at random intervals as per Merton (1978). Auditors are interested
in the level of C compared to the required minimum Cˆ. If Cˆ > C, then the bank must
decide whether to recapitalize at the cost of x + ∆C (where x denotes the fixed cost of
recapitalization) or to liquidate. In the case of liquidation, debt holders are repaid in full
from deposit insurance, and shareholders receive nothing.
This is a problem of dynamic stochastic optimization with analytical solutions. Appli-
cation of standard techniques shows that the value function satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman differential equation, or equation of optimality:
if C > Cˆ :
ρV = max
θ,σ∈[σ1,σ2]




if Cˆ ≥ C :
ρV = max
θ,σ∈[σ1,σ2]





{V (DeltaC + C)−∆C − x}, 0)− V (C)]
(2.4)
As long as the bank’s capital level C stays above the required minimum level, it
continues to chose θ and σ so as to maximize current dividends to shareholders as well as
the instantaneous capital gain [(RA− θ)VC + 12σ2VCC ]. If the bank breaches regulatory
requirements and the breach is noted during a random audit, the bank faces the choice of
recapitalization or liquidation. Recapitalization ∆C is optimal if the gain in shareholder
value, V (∆C + C)− V (C), is greater than the cost of recapitalization ∆C + x.
The most important findings of the model can be summarized as follows:
2.2.1 Cyclicality of Capital Buffers
The theoretical model outlined above predicts that risk taking will be positively related
to the level of capital held. If banks have a greater level of asset risk, then they will hold
a higher level of capital to insure themselves against breaching the minimum capital re-
quirements. As loans are traditionally the most important bank asset category, so credit
risk will be one of the key drivers of asset risk. Therefore, since credit risk is strongly
related to the business cycle, the capital buffers of banks will fluctuate cyclically. Despite
theory indicating a probable relationship between capital buffers and the business cycle,
the direction remains ambiguous and therefore incomplete. In Chapter 3, we empirically
test the following hypotheses in this regard:
H0 : Under the Basel I Accord, business cycle fluctuations do not have an
impact on the capital buffers of European banks;
against two alternatives:
H1a : Capital buffers move positively with the business cycle i.e. banks
tend to increase capital in business cycle expansions and reduce capital in
recessions;
and
H2a : Capital buffers move negatively with the business cycle i.e. banks
tend to reduce capital in business cycle expansions and increase capital in
recessions.
These descriptive hypotheses are consistent with a number of different underlying
structural models of bank capital dynamics. Estrella (2004) examines the relationship
between target forward looking capital buffers and deterministic cycles of loan losses. He
finds that banks, subject to costs of capital adjustment, will build up capital buffers in
anticipation of loan losses. Since loan losses themselves tend to lag the business cycle,
this suggests that actual capital buffers will rise during cyclical downturns, i.e. negative
cyclical comovement.
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2.2.2 Capital Buffers and Charter Value
The capital buffer model highlights a central role for charter value in bank capital de-
cisions. If charter value is sufficiently high, then the bank will always wish to retain a
capital buffer to reduce the expected cost of infringing the regulatory capital requirement.
If the charter value of the bank exceeds a certain threshold, then the bank will manage
its capital in such a way as to reduce the probability of regulatory breach. The target
amount of capital the bank will choose is thus a function of risk, charter value, audit
frequency, costs associated with recapitalization together with the costs of holding equity
in relation to debt. The bank will adjust towards the target buffer level C∗ by retaining
earnings as long as C < C∗, and paying out all earnings as dividends when C = C∗. The
opposite effect is evident when the banks charter value falls below a certain threshold. In
this case, the bank is no longer concerned with future earnings and has little incentive to
maintain adequate capitalization. Such banks have low expected earnings that offer little
protection against loss of earnings. As a result such banks have a very high probability
of failure.
The relationship between charter value and desired capitalization is predicted to be
highly non linear. As long as the charter value is a degree greater than the cost of
recapitalization, a decline in expected earnings increases desired capital protection to
protect the charter value.
For a set of publicly traded US BHCs, the hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 5 can
be outlined as follows:
H0 No long run relationship between bank capital and charter value exists.
against the alternatives:
H1A: The long run relationship between capital and charter value is signif-
icantly linear. A positive linear relationship signifies that high charter value banks will
hold larger buffers of capital so as to protect the valuable charter. Alternatively a nega-
tive linear relationship indicates that banks with valuable charters have better access to
the capital markets and therefore have less need to hold a large amount of excess capital.
and
H1B : The long run relationship between capital and charter value is highly
non linear and hump shaped. For banks with high charter values, the optimum
capital buffer increases as the charter value decreases. Only if the charter value falls close
to the cost of recapitalization is the relationship reversed.
2.2.3 Capital Buffer and Risk Adjustments
The buffer theory of capital further predicts that a bank approaching the regulatory
minimum may have an incentive to increase its capital and reduce risk to avoid the
regulatory costs triggered by a breach of the capital requirements. Essentially, the model
predicts that adjustments in capital buffers and asset risk are positively (negatively)
related for banks with larger (smaller) than average capital buffers. Moreover, banks
with small (large) capital buffers will adjust their capital faster (slower). Similarly banks
with small (large) capital buffers will adjust their risk levels faster (slower).
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Furthermore, with unremunerated deposits4, the desired amount of excess capital is
invariant to the capital requirement. It is rather the buffer of free capital over and above
the regulatory minimum that determines bank attitude towards risk. Once capital has
been built up towards the target level, changes in capital requirements will have no impact
on bank behavior. Moreover, incentives for risk taking tend to be reduced, as leverage
is increased. However, once the bank is close to insolvency there is a marked increase in
incentive for risk taking (gambling for resurrection). The hypotheses tested in Chapter 4
are given as:
H0: Short term adjustments in both the capital buffer and bank risk have
no impact on one another, and the speeds of adjustment are equal for banks
with large and small capital buffers respectively.
against two alternatives:
H1A : Short term adjustments in the capital buffer and risk are positively
related for banks with large capital buffers. This hypothesis is in line with
the theory that well capitalized banks will maintain healthy cushion of excess
capital over time.
and
H1B :Short term adjustments in the capital buffer varies systematically, but
negatively, with adjustments in risk ie. riskier banks will hold less capital in
their buffer stock. This hypothesis is in line with the notion that banks with
capital near the regulatory minimum will try to build up their excess capital
over time.
2.3 Bank Regulation
The combination of the general instability of banking institutions, their complex web
of interconnections; together with their important facilitating role in the economy, has
led the banking sector to become a thoroughly regulated industry. Various different in-
struments have been adopted for the regulation of the banking sector, and can broadly
be characterized by the following: the government safety net, restrictions on asset hold-
ings, capital requirements, chartering and bank examination, disclosure requirements,
consumer protection and restrictions on competition.
Capital regulation has become one of the key instruments of modern banking regu-
lation with the aim of providing both a buffer during adverse economic conditions, as
well as a mechanism aimed at preventing excessive risk taking ex ante (see Rochet, 1992;
Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993). Broadly speaking, a bank has only two distinct means
to finance its operations; either through the use of borrowed money or alternatively, it
can make use of funds provided by its owners. Borrowings (including deposits) generate
contractual liabilities, which, if not paid when due, can result in bank failure. On the
contrary, the owners’ investments can either gain or lose value without causing the bank
to default on its obligations. Thus, all other things being equal, the greater the proportion
of a bank’s operations that are financed with capital funds contributed by its owners, the
higher the chance that the bank will continue to be able to pay its obligations during
4Deposits that earn low returns.
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periods of economic adversity. This simple reasoning is the basis for the longstanding
emphasis that bank supervisors have placed on capital adequacy as a key element of bank
safety and soundness.
With the intention of indirectly affecting capital structure by reducing the relative
amount of debt, capital regulation requires that banks hold an amount of capital de-
pendent on both the quantity and the quality of its assets. The ideology stems from
a combination of the legal construction of limited liability together with an important
incentive feature of debt finance. The concept of limited liability implies that cash flows
can not become negative, as debt remaining after all assets have been liquidated and
all outstanding debt repaid as far as possible, will be forgiven.5 In a largely leveraged
firm, owners are able to reap the gains of success while shifting losses to the lenders
via limited liability. Consequently, incentives for risk taking beyond Pareto optimality
are significantly increased.6 Since banks often have capital structures with substantial
amounts of debt, the possibility of such risk shifting behavior in this sector is particularly
problematic.
2.3.1 Basel I
The regulation, as implemented by the Basel Accord of 1988, applies to all internationally
active banks. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was established at the end
of 1974 to provide a forum for banking supervisory matters.
Although the Basel Committee is not a formal regulatory authority in itself, it has
great influence over the supervising authorities in many countries. The hope is that by
agreeing basic goals, the Committee can achieve common approaches and standards across
many member countries, without attempting detailed harmonization of each member
country’s supervisory techniques. In 1988, recognizing the emergence of larger more global
financial services companies, the Committee introduced the Basel Capital Accord (Basel
I). This sought to strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking
system by requiring higher capital ratios.
Since 1988, the Basel I framework has been progressively introduced not only in mem-
ber countries but also in virtually all other countries with active international banks. In
June 1999, the Committee issued a proposal for a new Capital Adequacy Framework to
replace Basel I. Following extensive communication with banks and industry groups, the
revised framework was issued on 26th June 2004 and is known as Basel II.
The Rules
Over 100 countries to date have adopted the rules, most of which additionally require
locally active banks to adhere to them. Under Basel I, the capital adequacy ratio is equal
to eight percent of the banks risk weighted assets, and acts as an indicator of the banks
ability to absorb losses. The numerator of the ratio comprises total capital which is a
combination of tier one and tier two capital. Tier one capital refers to the banks core
capital, including equity and disclosed reserves and can absorb losses without a bank
5See Eichberger and Harper (1997).
6For a more detailed discussion of the risk shifting phenomenon in banking and the role of capital
requirement regulation in mitigating this, see Greenbaum and Thakor (1995); and Keely (1990).
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being required to cease trading. The ratio of the banks’ tier one capital to risk weighted
assets should be no less than four percent. Tier two capital on the other hand relates
to secondary bank capital, and includes items such as undisclosed reserves, general loss
reserves and subordinated term debt. Tier two capital can absorb losses in the event of a
winding up and so provides a lesser degree of protection for depositors. The denominator
of the ratio is obtained by multiplying assets by a predefined weighting coefficient.7
The capital regulation rules, as outlined above, are a minimum to be implemented
by the individual supervisory authorities with the aim of creating a level playing field
for market operatives, as well as for ensuring a sound and stable financial environment.
Several of the supervisory authorities acting in the countries included in our study have,
for various reasons, either set capital ratios above those recommended by the accord, or,
alternatively, supplemented the rules with a range of additional requirements outlined
below.
2.3.2 Europe
All European countries have chosen to implement the Basel I minimum of eight percent as
the requirement for internationally active banks. However, in addition to this, as discussed
below, several countries have supplemented these rules with alternative measures to ensure
soundness and stability. All measures are outlined in Table 2.1.
Spain
In Spain, due to the concern of the Banco de Espanˇa regarding the ability of Spanish
banks to keep up with potential credit losses latent in the expansion of lending activity,
capital requirement regulations were supplemented in June 2000 by a dynamic provision-
ing system. The idea of the provisioning was based on the notion that funds are set
against loans outstanding in each accounting time period, in line with an estimate of
expected long run losses. Essentially, banks will build up a provision during a cyclical
upturn which is subsequently drawn from during a recession, or cyclical downturn. The
provision will increase when actual losses for one year are lower than expected, and is
used against specific provisions in years when losses are higher than expected. The pro-
visioning system therefore acts to smooth out cyclicality impacts of specific provisions
on the profit and loss account. The statistical provision is calculated using a bank’s own
internal method8, or alternatively, via a standard method recommended by the Banco de
Espanˇa. The standard method classifies exposures into six different categories depend-
ing on their degree of riskiness. Each category is allocated a weight coefficient.9 The
total provision is then equal to the sum of the requirements for all six categories. It is
therefore unsurprising, that the capital buffers of Spanish banks have remained relatively
unchanged (around 3.6 percent) since the implementation of the dynamic provisioning in
June 2000.
7Under the Basel I accord, four risk buckets are set: 0 percent for claims on central governments; 20
percent for claims on other banks; 50 percent for loans secured by residential property and 100 percent
for claims on private sector.
8The regulator must verify that the model adopted characterizes a suitable means to measure and
manage credit risk.
9The coefficients range from zero, for zero risk exposures, to 1.5, for high risk exposures.
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United Kingdom
In addition to the basic requirements set out by the Basel Accord, the UK Financial
Services Authority (FSA) has implemented various additional requirements to assure the
safety and soundness of its banking sector. First, the FSA sets two separate requirements
for each bank: a ‘trigger ratio’ and a ‘higher target ratio’. The trigger ratio serves as a
minimum ratio which will generate regulatory intervention if breached. The ‘target ratio’
serves as a warning signal and as a cushion of capital acting to prevent the accidental
breach of the trigger ratio. The gap between the target and the trigger ratio acts as a
buffer in that regulatory pressure is exerted when the capital ratio falls below the target
but drastic regulatory action is only enforced in the event of a breach of the trigger ratio.
These ratios are bank specific and are based on the supervisor’s perception of the degree
of riskiness of the banking institution. Banks deemed by the supervisor to be more (less)
risky is required to hold higher (lower) levels of capital. Consequently, most UK banks
are required to hold capital in excess of those specified by the Basel Accord. For the
purpose of our estimations, we calculate the capital buffer for UK banks based on an
assumed nine percent minimum, since we are unable to obtain individual bank specific
requirement data.
Recently Acceded Member States (RAMS)10
Banking policy for developing or transition economies generally tends to differ from that
adopted for more developed markets. Since a stable financial system is vital for eco-
nomic growth, the key questions for policy makers in this context relate to the specific
methods of bank regulation and supervision that can promote more efficient and robust
financial systems. Considering the varying degrees of development as well as the distinct
differences that exist between the RAM economies in terms of banking sector structures,
it is unsurprising that the minimum capital adequacy ratio required of financial market
operatives has varied across countries throughout our sample period.
Table 2.1 highlights the minimum ratios adopted in each of the RAM countries. In
Estonia and Cyprus, regulatory capital ratios were tightened from eight to ten percent
of risk weighted assets to account for changes in market structure. In 1997, the Estonian
authorities cited rapid growth of banks assets and changes in their operational environ-
ment as the main reasons for Estonias higher regulatory ratio. In 2001, Cyprus raised its
capital adequacy ratio to account for the increase in securities market activity. Latvia
and Lithuania on the other hand both reduced their required ratios from ten to eight
percent effective from January 2005.11
In Poland, while banks are required to hold no more than the eight percent regulatory
minimum, 15 percent is the requisite ratio for banks in their first year of operation, and
12.5 percent in the second year.
10We define the RAM10 as the ten accession countries that joined the European Union (EU) in 2004.
Countries included are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovenia and Slovakia.
11The ten percent regulatory minimum continues to be effective for AB VB Mortgage Bank in Lithuania.
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2.3.3 United States
Prior to the 1980s, US banks were not subject to specific numerical standards imposed
by regulators. Rather, banker and supervisory judgment was exercised such that the
circumstances of the individual institution were considered. To this effect, important
factors such as managerial capability, loan portfolio quality and adherence to fixed ratios
were considered as arbitrary rules that did not always account for the most important
factors.
Only after the worldwide recession in 1981 did Federal banking agencies across the US
impose explicit numerical regulatory requirements for banks. These measures were further
amended shortly after the initial requirements were imposed. In 1985, the International
Lending and Supervision Act (ILSA) required that all banks hold a primary capital
(consisting mainly of equity and loan loss reserves) ratio of 5.5 percent of assets, while the
total amount of primary plus secondary (primarily qualifying subordinated debentures)
capital had to exceed six percent of assets. Moreover, any bank operating with less than
three percent of primary capital to assets were deemed unsafe and were subject to comply
with enforcement actions. For the first time, capital was viewed as a cushion for absorbing
shocks, as a means to signal strength and soundness to investors as well as to support
overall banking sector growth and stability.
In 1986, regulators however became concerned that the regulations imposed failed to
distinguish between different types of risks. It was therefore felt that the rules did not
provide an accurate measure of risk exposures associated with modern banking activities.
Finally then, in 1988, regulators in the Group of Ten countries (G-10) agreed upon a new
legislation that appeared to capture all risks associated with banking activity. The new
Basel Capital Accord was adopted and implemented in the US in 1992. It affected both
tier one as well as total capital and was able to capture both on and off balance sheet
risks by weighting items based on their perceived riskiness.
In addition to the Basel capital requirement, the US imposed an additional leverage
ratio requirement on banks. This is based on the unweighted sum of all balance sheet
assets. Five categories of bank types exist: well capitalized banks, adequately capitalized
banks; under capitalized banks; significantly under capitalized banks and critically under
capitalized banks. In order to be adequately capitalized, a bank holding company must
have a tier one capital ratio of at least four percent, a total capital ratio of at least eight
percent, and a leverage ratio of at least four percent. To be considered well capitalized, a
bank holding company must have a tier one capital ratio of at least six percent, a total
capital ratio of at least ten percent, and a leverage ratio of at least five percent. The
requirements for each category of bank is outlined in Table 2.2. These capital ratios
are reported quarterly via the Call Reports or Thrift Financial Reports. These capital
requirements are currently in force standing as the main tool in regulating the US banking
system.
2.3.4 New Rules
Since its implementation in 1988, The Basel Accord has helped to strengthen the sound-
ness and the stability of the international banking system as a result of the higher capital
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ratios that it required. However, since the Basel I capital adequacy requirements were
defined and adopted in the early 1990s, banking has become far more complex. The
initial Basel rules are therefore in the process of being reassessed and updated to better
suit current banking operations and risks inherent in assets held by banks.
While the basic methodology of limiting a bank’s risk weighted assets relative to its
capital will be retained, the primary aim of Basel II is to create a closer link between
capital requirements and risks. Basel II, combines the two historical approaches to bank
capital adequacy regulation. The new accord provides legislation for banks to closely
follow in the calculation of their capital. Numerical minimum requirements therefore
remain however, much more emphasis will be placed on the wide range of risks that can
be faced by each individual bank. The forms of banking capital were largely standardized
in the initial accord and have been left untouched in the updated version. Basel II aims to
bring the framework more in line with modern banking by becoming more risk sensitive
and representative of current risk management practices. There are several components
to the new framework. First, it is more sensitive to the risks that firms face: the new
framework includes an explicit measure for operational risk and additionally updates
the existing weightings that exist against credit risk. Second, under the standardized
approach, banks will be permitted to make use of external ratings by acknowledged ratings
agencies; introducing differing weight coefficients for counterparties distinct from the set
risk buckets defined under Basel I. Risk coefficients for enterprizes under Basel II, will
range between 20 and 150 percent depending on the risk involved.
The accord further reflects improvements in firms’ risk management practices, for
example by the introduction of the internal ratings based approach (IRB). The IRB ap-
proach will allow firms to rely, to a certain extent, on their own internal estimations of
credit risk. Risk coefficients here will be even more risk sensitive than under the stan-
dardized approach, with coefficients ranging between three and 600 percent, depending
on the perceived riskiness of the counterparty.
Main Differences: Basel I vs. Basel II
Basel II differs from its predecessor in several respects: first, the capital formula is sub-
stantially revised; second, guidelines on the supervisory review of banks’ capital adequacy
are included; and third, the concept of market discipline is implemented through updated
disclosure rules. The Basel II framework consists of three pillars detailed below:
Pillar I
Pillar I sets out the minimum capital requirements firms will be required to meet to
cover credit, market and operational risk. Pillar I of the new capital framework revises
the 1988 guidelines by aligning the minimum capital requirements more closely to each
bank’s actual risk of economic loss. First, Basel II improves the capital framework’s
sensitivity to the risk of credit losses generally by requiring higher (lower) levels of capital
for those borrowers thought to present higher (lower) levels of credit risk. Three options
are available to banks and supervisors in choosing an approach most appropriate for
the sophistication of a bank’s activities and internal controls. Under the standardized
approach, banks that engage in less complex forms of lending and credit underwriting and
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that have simpler control structures may use external measures of credit risk to assess
the credit quality of their borrowers for regulatory capital purposes. Banks that engage
in more sophisticated risk taking and that have developed advanced risk measurement
systems may, with the approval of their supervisors, select from one of two internal
ratings based (IRB) approaches. Under the IRB approach, banks rely partly on their
own measures of a borrowers’ credit risk to determine their capital requirements. This
method is subject to strict data, validation, and operational requirements. Second, the
new framework establishes an explicit capital charge for a bank’s exposure to the risk of
losses caused by failures in systems, in processes, or those that are caused by external
events such as natural disasters. Similarly to the range of options provided for assessing
exposures to credit risk, banks will choose one of three approaches for measuring their
exposures to operational risk. The approach will be agreed together with the supervisor,
such that it reflects the quality and sophistication of internal controls over this particular
risk area. By aligning capital charges more closely to a bank’s own measures of its
exposures to credit and operational risk, the Basel II framework encourages banks to
refine those measures. It also provides explicit incentives, in the form of lower capital
requirements, for banks to adopt more comprehensive and accurate measures of risk as
well as more effective processes for controlling their exposures to risk.
Pillar II
The rules under Pillar II create a new supervisory review process. This requires financial
institutions to have their own internal processes to (i) assess their capital needs; (ii)
appoint supervisors to evaluate their overall risk profile; and to (iii) ensure that adequate
capital is held. Pillar II of the new capital framework recognizes the necessity of exercising
an effective supervisory review of banks’ internal systems. In particular, the supervisory
review should assure that overall risks are adequately assessed, that bank management
exercises sound judgment and has set aside adequate capital for these risks. Supervisors
will evaluate the activities and risk profiles of individual banks to determine whether
organizations should hold capital above the minimum requirements and whether there is
any need for remedial actions. The Committee expects that, when supervisors discuss
with banks about their internal processes for measuring and managing their risks, they
will help to create implicit incentives for organizations to develop sound control structures
and to improve those processes.
Pillar III
The aim of Pillar III is to improve market discipline by requiring firms to publish certain
details of their risks, capital and management practices. Pillar III leverages the ability
of market discipline to motivate prudent management by enhancing the degree of trans-
parency in banks’ public reporting. It sets out the public disclosures that banks must
make that provide greater insight into the adequacy of their capitalization.
Basel II applies to internationally active banks. In the European Union, the new cap-
ital requirements framework has been implemented through the Capital Requirements
Directive (CRD). The CRD directly affects certain types of investment firms and all de-
posit takers (including banks and building societies). Member States were required to
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apply, the CRD from January 1, 2007. Institutions could choose between the Basic indi-
cator approach, that increases the minimum capital requirement in Basel I approach from
8% to 15%, and the Standardized Approach that evaluates the business lines as a medium
sophistication approaches of the new framework. The most sophisticated approaches, Ad-
vanced IRB approach and AMA or advanced measurement approach for operational risk
were available from the beginning of 2008. From this date, all EU have applied Basel II.
The framework under the CRD reflects the flexible structure and the major compo-
nents of Basel II. It has been based on the three pillars, but has been tailored to the
specific features of the EU market. Member States were required to apply the Directive
from the start of 2007, but the more sophisticated risk measurement approaches only
became available in 2008. The CRD is not a stand alone directive, rather it implements
the new framework by making significant changes to two existing directives: the Banking
Consolidation Directive and the Capital Adequacy Directive, both of which were based
on Basel I.
In the UK, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) is working with the Basel Com-
mittee, the EU and the banking industry to develop its policies for implementing the new
capital adequacy framework via the Capital Requirements Directive.
Several concerns regarding the new regulation have been raised. One effect of the
new rules is to give credit rating agencies an explicit role, particularly for less sophisti-
cated banks, in determining how much capital is enough. The risk associated with this
methodology is highlighted by the current crisis whereby it seems that agencies have
over estimated the creditworthiness of some asset backed securities. Moreover, Basel II
encourages banks to use instruments such as credit derivatives to transfer risks. The com-
plexity of such instruments however, lies behind the banks’ difficulty in knowing who will
ultimately bear the exposure to defaults. Its most prominent feature however is its risk
sensitivity compared to its predecessor. Much debate therefore exists relating to potential
cyclicality effects.
Moreover, Pillar III of the new framework introduces a market discipline component to
bank regulation. Under Pillar III, banks will be required to disclose to the public the new
risk based capital ratios and more extensive information about the credit quality of their
portfolios and their practices in measuring and managing risk. Regulators expect such
disclosures will make banks more transparent to financial markets, thereby improving
market discipline. However, it has been questioned whether a meaningful distinction
between disclosure and market discipline does in fact exist. It is therefore important to
understand what motivates bank capital management under Basel I (in the absence of a
Pillar III), whether it is possible to identify some internal disciplining force driving capital
and risk taking.
In addition, it has been argued that a more risk sensitive capital adequacy regulation
may impact a banks’ risk appetite via additional requirements associated with riskier
counterparties. It is therefore clearly of interest to understand the varying effect of risk
on capital buffer formation since the introduction of Basel I in the US. These questions
have important implications for competition policy, moral hazard in banking and the
overall safety and soundness of banks.
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2.A Tables
Table 2.1: Individual Country National Capital Requirements: Europe.
Minimum required ratio Year of implementation Reason for change





Cyprus 8% 2001 Changes in market structure.
Czech Republic 8% 1992











As explained in Section 2.3.2, the FSA sets additional ‘trigger’ and ‘higher target’ ratios for UK banks resulting in higher levels
of capital required by the regulators. For this reason in the study we apply a nine percent requirement to UK banks active in
the sample and calculate the buffer as capital above this level.
EU countries include Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal.
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Table 2.2: Capital Ratios for US Bank Categories
Tier one capital requirement Total capital requirement Tier one leverage requirement
Well capitalized bank ≥ 6 ≥ 10 ≥ 5
Adequately capitalized bank ≥ 4 ≥ 8 ≥ 4
Under capitalized bank < 4 < 8 < 4
Significantly under capitalized bank < 3 < 6 < 3




The Cyclical Behavior of
European Bank Capital Buffers
1
3.1 Introduction
As outlined in Section 3.3 of Chapter 2, much debate surrounding Basel II on bank
capital requirements has centered on its potential procyclicality effect. Creating a closer
link between capital requirements and risks means required capital will become largely
determined by economic conditions. In a cyclical downturn capital requirements are likely
to increase to account for increased counterparty risk. Similarly, during an economic
upturn, the amount of capital required would be reduced. Since raising capital is costly,
especially during a recession, banks might be forced to reduce their loan portfolio, so as
to meet rising capital requirements. Thus many have argued that the new accord will
make it much harder for policy makers to maintain macroeconomic stability.
The growing literature on the potential procyclicality of Basel II has largely focused
on quantifying the likely range of variation in Pillar I capital requirements through the
business cycle. In practice, well functioning banks hold capital in excess of the minimum
requirements, which will reduce the impact of Pillar I regulatory capital requirements
on loan portfolios. Moreover, the supervisory review powers granted to regulators under
Pillar II, allowing them to demand a buffer of additional capital during a business cycle
expansion, provide policy makers with a tool to counter the potential procyclicality effect
of the new accord. All this implies that the management of bank capital buffers over
the course of the business cycle will be as important, or even more important, than the
Pillar I requirements as a determinant of the cyclical impact of the new accord. With
this policy concern in mind, we investigate the cyclical behavior of bank capital buffers
of European banks, under the old Basel 1988 Accord. By “capital buffer”we mean the
amount of capital banks hold in excess of that required of them by national regulators.
The main objective of this chapter is to establish the extent of comovement between this
1This chapter has been published as Jokipii and Milne (2008). ’The cyclical behavior of European
bank capital buffers.’ Journal of Banking and Finance, 32(8): pp. 1440-1451.
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buffer and the cycle, and to determine whether such comovement is country, bank type
or bank size specific. We also analyze the impact of various cost and revenue variables
on the behavior of bank capital buffers.
Our estimation results reveal substantial differences in the cyclical behavior of capital
buffers. We find that capital buffers of RAM (ten countries that joined the EU in May
2004) banks move together with the business cycle while those of banks in the Denmark,
Sweden and the United Kingdom (DK,SE,UK) and Euro Area (EA) sub-samples exhibit
negative comovement.2 We also find additional distinctions by size and type of bank.
Capital buffers of commercial and savings banks, as well as those of larger banks have a
negative relationship with the cycle while those of co-operative banks and of smaller banks
move together with the cycle. In almost all cases we find a fairly slow speed of adjustment
towards desired capital buffers. These results provide a benchmark from which inferences
relating to the introduction of Basel II and its effect on capital buffer management can
be made. In particular, they shed some light on how capital management decisions may
need to be adjusted through Pillar II and III of Basel II in order to offset the potential
cyclical effects of the new accord.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the motivation for
holding excess capital, sets out the hypotheses we test, and describes our data including
the various controls we introduce for bank specific determinants of bank capital. Sec-
tion 3.3 presents our specification and empirical results and summarizes some robustness
checks. Finally, Section 3.4 briefly discusses the findings and concludes.
3.2 Hypotheses and Data Description
Our data, for the years 1997-2004, indicates that banks hold far more prudential capital
than that required by the regulators (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2).3 Total capital buffers (tier
one plus tier two) of banks within the EU15 vary from 1.87 percent of risk weighted assets
in Portugal to 4.79 percent in Finland with an average across the EU15 of 2.93 percent.
Buffers are also substantial in the Accession countries, ranging between 2.64 percent in
Cyprus and 6.99 in Malta. The average buffer for the RAM10 is around 5.14 percent
which is considerably larger than in the EU15.
Several reasons have been put forward to explain why banks hold excess capital (see
amongst other studies Marcus, 1984; Berger et al., 1995; Jackson, 1999; Milne and Whal-
ley, 2001; Estrella, 2004; Milne, 2004). Banks generally will tend to assess their risks
differently than regulators, for instance using their own internal economic capital mod-
els. Appropriate bank specific capital levels will therefore be set according to their own
assumptions and risk appetites.
Banks may also need to hold excess capital in order to signal soundness to the market
and satisfy the expectations of rating agencies (Jackson, 1999). These market disciplines
may lead banks to hold more capital than required by regulators. Banks may also hold
2The latter finding is broadly in line with most of the individual country studies that analyze the
determinants of excess capital and their relationship to the cycle (see among others Ediz et al., 1998;
Rime, 2001; Ayuso et al., 2004; Lindquist, 2004; Stoltz and Wedow, 2005; Francis and Osborne, 2009;
Repullo and Suarez, 2009).
3Similarly large capital buffers are also held by US and Asian banks. See for example Peura and
Jokivuolle (2004) for a tabulation of US capital buffers.
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a buffer of capital as a protection against the breach of the regulatory minimum require-
ments (Marcus, 1984; Milne and Whalley, 2001; Milne, 2004). By holding capital as a
buffer, banks insure themselves against costs arising from a supervisory intervention in
response to a breach of the requirements.
A further reason for holding a capital buffer is to take advantage of future growth
opportunities, putting banks in a position to obtain wholesale funds quickly and at a
competitive rate of interest in the event of unexpected profitable investment opportuni-
ties. In the event of a substantial increase in loan demand, banks with relatively little
capital may lose market share to those that are well capitalized. It is difficult to em-
pirically distinguish these different underlying determinants of bank capital buffers: for
example higher portfolio volatility can be expected to increase capital buffers, whether
these are the result of market disciplines or of a desire to avoid supervisory interventions.
It is important to note that cyclicality in the banking system is not a new phenomenon.
Potential sources of volatility include the probability of default, the loss given default,
exposure at default as well as the correlation factor (see Lowe, 2002 for a more detailed
discussion). The issue we are concerned with is whether the new guidelines on bank capital
management will create additional volatility in capital, and in turn on credit availability.
This chapter has a more limited objective, to investigate how capital buffers of European
banks behave over the business cycle, and in particular whether capital buffers are higher
in business upturns and lower in business downturns (positive comovement) or the reverse
(negative comovement), controlling as far as we can for various bank specific determinants
of capital buffers. We thus test the following null hypothesis:
H0 : Under the Basel I Accord, business cycle fluctuations do not have an
impact on the capital buffers of European banks;
against two alternatives:
H1a : Capital buffers move positively with the business cycle i.e. banks
tend to increase capital in business cycle expansions and reduce capital in
recessions;
and
H2a :Capital buffers move negatively with the business cycle i.e. banks
tend to reduce capital in business cycle expansions and increase capital in
recessions.
These descriptive hypotheses are consistent with a number of different underlying
structural models of bank capital dynamics. Estrella (2004) examines the relationship
between internally optimal forward looking capital buffers and deterministic cycles of
loan losses. He finds that banks, subject to costs of capital adjustment, will build up
capital buffers in anticipation of loan losses. Since loan losses themselves tend to lag the
business cycle, this suggests that actual capital buffers will rise during cyclical downturns,
i.e. negative cyclical comovement.
It is also argued (see among others Rajan, 1994; Borio et al., 2001; Crockett, 2001) that
portfolio risks actually increase during an economic upturn. During an economic boom,
lenders provide large amounts of credit while imbalances that will become responsible for
the following recession continue to build up, increasing the possibility of unusually large
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losses during a cyclical downturn. Under this interpretation rational forward looking
banks may build up capital buffers during cyclical upturns, i.e. positive comovement.
Both positive and negative comovement may also arise as a consequence of myopic
bank behavior. For example during an economic upturn, when risks are less likely to
immediately materialize, banks may underestimate risks and as a result expand their
loan portfolios and lower their capital ratios (negative comovement). On the other hand
unanticipatedly high levels of loan loss provisions in an extended cyclical downturn may
lead to lower capital ratios in a deep recession (positive comovement).
While we cannot distinguish these different structural models of bank capital buffers,
or distinguish myopic from forward looking expectations, we can control for institution
specific factors that influence the banks desired level of capital. A large body of literature
examines variations in risk profile and portfolio and capital structure decisions between
different types of banks (see among others, Saunders et al., 1990; Gorton and Rosen, 1995;
Esty, 1997; Salas and Saurina, 2002). Differences in capital buffers can arise because of
variations in portfolio risks, in ownership structures and in access to the capital market.
The clearest prediction of this literature is that larger banks will hold smaller average
capital buffers. Most obviously, large geographically diversified banks will have a much
smaller probability of experiencing a large decline in their capital ratios, a diversification
effect increasing with size. This effect is reinforced by asymmetric information between
lenders and borrowers and by government support for banks that are too big to fail.
Banks help overcome information asymmetries by screening and monitoring borrowers,
but these are costly activities and banks are likely to balance the cost of (and gain from)
these activities against the cost of excess capital. In the presence of scale economies in
screening and monitoring, one would expect large banks to substitute relatively less of
these activities with excess capital. Large banks may expect a greater degree of support
than small banks from the government in the event of difficulties, further reducing capital
buffers.
3.2.1 Sample selection
We build an unbalanced panel data set with eight years of annual bank balance sheet
data obtained from the Bureau Van Dyck Bankscope database. Our sample includes
data for commercial, savings and co-operative banks. In total, 468 banks are included in
the sample, made up of 364 EA banks, 427 EU15 banks and 41 banks for the RAM10 (the
10 accession countries that joined the European Union in 2005). All 25 European Union
countries are represented in the sample. As is usual in panel studies using accounting
data, we remove some extreme outlier observations of changes in capital buffers.4 See
Appendix 3.B for a description of the treatment of outliers in this sample.
We have to consider carefully the timing of accounting years. The majority of bank
accounting years end in the December of the calendar year (this applies to around 80 per-
cent of our observations. However some 20 percent of our observations are for accounting
4Data errors lead to occasional very large movements in reported capital buffers. Of the total 3736
observations available to us, we dropped 21 in the extreme tails of the cross sectional distribution of capital
buffers, with a much larger number of standard deviations from the mean than the bulk of observations,
on the assumption that these are reporting errors.
42
years ending between January and March). Since capital buffers in the first quarter of
the calendar year are determined by economic conditions in the previous year, we have
transferred all accounting years ending between January and March back one year, so for
example an end-March 2004 year we classify as an 2003 observation.
The largest bank in the samples is BNP Paribas, with total assets of around e906
bln at the end of 2004. The smallest bank, Budapest Bank in Hungary, has total assets
amounting to just around e1.5 million at the end of 2004. The largest number of banks
are in France (103 banks) and Spain (70 banks) from the EU15 and in Poland (10 banks)
for the RAM10.
Our sample is further broken down by bank type distinguishing between commercial,
co-operative and savings banks. We additionally differentiate between small and large
banks, defining large banks as those with total assets exceeding the 2004 median of e37
billion in 2004. The sample distribution across sub-samples, by type and size of bank, is
presented in Table 3.3. The RAM10 sub-sample is made up of small commercial banks,
with the exception of a small Polish savings bank, Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank.
We divide the EU15 into two further sub-samples, the Euro area (EA) and Denmark,
Sweden, and UK (DK-SE-UK). The two sub-samples and the total EU15 contain a similar
breakdown of banks, with 19 percent of banks large and with 65 percent commercial banks,
15 percent co-operative banks and around 20 percent savings banks. Across the entire
data set Sweden has the largest percentage of large banks (around 50 percent), followed
by Ireland (around 35 percent).
Dependent and explanatory variables Table 3.1 tabulates average capital buffers
for individual banks in the sample, by time and by country. Here the capital buffer is
measured as the institutions’ total tier one plus tier two capital ratio less its regulatory
minimum requirements.5 These requirements vary slightly from one country to another,
sometimes exceeding the Basel minimum of eight percent. The individual country av-
erages are averages weighted by the market share (total assets) of the individual banks.
There are several differences in the buffer sizes between countries. Many of the smaller
countries such as Finland, Belgium and Ireland have large buffers of around four percent
when compared to banks in larger countries such as France and Italy and the UK, where
the buffers are around two percent above the required minimum.
On average over our sample period RAM10 banks held far more capital than banks in
the EU15 countries (see the averages of the composite countries in Table 3.2). However
this gap has declined over time. Figure 3.5 plots the evolution of our individual sub-
sample capital buffers. In the EU15 capital buffers rose slightly between 1998 and 1999,
but then increased substantially between 2002 and 2003. In the RAM10 countries capital
buffers have behaved very differently, rising steadily from 1997 to 1998 before falling
sharply between 2000 and 2001. Thereafter, the RAM10 buffer level continues on a slight
downward trend and by 2004 is at a similar level to the EU15.
5We study only the total capital buffer not the tier one buffer. There are two reasons for this. We
need to take account of variations in the minimum level of required capital between jurisdictions (see
Chapter 2). As summarized in Table 2.1 these differences are in total not tier one capital requirements.
Also the main source of capital fluctuation e.g. equity and loan loss reserves, affect both tier one and
total capital buffers.
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Figure 3.5 also distinguishes between different bank types and bank sizes, for the
EU25 and for our three sub-samples (EA, DK,SE,UK and RAM10), and compares these
buffers with our principal explanatory variable, the output gap. The capital buffers of
co-operative banks behave very differently than those of commercial and savings banks,
possibly reflecting the differences in ownership structure and objectives of co-operative
banks.6 This figure also confirms that small banks hold much higher average capital
buffers than large banks.
6Co-operative banks cannot easily issue new shares and members prefer cash payments over retained
earnings because there is no market for their ownership claims.
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Table 3.4 provides definitions of the variables used in our estimation. Our cyclical
indicator is real GDP growth calculated from Eurostat data for each of the 25 countries
and for the different sub-sample country groupings.7 Our basic specification (Model I) in-
cludes three additional variables (roe, risk and size) as controls for various determinants
of individual capital buffers as discussed by Estrella (2004). The first of these determi-
nants is the greater cost of equity capital funding, relative to deposits or debt. Theoretical
analysis (see Myers and Majluf, 1984; Campbell, 1979) suggests that in the context of
information asymmetries, equity is a more costly alternative to other bank liabilities.
Equity may also be disadvantaged because interest payments on debt are deducted from
earnings before tax.
Direct measurement of this cost is difficult. Previous studies (see among others Ayuso
et al., 2004; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2004; Stoltz and Wedow, 2005) have included
the banks return on equity (roe), the ratio of post tax earnings to book equity, as a
proxy for the direct costs of remunerating excess capital. However roe may well exceed
the remuneration demanded by shareholders and to this extent is a measure of revenue
rather than cost. For comparability with previous studies we include roe as a control
variable, but we acknowledge that this reflects both revenue and cost. The buffer capital
model of Milne (2004) suggests that for financially strong banks the revenue impact will
generate a negative relationship between roe and capital buffers, because a high level of
earnings substitutes for capital as a buffer against unexpected shocks i.e. under both
cost and revenue interpretations we expect to observe a negative relationship between the
capital buffer and the roe variable.
The second determinant identified by Estrella (2004) is the expected cost of failure
equal to the dead weight cost carried by shareholders times the probability of failure.8
Since a banks’ probability of failure is dependent on its risk profile, we proxy the cost
of failure by adopting various measures of risk. As a first measure, we consider the
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (risk) as in Ayuso et. al (2004). This is
an ex post measure of the risks assumed by banks and is comparable to other measures
adopted in the literature since banks with non-performing loans are obliged to make
provisions for loan losses. If banks set their capital in line with the true riskiness of their
portfolios, then we would expect the relationship here to be positive.9 Furthermore, we
include an alternative measure for risk as per Stoltz and Wedow (2005) and Lindqvist
(2004) whereby we consider the ratio of new net provisions over total assets risk2.10 As
discussed above there are several reasons, most notably greater portfolio diversification,
for expecting a negative relationship between bank size and the level of capital buffers.
Furthermore, we include dummy variables denoted big and small to capture differences
in buffer movements varying with the size of the institution. big equals one for banks in
7We also investigated the use of the output gap which we obtained by applying the Hodrick-Prescott
filter to the real GDP series. Estimates substituting this gap differed to only a minor extent and are
therefore not presented here.
8An alternative framework for modelling these costs is Milne, 2004 and Milne and Whalley, 2001.
9Banks may vary significantly in their willingness to take risk. This measure therefore can be assumed
to uncover information on bank type. Any further idiosyncratic time invariant component in the banks
risk profile would be captured by the component of the residual term of Equation 3.6
10As the results for risk are broadly in line with those obtained for risk2, we present only those for
risk since more observations are available for this variable.
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the highest decile of the size distribution of assets and zero otherwise. Similarly small
equals one for banks in the lowest thirtieth percentile of the size distribution of assets.
These dummy variables are recomputed for each time period and for each sub-sample.
In a further specification (Model II) we include three additional balance sheet variables
to control for the determinants of bank capital. Our profit variable capturing post tax
profits over total assets has an ambiguous anticipated sign. Higher retained earnings
can be expected to increase capital buffers, but also higher expected earnings can be
expected to reduce desired capital buffers. The ratio of bank loans to total assets (net
loans) suggests a riskier profile so the expected sign is therefore positive. Annual loan
growth (∆loans) is a proxy for credit demand (this variable is also used by Ayuso et al.,
2004) and should be expected to increase assets relative to capital and hence lower capital
buffers.
3.3 Estimation Results
Following previous literature (Ayuso et al., 2004, Estrella, 2004) we use a partial ad-
justment framework with quadratic costs of adjusting capital.11 Lower adjustment costs
result in a faster speed of adjustment δ:
∆bufijt = δ(buf
∗
ijt − bufijt−1) + uijt (3.1)
Here bufijt and buf
∗
ijt are the actual and the optimum capital buffer respectively, of
bank i in country j at time t. The proportionate adjustment towards the desired capital
buffer in each period is δ. uijt is the error term that can be decomposed as the sum of two
components, a random country specific component µi , plus a pure bank idiosyncratic
component εijt .
The desired capital stock buf∗ijt however cannot be observed, and is therefore approx-
imated by the various cost and revenue variables discussed in the previous section.12 The
estimated version (our Model I ) including these variables is therefore:
bufit = αkkit + γkfit + (1− δ)bufit−1 + βcyclet + uit (3.2)
All of the variables in equation (3.2.) are defined in levels and so as is common with
panel data analysis, we proceed to transform equation (3.2.) into first differences in order
to obtain unbiased estimates. Since the model includes the lagged endogenous variable
among the regressors and, since some of our other explanatory variables are likely to be
endogenous, we employ the two step generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure
of Arellano and Bond (1991).13 The instruments chosen include the full set of lags of the
dependent variable (buf) together with two to four lags of both risk and roe. In each
case, the number of lags was chosen to avoid correlation with the error term (which now
11We do not investigate the possibility of asymmetries in these costs, since it may be easier to reduce
capital, e.g. by paying dividends or buying back equity, than it is to increase capital.
12For a theoretical derivation and explanation of partial adjustment in models of bank capital see
Ayuso et al. 2004 or Estrella, 2004.
13The GMM estimator is particularly useful in obtaining unbiased and efficient estimates in dynamic
models with lagged endogenous variables as regressors.
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appears in first differences) while simultaneously minimizing the number of observations
lost.
3.3.1 Estimation results for country groups
The results for Model I are presented in Table 3.5 for the total EU25 sample and our four
sub-sample country groups. Estimation results are presented with both the domestic and
the broad (EU25) measures of the cycle (real GDP growth).
For the EU25 and the EU15, EA and DK,SE,UK sub-samples, we find a negative sig-
nificant relationship between the capital buffer and each of the cycle variables, consistent
with our hypothesis H2a. In the Euro Area (EA) sub-samples, a one percentage rise in
the growth rate of domestic GDP is associated with a 0.13 percent fall in the capital
buffer. The positive 0.12 coefficient on the lagged dependent variable indicates that this
cyclical impact increases after one year. A larger impact effect is seen for the DK,SE,UK
sample, where the capital buffer decreases on average around 0.46 percentage points on
a one percentage point rise in the domestic cyclical variable, however this is offset by a
negative coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. These effects, a positive coefficient
on the lagged dependent variable and a negative coefficient on the growth rate of domestic
GDP, carry through to the EU15 and EU25 aggregated samples.
These findings are broadly in line with previous literature. Ayuso et al. (2004),
Lindqvist (2004), Stoltz and Wedow (2005) and Francis and Osborne (2009) find a similar
negative relationship between bank buffers and the cycle variables for German, Spanish,
Norwegian and UK banks respectively. These findings can additionally be compared to
those of Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) who conduct a cross country analysis of bank
capital buffers for 29 OECD countries. Using the aggregate OECD database they find
a negative relationship between capital buffers and the cycle. Their finding however
is only marginally statistically significant. They consequently conclude that while the
relationship appears to be negative, cyclical effects on buffer movements are fairly limited.
The RAM10 sample returns opposite results. Here we find a significant positive re-
lationship between the buffer and the cycle variables, in line with our hypothesis H1a.
Here we see a significant increase in the capital buffer variable of 0.10 and 0.25 percentage
points for a one percentage point rise in the rate of GDP growth.
Tables 3.5 also reports results using a broader cyclical measure (GDP growth for the
EU15, or EU25, as a whole) instead of domestic GDP growth. This makes little difference
to the results, aside from a slightly smaller coefficient on the lagged dependent variable
for the DK,SE,UK sub-sample.
Turning to the bank specific variables, the coefficient on is significant with the expected
negative coefficient in each of the sub-sample estimations, but the coefficient size is fairly
small: -0.03 in the EA and RAM10 and slightly larger -0.09 in DK,SE,UK. The signs
of the big coefficients are negative, consistent with the notion that big banks keep lower
levels of capital in the expectation that in the event of difficulties, they will be bailed
out. The sign of the small coefficient is positive, suggesting that these banks hold larger
capital buffers. These size coefficient are however only significant in some sub-samples.
risk (non performing loans over total lending) is highly significant and positive for four
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of the five sub-samples. This suggests that banks with relatively risky portfolios generally
do hold more capital. For the case of DK,SE,UK, the risk coefficients are negative and
significant.
Finally, the cost of adjusting capital, captured by the lagged endogenous variable, is
positive and significant in almost all cases. This finding is in line with the view that the
costs of capital adjustment are an important explanation of the holding of large capital
buffers. The coefficients are largely uniform across sub-samples, which would indicate
that the costs of adjustment are largely consistent between countries, corresponding to a
rate of adjustment towards desired capital of around 66 percent per annum. However we
find that the coefficients are negative for the DK,SE, UK sub-sample, which is inconsistent
with a costly adjustment model of bank capital management.
Table 3.6 presents further estimation results for a second model (Model II), adding
several further balance sheet variables to our baseline model (Model II). The sign of
the relationship between GDP growth and bank capital buffers is unchanged. In EA
and DK,SE,UK sub-samples the magnitude remains negative but is smaller (the decline
is more marked when using the domestic measure of the cycle). In the RAM10 the
magnitude remains positive and is now larger. The additional variables in this second
model are themselves cyclically varying, so some change in the estimated comovement is
unsurprising. Overall we conclude from this second specification that considerable cyclical
comovement exists and that this movement is very different in RAM10 than in the rest
of the EU .
The coefficient on the proxy for the cost of holding capital (roe) and the speed of
adjustment (the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable) are broadly unchanged
from those reported for Model I. The coefficients for the risk proxies are now larger while
the coefficients on the big and small variables are almost the same as in the previous
model specification.
The new profit variable for all sub-samples is positive and highly significant; in-
dicating that retained earnings seem to be used to increase the capital cushion. The
effect is noticeably larger for the EA sample when compared to the other sub-samples.
The expected negative sign for the net loans variable is found for the EU15, EA and
RAM10 sub-samples, however the coefficients are broadly insignificant. The DK,SE,UK
sample returns a highly significant positive coefficient. Considering the ∆loans variable,
for all sub-samples, we find the parameter to be highly significant, with a negative sign
as expected. This finding suggests that a contemporaneous increase in loan demand
substantially reduces the capital buffer.
Estimation results for sub-groups of types and sizes of banks. Table 3.7 re-
ports further versions of these estimation results, for sub-groups of banks, distinguishing
between commercial, savings and co-operative banks and also large and small banks.
We report estimates using data only for the EA15. Here we wish to determine the ef-
fect that special bank specific features can have on capital buffer movements. We find
this particularly useful for our estimations since the RAM10 sub-sample consists only of
small commercial banks and RAM10 banks appear to behave so differently from those
in the EA15. Considering commercial and savings banks, we find that the comovement
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with the cycle remains negative. The results for savings banks are more significant than
for commercial banks, suggesting that the negative relationship reported in Table 3.7 is
largely driven by savings banks. For co-operative banks however, the relationship is very
different, a positive relationship evident between the cycle and capital buffers.
This finding can help explain the relationship between our results and those of other
researchers. Stoltz and Wedow (2005) present evidence for German banks showing that
the relationship between the buffer and the cycle variable is stronger for savings banks
than it is for co-operatives. The cross country study of Bikker and Metzemakers (2004)
finds that the cyclical effects appear to be limited. This finding is in line with our results
since they focus their estimations on commercial banks only. Ayuso et al. (2004) consider
only savings and commercial banks in their study and find a robustly significant negative
relationship. Their study does not however analyze bank type effects separately.
The roe variable coefficients are very similar to those reported in Table 3.5. The
coefficient is noticeably more significant amongst savings banks than it is for co-operative
or commercial banks. This finding tends to indicate that the cost of holding excess
capital appears to be most significant for co-operative banks when compared to savings
and commercial banks.
The risk coefficient remains positive and significant for both commercial and co-
operative banks in all three sub samples, while it is negative for savings banks. The
impact of bank size (the big and small variables) is similar to that reported in Tables 3.5
and 3.6, but only statistically significant for small savings banks.
For all three sub-samples, the bufijt−1 variable is positive and highly significant for
commercial banks, while it is much smaller (and significant) for savings banks and insignif-
icant for co-operative banks. This suggests that adjustment costs are more important for
commercial banks.
Table 3.7 additionally reports a comparison by bank size. Here small banks are those
with total assets less than e37bn in 2004. The dummy variables big and small are
dropped from these estimates. We find a positive and significant relationship between the
capital buffers of small banks and the cyclical variables, while the relationship is negative
and significant for large banks. The coefficients on the roe variable are little changed from
those obtained for the initial total sample estimations, negative and significant for both
small and large banks. The risk coefficients remain positive and significant for both small
and large banks. The estimated cost of adjusting capital (the coefficient on bufijt−1 ) is
significant for both large and small banks. The coefficient is somewhat lower for small
banks suggesting that adjustment costs play a larger role in the case of large banks.
To summarize, our estimations by both size and type of bank provide evidence that
the capital buffers of both small and co-operative banks have a positive relationship with
the output gap variables. On the other hand we find negative comovement with the cycle
for commercial banks, savings banks, and large banks. These differential results might be
due to different access to capital markets or due to the fact that both smaller banks as
well as cooperative banks are more reliant on retained earnings than other banks in the
sample hence building up capital during the economic upturn.
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3.3.2 Robustness tests.
We investigated a large variety of alternative specifications as a check on the robustness
of our main findings, including subsets of the explanatory variables reported in Tables
3.5 and 3.6. In all cases the relationship between the capital buffer and the output gap
is very similar to that which we report here.
A major concern is endogeneity, leading us to investigate whether the relationships
that we report between capital buffers and the business cycle is robust to alternative
dynamic specifications. We estimate a static version of the model where we omit the
lagged dependent variable bufijt−1. We also experimented with varying lag lengths for
the explanatory variables, and by dropping the roe variable from the estimations (since
this is itself a cyclically varying variable). Finally we estimated a fixed effects version of
the model, in which all the bank specific variables (risk, roe, big and small) were omitted
but in which we introduce a dummy (fixed effect) for each bank in the sample. In all these
cases the coefficients on the business cycle variables remain fairly close to our reported
results, indicating that these estimates are reasonably robust to dynamic re-specification.
There are potentially individual national effects that could arise from various country
specific characteristics relating to the legal, regulatory, structural, or tax and accounting
framework. A simple way to test, and control for these conditions, is to create a country
specific dummy variable (Di) for each country. As it turns out, there are no significant
fixed country dummy coefficients in our regressions, indicating that all the national effects
are already captured by our chosen specifications.
We also re-estimated Model II, including both the broad cycle and the difference
between the broad EU25 cycle and the domestic cycle as explanatory variables. In the
case of the DK,SE,UK and the RAM10 country grouping, we find that both the domestic
cycle and the additional impact of the broad cycle are significant at the five or ten percent
level. In the other sub-samples and the EU25 there is no significant additional effect. Very
similar results emerged when re-estimating Model I. This indicates that, while there is
collinearity between the broad and domestic cycle, the domestic cycle is the slightly better
measure. It does better than the broad cycle for DK,SE,UK and the RAM10, while the
choice of cycle measure is immaterial for the other groupings.
Checking for downward bias in the standard errors on aggregate variables
We are concerned with a further econometric problem affecting all studies, such as our
own, that combine macro level and micro data, whether in panel or cross section. This
problem, originally highlighted by Moulton (1990), is the downward bias on standard
errors for macroeconomic variables, when there is clustering of unobserved random error
components. This possibility cannot be ignored since any omission of macroeconomic
variables, affecting the dependent variable, will lead to such clustering. Correcting for
clustering of unobserved variables can have a dramatic impact on reported significance
levels. In the cross sectional example reported by Moulton, standard errors on aggregate
variables are biased upwards by a factor of around three. A change of this size would
imply a fall for example in t-statistics from an apparently highly significance level, to a
statistically insignificant level of less than 1.5. Failure to investigate this bias invalidates
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the results of very many published papers.
Several methods have been proposed to deal with this problem, the most common
being robust cluster adjustment of standard errors available in stata. Unfortunately we
have been unable to carry out this adjustment, since the adjustment is only available for
the estimation of a static panel regression with random effects. The option to adjust our
preferred dynamic fixed effects regression models is not available. We instead conduct
two alternative calculations in order to assess the magnitude of the resulting bias in
the standard errors on our aggregate cyclical variables (reported in Table 3.8). First,
we estimate a static random effects version of our model, allowing us to then apply the
robust cluster adjustment to the standard errors. For purposes of comparison we compare
these estimates with those from a static fixed effects version of our model as well as our
preferred dynamic fixed effects model. We find that for each variable, without the robust
cluster adjustment, the standard error in the static regression using either fixed or random
effects are very similar. We find that using the robust cluster adjustment, the standard
error changes increase by on average by around 20 percent for each variable within each
sub sample. This suggests that, while clustering of errors reduces but does not totally
overturn the significance of our results. We therefore conclude that our sample is affected
to only a small extent by the problem of residual clustering identified by Moulton (1990).
3.4 Discussion
This chapter has examined the relationship between European bank capital buffers and
the business cycle. Much of the empirical literature in this field has focused on analyzing
the determinants of bank capitalization within a single country framework. Our research
is cross country, allowing for the comparison of behavior in different sub-sample groups
of countries and for different groups of banks.
We build an unbalanced panel of 486 banks, using annual balance sheet data between
1997 and 2004. Controlling for various determinants of capital buffers, we estimate the
remaining impact of the business cycle. We find a significant negative relationship between
the capital buffers of banks and the cycle variable adopted, for EU25, EU15, EA and
DK,SE,UK sub-samples. This finding is in line with the existing literature in this field.
For the RAM10 banks i.e. those in the ten accession countries that joined the EU in
2004, our results indicate that capital buffers move positively with the cycle. However,
as indicated in Figure 3.5, RAM10 capital buffers have been converging on those in the
rest of the EU, and it is possible that negative comovement may be observed once this
convergence is complete.
We further break the sample down, distinguishing between both type and size of bank.
Our findings indicate that capital buffers of large banks, and of commercial and savings
banks, appear to behave in a similar fashion to the sample as a whole, comoving negatively
with the cycle i.e. rising in recession. On the other hand the capital buffers of small banks
and of co-operative banks move positively with the cycle, declining in recession. These
differential results might be due to different access to capital markets, so that these banks
are more reliant on retained earnings than other banks in the sample hence building up
capital during the economic upturn.
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Our results complement and extend the findings of previous researchers. Negative
comovement of capital buffers with the cycle has been reported before for banks in indi-
vidual countries (Ayuso et al., 2004; Lindqvist, 2004; Stoltz and Wedow, 2005; Francis
and Osborne, 2009; Repullo and Suarez, 2009). The only previous cross country study,
that of Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) finds a rather smaller degree of negative comove-
ment than we do, using a longer time period of aggregated OECD bank data. However
their data covers only commercial banks. Our investigation of different bank types re-
veals a more pronounced negative comovement for savings banks than commercial banks,
which may help to explain the difference in our finding.
Negative comovement suggests a further cause of concern relating to the potential
procyclical impact of the introduction of Basel II on bank capital adequacy. Larger banks,
notably the commercial and savings banks, have in our sample period increased capital
buffers in the economic downturn. Under the new accord, Pillar I capital requirements
will increase as bank exposures are downgraded, whether by external rating agencies or in
internal rating systems. Repullo and Suarez (2009) provide further confirmation of these
findings. They show that capital buffers are countercyclical under risk-insensitive capital
requirements (e.g. Basel I) and procyclical under risk-sensitive capital requirements (e.g.
Basel II). Yet, under risk-sensitive capital requirements, the higher buffers maintained
in expansions are insufficient to prevent a significant contraction in the supply of credit
at the arrival of a recession. This suggests that capital management will be especially
challenging since it will lead to higher capital requirements precisely at the time (the
trough of the business cycle) when most banks are seeking to reduce their capital levels.
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3.A Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Bank Capital Buffers by Country (weighted by market share).
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Avg
Austria 2.8 2.5 1.8 3.4 5.2 12.5 10.1 6.4 5.6
Belgium 3.8 4.7 3.8 4.9 5.2 5.1 6.3 5.5 4.9
Germany 2.1 2.3 2.8 3.1 2.7 3.4 4.8 5.4 3.3
Spain 5.6 5.3 4.7 3.7 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.6 4.2
Finland 6.6 4.4 3.7 3.5 3.7 3.4 5.7 5.3 4.5
France 5.1 4.6 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.2 3.4 2.9 4.0
Greece 2.3 2.1 9.5 7.2 3.8 2.8 5.9 5.3 4.9
Ireland 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.9 4.6 4.3 4.4 3.9 3.9
Italy 4.3 5.8 4.4 4.5 2.5 2.9 2.9 3.7 3.9
Luxembourg 6.1 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.5 4.9 6.6 4.8 5.2
Netherlands 7.1 8.0 5.6 5.5 6.1 6.7 7.6 7.6 6.8
Portugal 9.3 8.2 7.9 6.3 5.1 4.4 5.2 5.8 6.5
Denmark 4.4 3.4 3.3 2.7 3.0 3.6 4.9 4.2 3.7
Sweden 2.6 6.7 16.5 5.4 4.6 4.8 5.3 5.o 6.4
UK 12.1 9.7 11.4 9.7 8.4 8.9 9.8 7.2 9.8
Cyprus 2.1 1.7 2.5 4.5 5.7 6.0 5.4 5.3 4.2
Czech Republic 2.9 10.2 12.2 6.2 7.3 6.9 6.7 4.8 7.2
Estonia 3.1 7.7 9.1 6.2 6.3 6.2 5.3 4.3 6.0
Hungary 5.0 6.5 6.7 5.9 4.2 4.8 3.3 3.2 5.0
Latvia 10.1 3.6 8.4 5.5 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.4 5.7
Lithuania 6.3 14.4 5.5 4.8 6.7 6.7 4.1 3.1 6.5
Malta 6.5 8.4 8.0 8.1 6.5 7.1 7.6 6.9 7.4
Poland 1.9 3.7 5.2 4.9 5.8 4.9 4.8 7.4 4.8
Slovakia 5.4 9.2 9.5 8.0
Slovenia 6.3 4.6 6.7 8.1 7.5 7.6 5.7 6.3 6.6
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Table 3.2: Bank Capital Buffers by Sub-Samples.
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Avg
EU15 5.2 5.1 5.8 4.8 4.5 5.1 5.9 5.1 5.2
EA 4.9 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.8 5.5 5.0 4.8
DK,SE,UK 6.3 6.6 10.3 5.9 5.3 5.8 6.9 5.4 6.6
RAM 4.9 6.7 7.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.6 5.5 6.0
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Table 3.3: Sample Distribution.
Commercial Cooperative Savings Big Small Total
Austria 12 8 6 4 22 26
Belgium 10 2 2 10 12
Germany 24 8 2 7 27 34
Spain 23 3 44 8 62 70
Finland 4 1 1 4 5
France 55 42 6 13 90 103
Greece 12 1 11 12
Ireland 11 4 7 11
Italy 30 13 11 10 44 54
Luxembourg 7 1 6 7
Netherlands 18 1 5 14 19
Portugal 8 1 2 3 8 11
Denmark 13 2 15 15
Sweden 3 1 2 3 3 6
UK 41 1 9 33 42
Cyprus 5 5 5
Czech Republic 3 3 3
Estonia 2 2 2
Hungary 6 6 6
Latvia 4 4 4
Lithuania 2 2 2
Malta 2 2 2
Poland 9 1 10 10
Slovakia 2 2 2
Slovenia 5 5 5
EU25 306 77 85 71 397 468
EU15 5271 77 79 71 356 427
EA 214 76 74 59 305 364
DK, SE, UK 57 1 5 12 51 63
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Table 3.4: Variable Descriptions.
Variable Description
Balance sheet variables
buf Capital ratio minus national regulatory minimum as per Table 3.1.
roeijt Return on equity.
riskijt Ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.
risk2ijt Loan loss provisions over total assets.
sizeijt Log of total assets.
profitijt Post tax profit over total assets.
∆loansijt Annual loan growth.
totalloansijt Loans over total assets.
Business cycle variables
gdpjt Domestic and sub-sample GDP growth.
outputgapjt HP filtered real GDP series.
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Table 3.5: Two Step GMM Estimates (Model I).
EU25 EU15 EA DK-SE-UK RAM
Model I Model I Model I Model I Model I
Cycle variable: domestic cycle EU25 cycle domestic cycle EU15 cycle domestic cycle EU15 cycle domestic cycle EU15 cycle domestic cycle EU15 cycle
bufijt−1 0.36 (4.22)*** 0.45 (4.62)*** 0.20 (2.91)*** 0.19(3.02)*** 0.12 (3.12)*** 0.18 (3.62)*** -0.40 (3.02)*** -0.35 (3.12)*** 0.22 (9.66)*** 0.27 (6.88)***
roeijt -0.03(1.85)* -0.04 (1.66)* -0.04(5.41)*** -0.05(3.43)*** -0.03 (1.75)** -0.05(1.23) -0.09 (1.66)** -0.10 (0.98) -0.03(1.27)* -0.03 (4.01)***
riskijt 64.55(4.33)*** 62.75(3.55)*** 44.66 (3.16)*** 43.72 (2.18)** 42.11 (3.12)*** 37.62 (2.42)** -31.69 (4.02)*** -68.75 (4.66)*** 22.66 (1.45) 26.78 (1.75)*
bigijt -14.87 (2.13)** -24.33 (1.65)* -17.25 (0.08) -16.74 (1.81)* -19.32 (2.01)** -18.33 (1.85)* -23.67 (0.08) -19.54 (0.21) -11.76 (0.06) -22.34 (0.04)
smallijt 21.77(1.92)* 18.33(1.99)** 22.33(0.17) 16.33(0.33) 19.01(1.90)* 23.04(1.66)* 13.22(0.08) 12.76(0.66) 23.54(1.94)** 20.87(1.46)
cyclejt -0.10(3.77)*** -0.09(3.22)*** -0.12 (4.99)*** -0.12 (4.65)*** -0.13(3.66)*** -0.15(5.02)*** -0.46(4.55)*** -0.40 (6.33)*** 0.10 (2.02)** 0.25 (3.97)***
Sargan 21.34 (0.74) 20.58 (0.67) 20.97 (0.69) 24.79 (0.78) 25.78 (0.76) 21.69 (0.59) 32.58 (0.99) 29.87 (0.55) 25.67 (0.85) 21.46 (0.92)
a(1) -2.16 (0.00) -2.78 (0.00) -2.02 (0.00) -2.76(0.00) -2.45 (0.00) -2.62 (0.00) -1.44 (0.00) -1.68 (0.00) -1.76 (0.00) -1.67 (0.00)
a(2) -1.56 (0.72) -1.69 (0.44) -1.04 (0.52) -1.33 (0.96) -1.65 (0.44) -0.95 (0.52) -1.62 (0.26) -1.79 (0.71) -1.21 (0.75) -0.99 (0.55)
Note: Dependent variable is bufijt. Other variables as defined in Table 3.4. T -values presented in parentheses. a(1) and a(2) represent first and second order residual tests. *, **, ***
denote significance at the ten, five and one percent levels of significance respectively. Cycle variable corresponds to real GDP growth. Models including the broad and the sub-group
cycle are estimated separately.
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Table 3.6: Two Step GMM Estimates (Model II).
EU25 EU15 EA DK-SE-UK RAM
Model II Model II Model II Model II Model II
Cycle variable: domestic cycle EU25 cycle domestic cycle EU15 cycle domestic cycle EU15 cycle domestic cycle EU15 cycle domestic cycle EU15 cycle
bufijt−1 0.28(3.66)*** 0.24(5.82)*** 0.33 (3.51)*** 0.25(3.24)*** 0.19 (4.62)*** 0.21 (3.76)*** -0.39(4.01)*** -0.39 (3.97)*** 0.12 (3.02)*** 0.18 (4.63)***
roeijt -0.03 (1.81)* -0.03(1.31) -0.05(1.97)** -0.04 (2.35)** -0.04(1.05) -0.05 (1.16) -0.09 (0.23) -0.08(3.20)*** -0.03(0.45) -0.03 (0.66)
riskijt 76.44 (3.54)*** 72.33 (3.17)*** 35.86 (5.02)*** 66.97 (4.87)*** 55.24 (4.22)*** 23.67 (3.96)*** -30.06(2.99)*** -28.74(3.15)*** 86.35 (3.05)*** 77.84 (4.66)***
bigijt -24.44(1.44) -18.76 (1.96)** -11.99(0.13) -21.77(1.66)* -12.65(1.45) -12.22(1.69)* -23.65 (0.11) -18.77 (0.31) -23.44 (0.15) -19.87 (0.66)
smallijt 19.66(1.47) 22.34(1.52) 12.77(0.99) 13.66(0.77) 18.86(1.84)* 15.87(1.92)* 20.11(0.16) 13.66 (0.22) 12.12(2.01)** 15.66 (1.99)**
peofitijt 180.10 (3.56)*** 175.22 (3.02)*** 165.21(3.99)*** 135.21(3.42)*** 152.55(3.11)*** 164.75(3.75)*** 66.32 (4.02)*** 78.56 (4.51)*** 82.47 (4.66)*** 90.57 (4.06)***
cycleijt -0.06(3.98)*** -0.02(3.01)*** -0.08(4.01)*** -0.41 (3.33)*** -0.04(3.11)*** -0.10(2.98)*** -0.06(4.55)*** -0.38 (5.78)*** 0.19 (2.55)** 0.16(3.11)***
∆loansijt -0.01 (3.06)*** -0.01(3.77)*** -0.01 (3.05)*** -0.00 (2.52)** -0.02(2.06)** -0.02(1.97)** -0.02 (3.13)*** -0.01 (4.12)*** -0.06 (3.11)*** -0.08(3.25)***
totalloansijt -0.06(0.98) -0.06(0.76) -0.11(1.02) -0.01 (0.63) -0.00(0.72) -0.01(0.99) 0.01 (2.99)*** 0.00 (2.87)*** -0.01 (0.11) -0.02(0.55)
Sargan 24.68 (0.88) 27.69 (0.76) 27.69 (0.99) 29.78 (0.92) 27.63(0.79) 22.46(0.83) 26.89 (0.63) 27.96 (0.79) 22.97 (0.46) 23.69 (0.76)
a(1) -2.34 (0.00) -2.65 (0.00) -2.42 (0.00) -2.36 (0.00) -2.09 (0.00) -2.11 (0.00) -0.96 (0.00) -1.02 (0.00) -1.55 (0.00) -1.67 (0.00)
a(2) -1.11 (0.46) -0.84 (0.36) -1.42 (0.45) -1.29 (0.65) -1.08 (0.46) -1.12 (0.76) -1.24 (0.82) -1.34 (0.23) -0.92 (0.65) 0.76 (0.98)
Note: Dependent variable is bufijt. Other variables as defined in Table 3.4. T -values presented in parentheses. a(1) and a(2) represent first and second order residual tests. *, **, ***
denote significance at the ten, five and one percent levels of significance respectively. Cycle variable corresponds to real GDP growth. Models including the broad and the sub-group
cycle are estimated separately.
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Table 3.7: Two Step GMM Estimates (by bank size).
Commercial Banks Cooperative Banks Savings Banks Big Banks Small Banks
Cycle variable: domestic cycle EU25 cycle domestic cycle EU15 cycle domestic cycle EU15 cycle domestic cycle EU15 cycle domestic cycle EU15 cycle
∆bufijt−1 0.33(4.00)*** 0.21(4.11)*** -0.15 (0.60) 0.19(0.77) -0.17(1.46) -0.16(3.04)*** 0.44(6.00)*** 0.30(4.66)*** 0.25(3.33)*** 0.15(3.21)***
roeijt -0.03(1.52)* -0.04(1.33) -0.01(0.70) -0.02 (1.32) -0.04(4.01)*** -0.06(4.66)*** -0.10(3.99)*** -0.7(3.12)*** -0.04(1.86)* -0.03(1.97)**
riskijt 26.55(2.11)** 22.46(2.12)** 40.55(3.62)*** 70.44(3.17)*** -31.22(4.11)*** -22.54(3.66)*** 40.25(2.25)** 69.68(2.52)*** 29.66 (2.23)** 55.78(2.09)**
bigijt -16.57(0.44) -16.33(0.96) -21.43(0.66) -20.66(0.68) -18.99(0.65) -21.34(0.11)
smallijt 11.22(0.56) 18.76(0.45) 15.66(0.34) 21.23(0.26) 17.43 (1.52) 18.75(1.43)
profitijt 146.89(4.00)*** 137.66(4.11)*** 130.22(3.00)*** 120.66(1.85)* 170.22(4.06)*** 140.66(4.98)*** 201.46(3.88)*** 160.35(2.93)*** 130.22 (2.99)*** 88.66(4.01)***
cyclejt -0.16(1.25) -0.45(2.77)** 0.15(2.18)** 0.22(0.84) -0.10(3.00)*** -0.37(4.61)*** -0.12(2.53)** -0.55(1.63) 0.06 (2.99)*** 0.20(2.97)***
∆loansijt -0.03(4.62)*** -0.02(3.85)*** 0.00(3.66)*** 0.03(4.96)*** 0.01(0.75) -0.01(0.66) -0.01(6.33)*** -0.02(7.44)*** 0.00(0.12) -0.00(0.32)
totalloansijt 0.10(1.05) 0.00(0.12) -0.25(8.53)*** -0.01(0.63) -0.03(4.00)*** -0.09(1.88)* 0.01(3.01)*** 0.01(3.00)*** -0.12(1.97)*** -0.01(1.86)*
Sargan 42.44 (0.78) 34.66 (0.63) 27.89 (0.93) 25.67 (0.86) 22.97 (0.79) 33.79 (0.67) 31.75 (0.92) 22.97 (0.78) 23.67 (0.81) 22.75 (0.84)
a(1) -1.66 (0.00) -2.11 (0.00) -1.75 (0.00) -1.65 (0.00) -1.88 (0.00) 1.35 (0.00) -2.44 (0.00) -3.13 (0.00) -1.78 (0.00) -1.44 (0.00)
a(2) -1.21 (0.74) -1.34 (0.90) -1.66 (0.96) -1.53 (0.76) -1.57 (0.83) -1.45 (0.98) -1.76 (0.80) 1.45 (0.76) -1.55 (0.86) -1.63 (0.76)
Note: Dependent variable is bufijt. Other variables as defined in Table 3.4. T -values presented in parentheses. a(1) and a(2) represent first and second order residual tests. *, **, ***
denote significance at the ten, five and one percent levels of significance respectively. Cycle variable corresponds to real GDP growth. Models including the broad and the sub-group
cycle are estimated separately.
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Table 3.8: Robustness Check: Within Group Correlations Summary.
Dynamic Static Moulton formulae
avg no of banks per country within group avg within group avg (fe) fe re robust cluster adj. s.e percentage δ coeff. var d.b* s.e d.b*
EU25 19 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.06 27.59 1.72 1.31
EU15 28 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.07 25.27 1.81 1.35
EA 30 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.08 17.39 1.87 1.37
DK SE UK 21 0.03 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.13 23.17 1.80 1.34
RAM 4 0.04 0.06 0.21 0.21 0.19 11.43 1.18 1.09
Note: The static case refers to results obtained by running the regression excluding the LDV. The dynamic case refers to our equation (3.7.). fe and re denote fixed and
random effects respectively. Within-group correlations are obtained by calculating an average correlation coefficient of individual bank correlations within each country. *d.b
stands for downward bias..
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3.B Data Manipulations
In order to deal with various incidents of large fluctuations in the level of the buffers over
time, we clean the data and get rid of any eccentric jumps that are not representative
of the sample. Such jumps were generally due to individual bank effects rather than
due to entry or exit from the sample and were identified via graphical representation of
the sample. In 1999, together strange buffer figures for Austrian Raiffeisenlandesbank
Obero¨sterreich AG, Greek Emporiki Bank, and Swedish Kommuninvest Bank resulted
in a significant outlier that would drive overall results. In Austria, Raiffeisenlandesbank
Obero¨sterreich AG reports its capital buffer figures for the first time in 2003, reporting
a ratio of 13.2 percent. In the case of Emporiki bank the capital buffer jumps from -0.8
percent in 1998 to 16.6 percent in 1999. In Sweden on the other hand, a similar jump is
apparent in 1999. This jump is attributable to a single bank Kommuninvest Bank who
reports its capital ratio for the first time this year. The capital ratio reported is equal to
59.4 percent. These banks are removed from the sample in order gain a more accurate
representation of capital buffer movements and its relationship with the cycle over our
sample period. While other erratic movements are visible in Table 3.1, these are kept




Bank Capital and Charter
Values
4.1 Introduction
Traditionally, banking literature has centered on the notion that banks commit moral
hazard. Due to various government deposit insurance schemes as well as other safety
net protections, banks view themselves as partly insulated from risk and therefore do
not fully account for the negative consequences of their actions (see Gorton and Rosen,
1995). Merton (1977) shows that the existence of deposit insurance derives the put option
of the bank.1 Since the deposit insurance premium depends on the perceived riskiness
of the insured institution, the value of the put option can increase with risk, particularly
when the premium does not correctly capture bank risk. In moral hazard models, bank
shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the insuring agency (to maximize
the value of the put option) by adopting riskier strategies and reducing invested capital
relative to assets (see Keeley, 1990). As a means to offset these risk increasing incentives,
bank regulators directly target capital structures by setting minimum requirements for
bank capital.
Following the Myers and Majluf (1984) pecking order hypothesis, the higher cost of
capital (relative to deposits or debt) would dictate a capital minimization policy on the
part of banks. This however contrasts observed bank behavior. Banks typically hold a
significant amount of capital in excess of the required minimum (a buffer of capital) as
an insurance against risks that need to be managed, indicating that capital standards are
rarely binding.2
These stylized facts have motivated the literature to search for incentives that act
to mitigate the moral hazard behavior of banks. Theoretical analysis of bank capital
decisions has highlighted a central role for the charter value, also referred to as the
franchise value (see Keeley 1990; Demsetz et al., 1997; Hellman et al., 2000; Matutes and
Vives, 2000; Repullo 2004). The charter value, is the value that would be foregone if the
1The right to sell the banks’ assets at the face value of its liabilities.
2See for example Allen and Rai (1996), Peura and Jokivuolle (2004) Barth et al. (2005) and Berger
et al. (2008).
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bank closes, hence, capturing the banks’ private cost of failure. Traditional charter value
models have formally shown how a valuable charter can help reduce excessive risk taking,
since banks with a valuable charter have much to lose if a risky business strategy leads
to insolvency (see among others Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; and Ancharya, 1996). The
incentive to preserve the charter value should therefore outweigh the desire of shareholders
to maximize the put option value when risk is low, while the opposite is true at higher
probabilities of default. A large body of empirical literature has found evidence in favor
of the charter value hypothesis (CVH), that high charter value banks are less risky (see
Keeley 1990; Demsetz et al., 1997; Galloway et al., 1997; Saunders and Wilson, 2001;
Park and Peristiani, 2007).
In contrast to the traditional charter value models focusing on the amount of capital
held against market risk, the more recent capital buffer theory introduces a dynamic
aspect whereby a bank is faced with implicit and explicit costs of maintaining an internally
defined target level of capital above the required minimum (see among others Milne
and Whalley, 2001; Peura and Keppo, 2006; VanHoose, 2007a). The target level of
capital can be thought of as being a banks’ long run desired probability of default and is
therefore a function of both risk and capital. In this framework, the relationship between
charter values and the capital buffer is determined by two opposing forces: (i) a charter
value effect, and (ii) a moral hazard effect. The charter value effect dominates when the
expected loss of the charter value outweighs the increase in the option value. Banks with
a sufficient charter will be encouraged to build up enough capital to reduce the risk of
failure. The moral hazard effect dominates when the charter value is insufficient and all
incentives to protect the charter value are removed. The bank is no longer concerned
with future earnings and has little incentive to maintain a capital buffer. The long run
relationship between capitalization and charter values are therefore predicted to be highly
non linear, and dependent on the size of the charter.
Several papers have tried to shed some light on the relationship between bank capital
and charter values (see Keeley, 1990; Allen and Rai, 1996). These studies have however,
assumed the relationship to be linear. In this chapter, we contribute to the literature
by exploring non linearity between capital buffers and charter values. Adopting both
quadratic, and semi parametric spline estimation techniques, we wish to determine the
functional form of these relationships, and in particular, identify the size of the charter
which constitutes a reversal in the dominating effect. Our findings indicate that between
1986 and 2008 the relationship between bank capital and charter values is non linear and
concave. Moreover, for banks with charter values above the median threshold, the capital
buffer is held relatively constant. This finding is in contrast to predictions that banks
with higher charters necessarily hold larger capital buffers.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 outlines the theo-
retical predictions of the relationships studied. Section 4.3 describes the data and defines
the key variables. Section 4.4 presents our empirical methodology and results. Section
4.5 briefly discusses our findings and concludes.
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4.2 Theoretical Predictions
Marcus (1984) shows that incorporating intertemporal considerations into pure static
moral hazard models has potential moderating effects on the behavior of banks. Moral
hazard models based on static assumptions neglect the notion that banks can generate
rents. Such rents can arise from monitoring costs or imperfect competition. In a dynamic
framework, the present value of future rents constitute the banks charter value.
In charter value models3, today’s value of a banks equity, C, is given by:
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In contrast to a pure moral hazard model, the sign of the expression is undetermined.
An increase in equity reduces the probability of default and the associated loss of charter
value, while it also reduces the value of deposit insurance. For a high enough CV , the
first effect dominates. Hence a larger CV gives the bank an incentive to hold capital.
Moral hazard models introducing a charter value as a mitigating effect have largely
been restricted to the part of capital which is held against market risk, failing to recognize
the endogenous nature of bank capital decisions. Milne and Whalley (2001) develop a
continuous time dynamic option pricing model introducing endogenous capital into a
model with charter value. The concept of endogenous capital is based on a trade-off
banks face when violating the capital requirement. This trade-off is between incurring
costs related to recapitalization, or, the loss of charter value consequent of failure.
In the model, regulation occurs at random intervals as per Merton (1978). Auditors
are interested in the level of capital, c, compared to the required minimum, cˆ. If cˆ > c,
then the bank must decide whether to recapitalize at the cost of x+∆c (where x denotes
the fixed cost of recapitalization) or to liquidate. In the case of liquidation, debt holders
are repaid in full from deposit insurance, and shareholders receive nothing.
As long as capital is in excess of the requirement, banks act to maximize shareholder
wealth. If however, the capital buffer is depleted and the supervisor notices, then a bank
can either recapitalize or fail. Recapitalization is optimal if the gain in shareholder value
outweighs cost of recapitalization. Non linearity between bank capital and charter values
in the model therefore represents a trade-off between two varying effects. The first, a
charter value effect where charter value is sufficiently high such that the shareholder
value lost in liquidation is relatively high. In this case the bank will be encouraged to
build up the buffer of capital to reduce the expected cost of violating capital requirements
3Assuming the following diffusion process: dA = RAdt+σAdz with R as the instantaneous expected
growth rate of assets, A, and σ, the instantaneous standard deviation of the rate of return. dz is a Wiener
process.
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as well as to reduce the probability of failure. Earnings are either retained in full, or if the
long run target level of capital, cˆ, is reached, then all earnings are paid out as dividends.
When no costs are associated with regulatory breach, the charter value becomes the value
of the bank. Shareholders of well capitalized banks, those with capital at the long run
optimum, are fully insured against costs associated with a regulatory breach.
If on the other hand, the charter value is too low, a moral hazard effect dominates4.
The bank is no longer concerned with future earnings and the model reverts back to a
simple pure static moral hazard case. Gambling for resurrection, if successful results in
excess returns, on the other hand, if unsuccessful, a bail out by deposit insurance is guar-
anteed. The existence of state guarantees create additional incentives for capital transfer
to shareholders5. The threshold between the dominance of these effects is dependent
on either a greater ability to increase the uncertainty of cash flows which increases the
potential gains of exploiting moral hazard6, or a higher frequency of audit which lowers
potential gains.
4.3 Data
To test the predicted long run relationship between bank capital and charter values,
we construct an unbalanced panel of quarterly US bank holding company (BHC)7 and
commercial bank balance sheet data between 1986Q2 and 2008Q2. All bank level data
is obtained from the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income (referred to as the
Call Reports) published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.8 In addition, we obtain
information for the Fed Funds Y-9 form, filed by BHCs. By identifying the high holder to
which the individual commercial banks belong, we are able to merge the two datasets.9
We merge the two datasets since the BHC capital data is required for matching with
market data. Including the commercial balance sheet data allows us to keep a richer data
sample, as more observations used as control variables are available for the commercial
banks than for BHCs. Only publicly traded BHCs are kept in the sample. All market
data is obtained from the Center for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP). The final
panel contains bank balance sheet and income data for over 600 BHCs. See Appendix
4.B for more information on the construction of the data set.
4.3.1 Principal Variables of Interest
Bank Capital Buffers: Buffer capital, bufit, is defined as the amount of capital
bank i holds in excess of that required by regulation at time t. In the US, bank capital
4Such banks have a very high probability of failure since they have very low expected earnings offering
little/no protection.
5Milking the property whereby extra dividends are paid during times of financial stress. This mecha-
nism gives shareholders funds that should otherwise go to bondholders or towards bankruptcy costs.
6Since the put option value is always increased by a widening of the distribution of returns.
7A bank holding company, under the laws of the United States, is any entity that directly or indirectly
owns, controls, or has the power to vote 25% or more of a class of securities of a U.S. bank. Holding
companies do not however, administer, oversee, or manage other establishments of the company or enter-
prize whose securities they hold. They are primarily engaged in holding the securities of (or other equity
interests in) companies and enterprizes for the purpose of owning a controlling interest or influencing the
management decisions.
8This data is publicly available at www.chicagofed.org.
9Once the initial dataset is obtained, we further clean the data by keeping only those bank holding
companies for which we have three consecutive quarters of data.
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is currently regulated via the Basel I Accord, requiring banks to hold a tier one capital
ratio of at least four percent, a total capital ratio (tier one + tier two) of at least eight
percent and a leverage ratio (tier one capital over total assets) of at least four percent.
Two components together constitute the capital ratio. The numerator, measures the
absolute amount of capital held which is inversely related to the probability of failure.
The denominator captures the riskiness of the bank. Together, the ratio provides an
indication about the adequacy of capital in relation to some indicator of absolute risk.
Under both the total capital and tier one ratio requirements of Basel I, the calculated
risk is captured via risk weighted assets. This measure includes off balance sheet exposures
and additionally adjusts for differentials in credit risk according to the type of instrument
and counterparty. The denominator of the leverage ratio however, is the total assets of
the bank, assuming that the capital needs of a bank are determined by the level of assets.
The inaccuracy of the leverage ratio as a sole measure of capital adequacy is highlighted
through the existence of risky off balance sheet activities which are not captured by this
measure.
There is however no reason to expect that the capital measures defined by regulators
necessarily reflect the internally defined measure that banks target in the management of
their operations. Economic capital is the amount of risk capital, assessed on a realistic
basis, which a firm requires to cover the risks that it is running or collecting as a going
concern, such as market risk, credit risk, and operational risk. It is the amount of money
which is needed to secure survival in a worst case scenario. Typically, economic capital
is calculated by determining the amount of capital that the firm needs to ensure that
its realistic balance sheet stays solvent over a certain time period with a pre-specified
probability. However, obtaining a proxy measure of economic capital that is accurate as
well as comparable across institutions is extremely difficult. Therefore, in this chapter,
we assume that banks manage their capital in such as way as to reduce both likelihood of
a breach of regulation as well as the implicit and explicit costs associated. We therefore
adopt the total capital ratio as the basis on which we calculate the buffer of capital. The
measure of risk weighted assets (rwa) in the denominator requires banks to charge more
capital for riskier assets, discouraging them from holding risky assets. If the risk weights
accurately measure the riskiness of assets, then the risk weighted capital ratio should
successfully distinguish between risky and safe banks, and effectively predict bank failure.
Data on rwa are not, however, available as far back as 1986. Therefore, in order to order
to analyze capital management decisions dating back prior to the implementation of Basel
I, we create a proxy series as per the methodology put forward by Beatty and Gron (2001).
Our estimated rwa variable, defined as erwa is calculated as total loans + (0.2 ∗ agency
securities) + (0.5 ∗municipal securities) + (1 ∗ corporate securities).
Moreover, we proxy missing values of tier one capital with the series for total equity.
Comparing pre- and post- Basel periods we find that the correlations for both series are
good. Between 1990 and 2006, the correlation between the erwa to total assets series
and the true risk weighted assets to total assets is around 83 percent. The correlation
between the ratio of common equity to total assets and the tier one capital to total assets
ratio is around 97 percent.
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Prior to the introduction of Basel I in 1992, US regulators employed a simple leverage
ratio to assess capital adequacy: primary capital10 had to exceed 5.5 percent of assets,
while the total amount of primary plus secondary11 capital had to exceed six percent of
assets. According to the Federal Reserve Boards definition of zones for classifying banks
with respect to supervisory action, we consider a ratio of total capital to risk weighted
assets equal to seven percent to be the regulatory minimum. This requirement was
effective until December 31, 1990, when banks were required to hold a minimum of 3.25
percent of their risk weighted assets as tier one capital and a minimum of 7.25 percent of
their risk weighted assets in the form of total capital. From the end of 1992, the minimum
tier one and total capital ratios were raised to four and eight percent respectively under
Basel I. Capital requirements throughout the sample period are detailed in Table 4.1.
Charter value: The charter value of a bank is defined as the net present value of its
future rents. Charter value can hence be thought of as being the market value of assets,
minus the replacement cost of the bank (Keeley, 1990; Demsetz et. al., 1997 and Gropp
and Vesala, 2001). As is common in the literature, we proxy the charter value of the bank





Where bva, bvl and mve depict the book value of assets, the book value of liabilities
and the market value of equity respectively. The benefit of using Tobins q to capture
charter value is that it is a market based measure meaning greater market power in
both asset and deposit markets are reflected in a higher q value. Moreover, it allows for
comparability among banks of varying sizes in our analysis.
Descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest are presented in Table 4.2. The
sample is split by both capitalization, as well as by q, using an average value at the end
of the sample. Banks can therefore either be above or below average. In addition to the
sub-samples by capitalization and charter value, we further split the sample by asset size.
BHCs in the top tenth percentile by maximum total assets are classified as big. Those
in the tenth to fiftieth percentile are medium, and finally, BHCs in the bottom fiftieth
percentile are considered small. Figures 4.1, and 4.2 plot the total capital ratios and q
values of banks in each size sub-sample over the entire period respectively.
From Figures 4.1, and 4.2 we note substantial variations over time. In the late eighties,
interest rates were rising, regulatory pressure was generally lax, and the banking industry
was plagued with portfolio problems. Charter values at this time remain relatively low
and consistent across the three size classes. Bank capital rose slightly. During the early
1990s, corresponding with a period of economic recovery and falling interest rates, we
note slow rising charters, particularly among the larger BHCs. It is quite possible that
the too-big-to-fail provision in the FDICIA provided an implicit subsidy to large banking
10The sum of equity plus loan loss reserves.
11Primarily qualifying subordinated debentures.
12Tobins q is a measure of firm performance that compares the market value of a company’s stock with
the value of a company’s equity book value. If Tobin’s q (the ratio of the market valuation of assets to
the replacement cost of assets) is above 1, the firm is earning a rate of return higher than that justified
by the cost of its assets.
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firms, contributing to their higher charters evident at this time. Moreover, capital started
to build up, corresponding with a sharp rise in portfolio risks. These observations might
be explained through the introduction of the risk based capital requirements in the US
at this time.
Smaller BHCs held considerably larger capital buffers than their larger counterparts,
an observation that remains evident throughout the sample period. This finding is consis-
tently predicted by the literature (see among others Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Esty, 1997;
Salas and Saurina, 2002). Most obviously, large geographically diversified banks will have
a much smaller probability of experiencing a large decline in their capital ratios, and a
significantly greater ease with which to raise equity capital at short notice. This diversifi-
cation effect increases with size and can perhaps explain the desire of smaller institutions
to retain earnings as a precaution against unknown future needs. This effect is reinforced
by asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers and by government support
for banks that are at risk (too big to fail). Banks help overcome information asymme-
tries by screening and monitoring borrowers, but these are costly activities and banks are
likely to balance the cost of (and gain from) these activities against the cost of excess
capital. In the presence of scale economies in screening and monitoring, one would expect
large banks to substitute relatively less of these activities with excess capital. Despite
taking less risks, the larger capital buffers of smaller banks may reflect their difficulty in
raising equity capital at short notice, thereby retaining earnings as a precaution against
unknowns future needs. In all cases however, we note a significant jump in capital buffers
between 1992 and 1995.
The mid- to late 1990s were plagued with massive consolidation in the banking in-
dustry. Rising concentration and hence market power appears to have raised the charter
values of all BHCs significantly. Perhaps also because of scale economies, large BHCs
saw their charter values rising much faster than medium and small BHCs. The anticipa-
tion and the eventual passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act
(GLB)13 apparently further widened large banks’ charter values relative to their smaller
counterparts. Large BHCs were in a much better position to take advantage of the expan-
sion of banking powers, and hence scope economies, than medium and small BHCs. The
fact that very large BHCs continued to get even larger may have further substantiated
their implicit too-big-to-fail subsidies. The capital buildup congruently continued its up-
ward trend before stabilizing towards the late 1990s. Bank risks additionally continued
to fall until this time, perhaps indicating a relationship between risk and capital borne
from Basel I.
Towards the end of the sample period, there is some convergence in the average char-
ters across the three size classes. Possible explanations for this variation include the over
estimation of scope economies offered by GLB Act at the time of its implementation.
Alternatively, technological advances in banking may have gradually filtering down to
smaller institutions resulting in a removal of differences in this respect. Despite the slight
convergence, the average charter values of large BHCs remained significantly above those
13The GBLA legalized the integration of commercial banking, securities brokerage and dealing and
insurance activities, greatly expanding banking power and thus allowing banks to realize potential scope
economies by engaging in a mix of financial services.
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of medium BHCs which was in turn remained higher than the average charters of small
BHCs.
4.4 Estimation: Methodology and Results
Despite the benefits of adopting Tobins q to capture bank charter value, we acknowledge
some of the drawbacks associated. For example, due to the inclusion of bva in its cal-
culation, Tobins q measures only historical costs rather than the current costs of assets.
Deviations from one may therefore arise due to differences in expected and actual asset
returns. Moreover, endogeneity between q and bank capital may exist, since banks will
try to maintain a target probability of default depending on risk and capital, which is
primarily driven by the value of q. To account for these factors, our analysis consists
of two parts. In the first step, we regress our dependent variable qit on a set of control
variables that capture a banks’ revenue mix, loan portfolio and deposit composition as-
sumed to determine a banks’ charter. We are then able to extract predicted values for qit
(qˆit) as inputs into our second step equation, allowing us to address the aforementioned
estimation issues. The first step equation to be estimated can be formalized as follows:
qit = ζ0 + ζ1X0it + κ0it (4.4)
where κ0it is the error term consisting of a bank specific component (µ0i) and white
noise (κ0it). X0it represents a vector of variables that determine the banks charter value
including net interest margin (nim), capturing bank profitability; the ratio of loans to
total assets (loans), measuring risk; the lagged debt to asset ratio (debtt−1), to control
for financial leverage; the ratio of bank deposits to total liabilities (td), to capture the
cost of funds, and deposit growth rates (gdep), as a measure of bank growth possibilities.
The definitions of control variables and their expected signs are detailed in Table 4.3.
In the second step, we focus on the relationship between qit and buffer. As explained
above, we include the predicted values qˆit from the first stage as inputs into the second
step regression. The hypothesis to be tested is that the long run relationship between
the capital buffer and qit is highly non linear such that high charter value banks will
hold higher capital buffers. While banks with capital approaching the requirement will
have little incentive to hold much capital as protection. The second step equation to be
estimated can be presented as:
bufit = f(qˆit−1) + α1X1it + κ1it (4.5)
The key variable in our non linear regression model is the lagged explanatory variable
measuring bank charter value qˆit−1. We assume that the non linear relationship between
qˆit−1 and the capital buffer is determine by the unknown function f(·).
In addition to capturing the relationship between qˆit−1 and capital, the model includes
several other control variables that may influence the target capital buffer of bank i at
time t. Different corporate finance theories produce a long list of factors that drive non-
financial firms’ capital structures (see Harris and Raviv, 1991; Frank and Goyal, 2003;
Frank and Goyal, 2007). The empirical corporate finance literature has converged towards
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a set of variables that reliably predict leverage of non-financial firms in the cross section.14
Recently, a set of authors developing models of target bank capital have confirmed the
validity of these variables for a set of firms in a slightly different legal and institutional
environment (Diamond and Rajan, 2000; Allen et al., 2006; and Gropp and Heider, 2008).
Hence, variables included in the X1 vector above are drawn from the corporate finance
literature and can be defined as follows:
Risk From a regulators point of view, banks with a relatively risky portfolio, ie.
with a high credit risk, should hold a larger capital buffer. Otherwise, these banks will
be more likely to fall below the minimum capital ratio, increasing the probability of
bankruptcy and likelihood of facing costs associated with failure.15 Measuring bank risk
is not a simple task since each alternate proxy has its own characteristics and limitations.
Consequently no single proxy provides a perfect measure of bank risk. Several varying
measures of risk have been adopted in the literature however, no consensus on which is
most suitable exists.
Here, we capture risk by creatin an index as per Chessen (1987), Keeton (1989) and
Shrieves and Dahl (1992). The index, constructed from accounting data, is calculated as
follows:
(0.25 ∗ interest bearing balances) + (0.10 ∗ shortterm US treasury and government
agency debt securities) + (0.50 ∗ state and local government securities) + (0.25 ∗ bank
acceptances) + (0.25 ∗ fed funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to
resell) + (0.75 ∗ standby letters of credit and foreign office guarantees) +
(0.25 ∗ loan and lease financing commitments) + (0.50 ∗ commercial letters of
credit) + (all other assets)
The weighted sum of these asset amounts is then divided by total assets.
Bank size: It is usually argued that larger firms are safer, better known in the
market, and more exposed to agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) explaining
why larger firms generally have lower degrees of capitalization. The size of a bank may
additionally play a role in determining risk appetite through its impact on investment
opportunities and diversification possibilities as well as access to equity capital. Large
banks might be covered by the too-big-to-fail phenomenon whereby any distress will be
bailed out by government assistance. Therefore, to capture size effects on both buffer and
risk adjustments, we include the log of total assets (size) with an ambiguous expected
sign in both cases.
Return on assets: Bank profitability may have a positive effect on bank capital if
the bank prefers to increase capital through retained earnings rather than through equity
issues. This might be the case since equity issues may convey negative information to
the market about the banks value in the presence of asymmetric information. Return on
assets (roa) is included as a measure of bank profits. The expected sign on the coefficient
14See Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; and more recently Frank and Goyal, 2007.
15See Ancharya (1996).
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is positive since the level of buffer capital would, in this case, be expected to move in line
with the level of bank profitability.
Liquidity: Banks with more liquid assets need less insurance against a possible
breach of the minimum capital requirements. Moreover, the non zero risk weight associ-
ated with liquid assets means that banks can increase their capital buffers by liquidating
assets. Therefore banks with more liquid assets generally have smaller target capital
buffers and may also be willing to increase their levels of risk. We therefore expect a
negative relationship between liquidity, calculated as the ratio of bond holdings, share
holdings, and interbank assets to total assets, and the bank’s capital buffer.
Each is described in detail in Table 4.3. In addition to the banks specific controls,
we interact bank risk with the lagged charter value. By doing this, we will capture any
relationship between bank charter and the capital buffer that works through risk. The
error term, κ1it, is assumed to consist of a bank specific component (µ1i) and white noise
(κ1it).
Equations (4.4.) and (4.5.) are estimated using pooled time series cross section
observations, including a full set of time dummies to allow for the intercept to shift
over time. These dummies capture unobserved bank invariant time effects not included
in the regression, but their coefficients are not reported here for brevity. In addition
to estimating equations (4.4.) and (4.5.) as presented above, we re-run the equations
including the lagged dependent variable in each case. Here, we adopt the one and two
step Blundell-Bond system GMM estimators (Blundell and Bond, 1998). However, since
they produce quite similar estimates, we present only the (asymptotically) more efficient
two step estimates. The results are presented with Huber/White/sandwich corrected
standard errors.
4.4.1 Methodology
Since the functional form f(·) is assumed to be unknown, we adopt three varying ap-
proaches to estimate the relationships between charter value and the capital buffer in
equation (4.5.). The first, Model I, assumes f(·) to be a simple linear function. The
second, Model II, models f(·) as a quadratic function. These two approaches provide a
baseline against which we can compare the more efficient spline estimator. In our final
approach, Model III, we adopt a semi parametric methodology, whereby we estimate
a standard regression that includes spline variables for each of the charter value splines.
For equation (4.5.), the semi parametric spline approach allows the relationship between
the capital buffer and charter value to vary depending on the size of the charter.16
The idea is that any continuous function can be approximated arbitrarily well by a
piecewise linear function that is a continuous function composed of straight lines. One
linear segment represents the function for qˆit−1 below s1. Another linear segment rep-
resents the function for values between s1 and s2, and so on. The linear segments are
arranged so that they join at s1, s2,..., which are called knots. The knots, in our case
placed the 25th percentile, the median and the 75th percentiles, are used as threshold
16For a brief examination of the linear spline, see Greene (1993, pp. 235-238). A more detailed
treatment is found in Seber and Wild (1989, pp. 481-489).
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values from which the spline variables are created.17
Under Model III, spline variables are substituted for qˆit−1 in equation (4.5). The
benefit of estimating a GMM equation with spline variables rather than a non parametric
equation to capture non linearity, is that it allows the inclusion of all relevant variables
already included in the previous estimations as control variables.
4.4.2 Results
The results from estimating equations (4.4.) and (4.5.) are presented in panels 1 and
2 of Table 4.4 respectively. Equation (4.4.) is presented in columns one and two. For
equation (4.5) , columns three and four correspond to Model I, while columns five and
six correspond to Model II. These are the simple parametric versions of our model.
Columns seven and eight relate to the semi parametric case, Model III.
Equation (4.5.) For the linear case (Model I), the effect of charter value on the capital
buffer is positive and highly significant as expected, such that banks with higher qˆit−1
values hold larger capital buffers. In addition, risk is positive and significant in line with
previous findings in the literature (see Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Jacques and Nigro, 1997;
Rime, 2001). The interaction term qˆit−1riskit is positive and significant. This indicates
that the impact of charter value on capital buffers is dependent on the level of bank risk.
The positive coefficient shows that as risk increases the impact of charter value on capital
is enhanced.
The inadequacy of the linear model however, is highlighted by the improvement in
the fit of the quadratic model. Since the variables qˆit−1 and its square qˆ
2
it−1 exhibit some
evidence of collinearity, we center qˆit−1 at its mean. Hence, in Model II qˆit−1 is replaced
by qˆCENit−1. The coefficients on the quadratic estimates hint at a concave relationship
between the two variables. In particular, we find a significant negative coefficient on the
squared term (qˆ2it−1). For both the linear and the quadratic estimations, the coefficients
attached to the variables of interest remain largely unchanged regardless of the estimation
methodology imposed. The only difference is that the significance of the control variables;
size, roa and liquid and is reduced under the GMM approach. The coefficients on the
lagged dependent variables are positive as expected, and statistically significant in each
case.
While the quadratic estimate provides a fairly good fit, one major limitation is that
it imposes an arbitrary functional specification. For the estimations in column seven
and eight, we therefore substitute our spline variables for qˆit−1 and additionally include
all control variables as in the previous models. The coefficient on each spline variable
corresponds to the slope of the piecewise linear function in the relevant interval.
Despite the clear improvement in the fit of the model, we additionally find that most
spline variables are significant. The spline coefficients show a clear hump shaped rela-
tionship between charter value and buffer capital, in line with the concave form noted in
the quadratic estimation. These results indicate that banks with charter values above the
17See Poirier (1974) and Garber and Poirier (1974) for a detailed discussion.To create the spline vari-
ables, we start by constructing a set of dummy variables which are set equal to one if the qˆit value falls
in the desired range, and zero otherwise. The dummy variables are then multiplied by qˆit to obtain the
qˆitspline variables for equation (4.5.)
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median level maintain a constant capital buffer. However, as the charter value decreases,
banks build up their capital buffers since with lower expected earnings they are less able
to cushion negative capital shocks out of current earnings. The larger capital buffer serves
as an insurance against negative capital shocks. As the charter value continues to fall,
the relationship is reversed. The incentive for the bank to protect its charter value is
lost and the capital buffer falls rapidly towards zero. This is partially consistent with
the predictions of the theoretical literature whereby it is assumed that as long as charter
value is a degree greater than the cost of recapitalization, then a decline in expected
earnings increases desired capital protection against poor earnings and more capital is
needed to protect the charter value. However, we see that high charter value banks are
not necessarily holding larger buffers of capital as predicted (see Marcus, 1984; Keeley,
1990; Demsetz et. al, 1997; Hellman et. al, 2000), but rather that the capital buffers
remain relatively constant after a certain charter threshold. Banks with charter values
slightly below the median range are holding the largest capital buffers. One possible ex-
planation for the finding might be that for higher charter banks, it is generally easier to
raise new equity in the future, reducing the need for holding large levels of precautionary
capital. Alternatively, this finding indicates that banks with charter values above a cer-
tain threshold view themselves as too-big-to fail. The existence of government insurance
schemes erodes the need for them to protect further against failure.
A positive and significant relationship continues to exist between capital and risk; as
bank risk increases the capital buffer rises. The other control variables, roa, size and
liquid generally have the correct sign, but are barely significant.
4.4.3 Cross Sectional Estimations
To assess the sensitivity of the results to pooling over the sample period, we additionally
estimate cross section regressions for each time period. Since the results are broadly
unchanged from those obtained under the pooled estimations we do not report them
here. Instead, we graph the evolution of coefficients for qˆit−1 on bufit for Model I Model
II and Model III in Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 respectively.
In Figure 4.3, we observe that the positive relationship documented in Table 4.4 has
remained relatively constant over time. We do however note a slight increase in the linear
impact of charter value on bank capital around the time of the capital buildup (between
1990 and 1994). The coefficients however always remain between 0.10 and 0.25 indicating
that the variation has not been substantial.
Figure 4.4, corresponding to the quadratic estimation (Model II) again shows that
the form of the relationship has not varied significantly over time. The negative coefficient
on the squared term corresponding to the shape of the curve, documented here, indicates
a consistently concave form. We do however note a slight change in the shape of the curve
after 1995 when the slope becomes even steeper and remains that way until the end of the
sample. This would tend to indicate that the non linear relationship between charters and
capital buffers found in these estimations is particularly reinforced after 1994. Since this
change in the relationship comes after the introduction of the Basel capital requirements,
the finding is in line with that of Demsetz et. Al (1996). They show that after the
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introduction of Basel I, high charter value banks held more capital and took less risk.
Moreover, they find that high franchise value banks reduce the probability of default by
increasing capital.
The coefficients reported in Figure 4.5 correspond to the spline estimation (Model
III) giving further insight into what drove the change in the relationship observed above.
We can see that prior to 1994, banks with higher charters held higher buffers in line with
the traditional charter value models. The non linear effect, captured by the coefficients on
splines 1-3 indicate that the greatest change exists for low charter banks. In particular,
coefficients for spline 3 and spline 2 appear to drive the fluctuation noted in Figure 4.4.
These finding confirm the fact that a non linear relationship between capital and charter
values only becomes substantial after 1994.
Our cross sectional estimations show that coefficients on the variables of interest have
not varied substantially over time and therefore our previous estimations do not appear
to suffer significantly from pooling over the sample period. We do however find that the
non linear relationship between capital and charter values is enhanced substantially since
1995. This is in line with the panel estimation findings.
4.4.4 Robustness Check
As an additional robustness check, we vary the placement on the knots for the creation
of our spline coefficients. In our initial estimation, the knots for creating spline variables
were placed at the 25th percentile, the median and the 75th percentile. To further assess
the validity of the finding that past a certain charter threshold, banks will hold a stable
amount of capital (rather than the predicted increase in capital corresponding to larger
charters), we create new spline variables as per Section 4.4.1, varying the location of the
knots. Three further specifications are estimated: In Specification I, knots are placed
at the 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentiles. In Specification II we place the knots at
each decile until the median (10th, 20th, 30th, 40th and median) and then at the 75th
percentile. Finally, in Specification III, the knots are placed at the 25th percentile, the
median and then at each remaining decile (60th, 70th, 80th and 90th). These breakdowns
allow a detailed assessment of how the relationship between bank capital and charter value
varies depending on the size of the charter, and allows us to further assess the robustness
of our estimation results obtained in the previous section. Table 4.5 defines the splines
utilized in each of the specifications. The results from the robustness estimations are
presented in Table 4.6.
Again, the results are broadly in line with the panel estimations and cross sectional
findings. The detailed analysis confirms the finding that large charter banks maintain a
constant capital buffer. For each specification, spline coefficients above the median range
are very near to zero. Moreover, the signs on the slope coefficients below the median range
additionally confirm the shape of the curve depicted by the panel estimations. That is,
as charter values start to fall, capital is built up. The relationship is only reversed after
charters fall below the 20th percentile range. After this time, the capital buffer falls
rapidly towards zero. Specification II however indicates that the capital buffer never
actually equals zero, rather once charter values fall below the 10th percentile, capital
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buffers remain consistently small but above zero nevertheless.
4.5 Discussion
This chapter analyzes the long run relationship between bank capital and charter values
for a set of US BHCs between 1986 and 2008. Much of the literature examining the
relationship between capital, risk and charter values have assumed the relationship to be
linear. Our study explores the non linearity between bank capital and charter values by
adopting both quadratic and semi parametric spline techniques.
Our results show that the relationship between capital and charter values is highly
non linear as predicted by theory. Contrary to predictions however, we show that higher
charter value banks do not necessarily hold more capital. One possible explanation is
that beyond a certain charter level, it is easier for banks to raise new equity thereby
reducing the need for them to manage large capital buffers. Alternatively, higher charter
value banks may view themselves as partially insulated from failure due to the existence
of government safety nets and the too-big-to-fail paradigm. Our results further indicate
that when charters start to fall, banks build up capital in an attempt to protect their
charter. Falling charters reflects the notion that expected earnings are falling and hence
banks are less able to cushion negative capital shocks out of current earnings. A buildup
of capital at this time insures against negative capital shocks. The relationship between
capital and charter values is however reversed when charter values continue to fall. The
capital buffer then very quickly falls towards zero as a means perhaps to “gambling for
resurrection”.
Our results indicate that the charter value in itself does act as a disciplining mechanism
for bank capital management. Banks with a valuable enough charter will manage capital
so as to maintain a cushion for protection against negative shocks. Our analysis has
however, been limited to assessing capital ratios as defined by the 1988 accord. Current
turmoil suggests that securitization and financial market innovation may have resulted in
these capital buffers not reflecting the true capitalization of the banks, particulary in the
US. The rise in unknown risks, rather than the measurable risks that financial institutions
are specialized in managing, may therefore not have been adequately captured by the
existing regulatory requirements.
While our results indicate that charter values appear to have encouraged prudent
capital management policies in the run up to the current crisis, it is unclear how this
relationship will change when supervisors and regulators account for the off-balance sheet
risks. Our results therefore have important policy implications. Since bank capital man-
agement is evidently endogenous by nature, it is essential that amendments to bank
capital requirements are able to capture the true nature of risks and exposures inherent.
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4.A Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: US Bank Capital Requirements.
Tier one ratio Total capital ratio
1986 to end 1990 7%
1991 to end 1992 3.25% 7.25%
end 1992 to 2008 4% 8%
Table 4.2: Sample Distribution.
Observations Mean Std. Dev
Big Banks buffer capital 1.80 0.09
risk 0.74 0.10
charter value 1.20 0.11
Medium Banks buffer capital 2.89 0.06
risk 0.56 0.05
charter value 1.11 0.09
Small Banks buffer capital 4.11 0.04
risk 0.42 0.01
charter value 0.91 0.04
Highly Capitalized Banks buffer capital 5.10 0.07
risk 0.48 0.16
charter value 1.19 0.08
Low Capitalized Banks buffer capital 1.32 0.10
risk 0.82 0.10
charter value 1.04 0.06
High Risk Banks buffer capital 3.92 0.08
risk 0.54 0.13
charter value 1.01 0.08
Low Risk Banks buffer capital 4.01 0.03
risk 0.21 0.03
charter value 1.21 0.04
High Charter Value Banks buffer capital 4.01 0.08
risk 0.59 0.10
charter value 1.55 0.04
Low Charter Value Banks buffer capital 2.94 0.09
risk 0.70 0.21
charter value 0.85 0.10
Total Sample buffer capital 5.31 0.10
risk 0.68 0.21
charter value 1.08 0.05
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Table 4.3: Control Variables.
Variable Description
Equation (4.4.)
nim ratio of net interest income to total assets.
loans ratio of total loans to total assets.
debtt−1 lagged ratio of total liabilities over total assets.
td ratio of bank deposits to total liabilities.
gdep deposit growth rate.
Equation (4.5.)
risk risk weighted assets as per Section 4.3.1.
size log of total assets.
roa the of ratio return on assets to total assets.
liquid ratio of cash plus securities to total assets.
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Table 4.4: Total Sample Panel Regressions
First-step equation Second-step equation
Model I: Linear Model II: Quadratic Model III: Spline
fixed effects GMM fixed effects GMM fixed effects GMM fixed effects GMM
Panel I: Equation (4.4.): qit = ζ0 + ζ1X0it + κ0it
nim 0.40 (1.97)** 0.49 (2.04)**
loans 0.07 (0.98) 0.10 (2.87)***
debtt−1 -0.04 (3.12)*** -0.06 (1.88)*
td 0.06 (1.85)* 0.08 (1.99)**





Panel II: Equation (4.5.):bufit = f(qˆit) + α1X1it + κ1it
buft−1 0.09 (4.33)*** 0.08 (3.29)*** 0.05 (7.67)***
qˆit−1 0.69 (5.45)*** 0.74 (3.40)***







risk 0.77 (7.02)*** 0.64 (4.39)*** 0.89 (8.92)*** 0.44 (12.17)*** 0.73 (9.29)*** 0.86 (14.35)***
qˆit−1riskit 0.38 (2.05)** 0.29 (2.00)** 0.41 (0.99) 0.39 (0.71) 0.47 (1.01) 0.38 (0.99)
size -0.21 (1.84)* -0.12 (1.54) -0.22 (1.07) -0.15 (1.83)* -0.19 (0.99) -0.24 (0.56)
roa 0.21 (1.98)** 0.18 (1.23) 0.28 (1.14) 0.18 (1.34) 0.25 (1.86)* 0.33 (2.11)**
liquid 0.02 (2.95)*** 0.05 (0.99) 0.03 (1.99)** 0.07 (1.22) 0.06 (2.12)** 0.03 (2.69)***
R2 0.29 0.38 0.47
Sargan 64.34 (3.20) 34.23 (5.30) 28.40 (3.01)
a(1) 2.01 (0.00) 1.39 (0.00) -2.30 (0.00)
a(2) 1.03 (0.33) 2.01 (0.21) 1.38 (0.88)
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the ten, five and one percent levels respectively. Each regression includes time dummies as a control that are not reported here. Coefficients
depicted are estimates of equation (4.5.): bufit = f(qˆit) + α1X1it + κ1it. Spline1 refers to: qˆit < 25
thpercentile; spline2, to: 25th percentile <qˆit < median; spline 3, to: median
<qˆit < 75
thpercentile; and spline4 to: qˆit > 25
thpercentile.
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Table 4.5: Robustness Check: Spline Definitions
spline name definition
Specification I
spec11 qˆit < 20
thpercentile
spec12 20
th percentile <qˆit < 40
thpercentile
spec13 40
thpercentile <qˆit < 60
thpercentile
spec14 60
thpercentile <qˆit < 80
thpercentile
spec15 qˆit > 80
thpercentile
Specification II
spec21 qˆit < 10
thpercentile
spec22 10
th percentile <qˆit < 20
thpercentile
spec23 20
thpercentile <qˆit < 30
thpercentile
spec24 30
thpercentile <qˆit < 40
thpercentile
spec25 40
thpercentile <qˆit < median
spec26 median <qˆit < 75
thpercentile
spec27 qˆit > 75
thpercentile
Specification III
spec31 qˆit < 25
thpercentile
spec32 25
th percentile <qˆit < median
spec33 median <qˆit < 60
thpercentile
spec34 60
thpercentile <qˆit < 70
thpercentile
spec35 70
thpercentile <qˆit < 80
thpercentile
spec36 80
thpercentile <qˆit < 90
thpercentile
spec37 qˆit > 90
thpercentile
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Note: Coefficients depicted are estimates of equation (4.5.): bufit = f(qˆit) + α1X1it + κ1it. Spline1
refers to: qˆit < 25
thpercentile; spline2, to: 25th percentile <qˆit < median;
spline 3, to: median <qˆit < 75
thpercentile; and spline4 to: qˆit > 25
thpercentile.
82
Table 4.6: Robustness Check.
Second-step equation
Specification I Specification II Specification III
basic fixed effects GMM basic fixed effects GMM basic fixed effects GMM
Equation (4.5.):bufit = f(qˆit) + α1riskit + α2qˆitriskit + α3X1it + κ1it
bufit−1 0.04 (2.67)*** 0.06 (3.65)*** 0.07 (4.45)***
spec11 0.35 (1.97)** 0.39 (2.05)**
spec12 -0.33 (3.98)*** -0.27 (3.15)***
spec13 -0.12 (1.78)* -0.12 (1.77)*
spec14 0.02 (1.13) 0.01 (1.09)
spec15 0.00 (1.69)* 0.01 (1.57)*
spec21 0.04 (1.58)* 0.06 (1.67)*
spec22 0.57 (2.89)*** 0.46 (3.69)***
spec23 -0.04 (2.37)** -0.03 (5.56)***
spec24 -0.10 (2.53)** -0.07 (1.90)**
spec25 -0.12 (1.16) -0.12 (1.78)*
spec26 0.00 (1.69)* -0.01 (1.74)*
spec27 0.01 (1.98)** 0.00 (2.17)**
spec31 0.32 (1.87)** 0.29 (2.23)**
spec32 -0.22 (8.75)*** 0.17 (7.30)***
spec33 -0.05 (1.70)* -0.04 (1.10)
spec34 -0.02 (1.09) -0.01 (1.10)
spec35 0.04 (1.93)* 0.03 (1.99)**
spec36 0.00 (2.23)** 0.05 (2.13)**
spec37 0.01 (1.93)* 0.00 (1.99)**
risk 0.76 (11.89)*** 0.98 (12.22)*** 0.87 (14.97)*** 0.92 (12.35)*** 0.89 (11.69)*** 0.68 (12.19)***
qˆit−1riskit 0.27 (1.15) 0.15 (0.75) 0.12 (0.96) 0.23 (1.33) 0.33 (0.89) 0.41 (1.26)
size -0.10 (1.72)* -0.08 (1.11) -0.14 (3.02)*** -0.31 (1.96)** -0.16 (1.75)* -0.23 (2.72)***
roa 0.02 (1.94)* 0.08 (0.92) 0.04 (1.74)* 0.03 (1.68)* 0.06 (2.00)** 0.03 (1.55)
liquid -0.16 (2.71)*** -0.10 (1.71)* -0.22 (1.77)* -0.21 (0.72) -0.14(2.28)** -0.11(1.98)*
R2 0.21 0.33 0.35
Sargan 32.34 (5.40) 43.10 (3.29) 29.20 (2.93)
a(1) -2.30 (0.00) 2.10 (0.00) -1.93 (0.00)
a(2) 1.29 (0.93) -1.02 (0.36) 2.10 (0.73)
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the ten, five and one percent levels respectively. Each regression includes time dummies as a control that are not reported here. Coefficients
depicted are estimates of equation (4.5.): bufit = f(qˆit) + α1X1it + κ1it. Spline variables are as defined in Table 4.5.
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4.B Data Manipulations
4.B.1 Commercial bank dataset
All bank level data is obtained from the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income
(referred to as the Call Reports) published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Since
all insured banks are required to submit Call Report data to the Federal Reserve each
quarter we are able to extract income statement and balance sheet data for around 14,000
commercial banks. The dataset spans from 1976Q1− 2006Q2.
This particular dataset poses several problems for us to deal with in terms of
cleaning the data and obtaining a consistent set of data series. There are several reasons
for this. First, through time, definitions change for some of the variables of interest,
therefore, looking merely at the Report documentation that that banks are required to
fill in is not always sufficient. Therefore it is necessary, on some occasions, to join series
together in order to yield sensible series through time. Moreover, most of the large banks
only provide data on a consolidated foreign and domestic basis requiring the exploration
of which series to use.
RCON vs. RCFD series In general, larger banks only provide data on a consolidated
foreign and domestic basis. Therefore, it is necessary to use the RCFD series rather
than the RCON series for each variable. For banks that do not have foreign operations
however, it is possible to assume that the two series (RCON and RCFD) will be identical,
although it is necessary to bear in mind that foreign deposits in this case are not available.
The definition for total securities changes several times through our sample. It is
therefore necessary for us to combine various individual series through time to create a
consistent variable to work with. Prior to 1984, it is not possible to combine all of the
items that are now considered as investment securities. We therefore need to approxi-
mate the securities variable. Pre-1984 we combine RCFD0400 (US Treasury securities),
RCFD0600 (US Government agency and corporation obligations), RCFD0900 (obliga-
tions of states & political subdivisions) and RCFD0380 (other bonds, stocks and securi-
ties). In 1984q1 however, we are able to separately add up the items making up investment
securities because a) trading account securities for sale at book value (RCFD1000) is re-
placed by securities for sale at market value (RCFD2146) and b) there is no guarantee
that the securities are held to maturity match across the break in 1984. i.e. there is
no guarantee that RCFD0402 (securities issued by states and political subdivisions in
the US) + RCFD0421 (other domestic securities) + RCFD0413(foreign securities) =
RCFD0900 (obligations of states and political subdivisions) + RCFD0950(other secu-
rities). For the pre and post 1984 series to be consistent, these two summations must
be equal. We therefore combine the series RCFD0390 (book value of securities) and
RCFD2146 (assets held in the trading account) for the period 19841 to 1993q4. After
this time, RCFD0390 (book value of securities) is no longer available. From 1994q1 we
therefore proceed by summing up RCFD1754 (total securities held to maturity), and
RCFD1773 (total securities available for sale). Moreover, RCFD1754 (total securities
held to maturity), and RCFD1773 (total securities available for sale) excludes securi-
ties held in the trading account, which is part of RCFD3545 (total trading assets). We
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therefore create an additional securities variable (securties2) which is the summation of
RCFD1754 (total securities held to maturity), RCFD1773 (total securities available for
sale) and RCFD2146 (assets held in trading accounts). We generally make use of the
securities2 variable since this eliminates a break in the series in 1993.
For total loans, we again see that there is a break in the series in March 1984. In
the third quarter of 1984, the series includes the variable RCFD2165 (lease financing
receivables). From March 1984 we adopt RCFD1400 (total loans & leases, gross) as our
total loans variable. Prior to this however, we replace the series with a sum of RCFD1400
(total loans & leases) and RCFD2165 (lease financing receivables). Similarly for net loans
we have RCFD2122 (total loans, net of unearned income) for the period between 1984q1
and 2006q2. Prior to this, we again combine RCFD2122 (total loans, net of unearned
income) with RCFD2165 (lease financing receivables).
Commercial and Industrial loans has a change in definition as well. From 1976 until
1984q3, we make use of the RCFD1600 (commercial and industrial loans). Here, each
bank’s own acceptances are included. From 1984q3 however, the series starts to include
holdings of bankers’ acceptances which are accepted by other banks. We therefore re-
place this series with a combination of the RCFD1755 (acceptances of other banks) and
RCFD1766 (commercial and industrial loans, other). It remains impossible to create a
consistent series here that would exclude banker’s acceptances.
A further change in definition occurs with the Fed Funds series. Considering first the
Fed Funds Sold series. From 1976 until 2002q1 we are able to make use of RCFD1350
(Fed Funds Sold). However, the series discontinues thereafter. We subsequently form a
continuation by summing RCONb987 (Fed Funds sold in domestic offices) and RCFDb989
(securities purchased under agreement to sell).
Similarly, for Fed Funds Purchased, the series RCFD2800 (Fed Funds Purchased)
discontinues at the end of 2001. We are then able to replace the series in 2002q2 with
RCFDb993 (Fed Funds purchased in domestic offices) summed with RCFDb995 (securi-
ties sold under agreement to repurchase).
Other issues in the commercial bank dataset In most of the graphical analysis we
find a kink in the series in 1997q1. Looking closer at the cause of this disturbance in the
data, we find that the number of institutions falls in 1997q1 to 8,648 from 9,772 in 1996q4.
The number subsequently rises again in 1997q2 when the number of reporting institutions
jumps again to 9,248. Investigating the issue further, we find that there appears to be
a fault in the dataset for this period. It seems that information reported for around 800
banks are all returned with 0 values. We therefore correct the data by setting values
equal to those of the previous period where data is missing.
Dealing with mergers With respect to the treatment of bank mergers in the data,
several possible alternative approaches are considered: Option 0 : All observations affected
by a merger are simply dropped from the sample. Note however,if using any lagged growth
rates or differences in the model, this means dropping future observations as well as the
observation when the merger takes place. This option is applied by many existing studies
in the banking literature (see for example Kashyap and Stein, 2000). Option 1 : This
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option is preferable when a large bank acquires a very much smaller bank. Here, all
past balance sheet and income observations are rescaled, using a constant ratio, from the
beginning of the sample up to the quarter preceding the merger. This ratio is equal to
the increase in total assets triggered by the merger. Option 2 : This option is preferable
to Option 1 when two merging banks are of similar size. Here, the merged entities are
reconstructed backwards as the sum of the merging banks. In this case a new new bank
id, different from any existing id, is created and applied to all subsequent observations.
In this chapter, we adopt a mixture of Options 1 and 2; When merging banks are of
different sizes we adopt Option 1 while for a small number of mergers where the merging
banks are of similar size, we create a new bank id as per Option 2.
Merging the Commercial and BHC datasets The following steps were undertaken
to merge the holding company data with with commercial bank data from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago. We start with the commercial bank data set and start by
identifying those banks that belong to foreign call family:
1. We start by generating a foreign call identity as follows:
gen fgncall ind = 0
replace fgncall ind = 1 if fgncallfamily > 0 & fgncallfamily ˜ = .
We then created a variable called identifier which tells us the name of the financial
high holder. (this is equal to the rssd9348 variable in the dataset:
gen identifier = high holder /∗ = rssd9348 ∗ /
If however, the high holder is a foreign call family, the variable gives the number of it
instead:
replace identifier = fgncallfamily if fgncall ind == 1
2. We then make use of the identifier variable to collect holding company data from
the BHC data.
By changing the name of rssd9001 to identifier in BHC data. Moreover, we drop all
observations equal to 0.
3. Finally we merge this dataset back to the commercial bank data. First we copy
the commercial bank dataset and the BHC data into the same directory. Opening the
commercial bank data, we type the following:
merge rssd9001 dateq using BHCpanel, unique sort update merge( mergeBHC)
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Chapter 5
Bank Capital Buffer and Risk
Adjustments
5.1 Introduction
Capital requirements have become one of the key instruments of modern day banking
regulation providing both a cushion during adverse economic conditions and a mechanism
for preventing excessive risk taking ex ante (see Rochet, 1992a; Dewatripont and Tirole,
1994). Theoretical work focusing on the effects of capital requirements on bank risk
appetite is dominated by a theory of moral hazard, in which information asymmetries and
deposit insurance shield banks from the disciplining control of depositors. Taking capital
as exogenous, this strand of literature analyzes incentives in asset risk choice. These
studies show that capital adequacy regulation may reduce the total volume of risky assets
(see Merton, 1977; Sharpe, 1978; Furlong and Keeley, 1989). This literature however,
has also shown that with the further assumption of a risk averse bank utility function 1,
bank portfolio composition may be distorted in the direction of more risky assets. As a
consequence, average risk may increase and risk consistent weights are required to correct
for moral hazard.2 The theoretical literature is thus ambiguous about the relationship
between bank capital and bank risk.
A broader view, moving beyond the theory of moral hazard, is provided by the charter
value theory.3 This theory argues that banks have something to lose since bankruptcy
leads to a loss of future profits. Two further possible characterizations of the relationship
between bank capital and risk thus exist (see Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Diamond and
Rajan, 2000). In contrast to the predictions of the moral hazard theory, banks therefore
no longer hold the minimum allowable amount of capital, rather, they have their own
preferred (target) level of capitalization. If this level is exceeded by regulatory require-
ments, then there is no longer a relationship between capital and risk taking. To our
1A risk averse utility function is usually justified as reflecting the divergence of interest between
managers and shareholders inducing risk averse behavior.
2Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992; and Freixas and Rochet 1997.
3Also referred to as the franchise value (see Marcus, 1984; Boot and Greenbaum, 1993; Demsetz et.
al, 1997; Hellman, Murdoch, and Stiglitz 2000, Matutes and Vives 2000), charter value is the value that
would be foregone if the bank closes.
87
knowledge, there is no theoretical analysis exploring the resulting relationship between
capital and risk, which appears to be ambiguous. The following possible outcomes exist:
(i) higher risk can increase the probability of default and encourage banks to increase
capital, and (ii) higher systematic risk can reduce charter value and lower capital hold-
ings. If however, regulatory capital requirements exceed the banks target level of capital,
then a higher degree of capitalization will lead to a reduction in risk appetite whereby the
charter effects become less important. The quantitative magnitude of this effect however,
may be relatively small.
Within the charter value literature, attention has more recently shifted towards the
capital buffer theory4, a dynamic version of the charter value models in which there are
costs both of altering the level of capital and allowing capital to fall below the minimum
required levels. The buffer theory predicts that banks will maintain a level of capital
above the required minimum (a buffer of capital). The costs of falling below the minimum
required level of capital are both explicit and implicit. Buser et al. (1981) argue that
implicit costs of regulation may arise from regulatory interference designed to control
excess demand for insurance (eg. expanding risk taking). Explicit costs relate to penalties
and/or restrictions imposed by the supervisor triggered by a breach of the regulation,
possibly even leading to bank closure. The novel contributions of the capital buffer theory
are to distinguish the long from the short run relationships between capital and risk taking
and the impact of regulatory capital from observed bank capital. Here, regulatory capital
will have a limited long run impact on bank risk choice, regardless of risk weighting. The
long run relationship between the capital buffer and risk is similar to that predicted by
the charter value theory, and can therefore be either positive or negative. The short run
relationship between capital buffer and risk on the other hand, will depend on the degree
of bank capitalization. For banks near their desired level (highly capitalized banks), we
would expect a positive relationship. However, for banks approaching the regulatory
required level, the relationship should be negative. An increase in regulatory capital
requirements, in the short run, will reduce the buffer of capital and so has the same
impact as a direct reduction in the capital buffer.
Several empirical papers have focused on understanding the relationship between risk
and capital, testing whether increases in capital requirements force banks to increase or
decrease their risk (see Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Aggarwal and
Jacques, 2001; Rime, 2001). Most of these studies have confirmed the positive relationship
between capital and risk adjustments predicted by theory, indicating that banks that have
increased their capital levels over time, have also increased their risk appetite. Shrieves
and Dahl (1992) argue that a positive relationship between the key variables is in line with
several hypotheses which include the unintended effect of minimum capital requirements,
regulatory costs, bankruptcy cost avoidance as well as managerial risk aversion. Jacques
and Nigro (1997) on the other hand find a negative relationship between changes in capital
and risk levels. They note that such a finding may be attributable to methodological flaws
in the risk based guidelines.5 Alternatively, as suggested by Shrieves and Dahl (1992),
4See among others Milne and Whalley, 2001; Peura and Keppo, 2006; VanHoose, 2007a&b.
5Avery and Berger (1991) suggest that while the risk weights constitute a significant improvement
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a negative relationship may exist between capital and risk adjustments if banks seek to
exploit the deposit insurance subsidy.
Evidence on the capital buffer theory is however more limited. For a set of German
savings banks, Heid et. al (2004) suggest that the coordination of capital and risk ad-
justments depends on the amount of capital the bank holds in excess of the regulation.
Banks with low capital buffers try to rebuild an appropriate buffer by raising capital
while simultaneously lowering risk. In contrast, banks with large buffers maintain their
capital buffer by increasing risk when capital increases. These findings are in line with
the predictions of the capital buffer theory.
The relationship between risk and capital has several important policy implications.
The recent modification in the capital requirement regulation (Basel II) is a structural
change that places far more emphasis on the range of capital that may be required given
the specific risks faced by each bank. It has been argued that a more risk sensitive capital
adequacy regulation may reduce banks’ willingness to take risk. However, if banks already
risk adjust their total capital, ie. minimum capital plus buffer capital, more than implied
by Basel I, then replacing Basel I with Basel II may not affect the capital to asset ratio
or risk profile of banks’ portfolio as much as feared. It is therefore clearly of interest to
understand the relationship between risk and capital buffer formation.
For a sample of publicly traded US bank holding companies (BHCs) we investigate the
relationship between short run capital and risk adjustments. Our estimations show that
the management of short term adjustments in capital and risk are dependent on the size
of the buffer. For banks with capital buffers approaching the minimum requirement, the
relationship between adjustments in capital and risk are negative. That is that low capital
banks either (i) increase their buffers by reducing their risk, or (ii) gamble for resurrection
by taking more risk as a means to rebuild the buffer. In contrast, the relationship between
capital and risk adjustments for well capitalized banks is positive, indicating that they
maintain their target level of capital by increasing (decreasing) risk when capital increases
(decreases). Allowing for the speed at which banks adjust towards their target capital
and risk levels to be bank specific, we show that small buffer banks adjust to their
target capital level significantly faster than their better capitalized counterparts. We are
however, unable to find significant evidence of a similar trend for adjustments in risk.
We additionally investigate the time varying nature of the relationship between capital
and risk adjustments, which appears to exhibit a cyclical pattern: negative after the
1991/1992 crisis, and positive before 1991 and after 1997.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 outlines the empirical
framework adopted. Section 5.3 describes the data and defines the hypotheses to be
tested. Section 5.4 presents our empirical estimations and results. Section 5.5 briefly
discusses our findings and concludes.
over the old capital standards, several instances in which the weights assigned to specific categories are
too crude to reflect true risk.
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5.2 Empirical Framework
In order to investigate the short run relationship between capital buffer and risk ad-
justments, we acknowledge that banks will manage their capital buffer by accounting
primarily for the risk of default. Similarly, risk taking will depend on how close the capi-
tal buffer is to the minimum requirement. Moreover, in this framework, observed changes
in a banks’ capital buffer and its portfolio risk can be thought of as a function of two
components; one part which is managed internally by the bank plus an exogenous random
shock. Building on previous work6, our model, with simultaneously determined variables,
can be written as follows:
∆bufit = ∆buf
bank
it + εit (5.1)
∆riskit = ∆risk
bank
it + µit (5.2)
where ∆bufit and ∆riskit are the observed changes in the capital buffer and risk
respectively. ∆buf bankit and ∆risk
bank
it are the changes in the capital buffer and risk that
are managed internally by the bank. εit and µi and are the exogenously determined
random shocks for bank i at time t.
The framework outlined above further assumes that banks will establish an internally
optimal capital buffer and risk level that they will target over time. The long run level
of target capital and risk are given by:
buf∗it = ξzit + ηit (5.3)
risk∗it = ϕuit + ωit (5.4)
Here zit and uit capture all variables (including ∆bufit in the risk equation and ∆riskit
in the buffer capital equation) that determine the banks’ target level of capital buffer and
risk. ξ and ϕ are the vectors of coefficients to be estimated. ∆bufit is assumed to impact
the target level of risk since any short term change in the capital of the bank will affect
the banks’ probability of default. Similarly a shift in the banks’ risk profile will alter the
banks distance from the regulatory minimum.
Over time, exogenous shocks will drive actual levels away from or toward, target levels.
Banks will therefore need to adjust both the capital buffer and risk taking to revert back
to their internally optimal level. This adjustment is depicted by ∆buf bankit and ∆risk
bank
it .
Full adjustment to the target level however, may be too costly or infeasible. Our model
therefore assumes partial, rather than complete, adjustment in each period.
We can then think of the bank managed adjustment as:
∆buf bankit = ξ0(buf
∗
it − bufit−1) (5.5)
∆riskbankit = ϕ0(risk
∗
it − riskit−1) (5.6)
6See Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Aggarwal and Jacques, 2001.
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Here ξ0 and ϕ0 are the speeds of adjustment of the capital buffer and risk respectively;
buf∗it and risk
∗
it are the target levels of capital buffer and risk; and bufit−1 and riskit−1
capture the actual levels of buffer capital and risk in the previous period. bufit − bufit−1
and riskit − riskit−1 then represent the actual change in capital and risk between two
periods, while buf∗it − bufit−1 and risk∗it − riskit−1 denote the desired long run change.
These equations highlight the fact that observed changes in the buffer and risk levels in
period t are a function of the differences between the target level of capital and risk in
period t and previous period’s actual capital and risk, and any exogenous shock.
Substituting equations (5.5.) and (5.6.) into equations (5.1.) and (5.2.) we then have:
∆bufit = ξ0(buf
∗
it − bufit−1) + κit (5.7)
∆riskit = ϕ0(risk
∗
it − riskit−1) + φit (5.8)
We note that the observed changes in capital and risk in any given time period t is
some fraction ξ0 or ϕ0 of the desired change for that period. If ξ0 (ϕ0)= 1, then the actual
buffer (risk) level will be equal to the desired buffer (risk) level. That is, adjustment to
the target level is instantaneous. If on the other hand, ξ0 (ϕ0)= 0, nothing changes, since
the actual level of buffer (risk) at time t is the same as that observed in the previous
period. Typically then, ξ0 and ϕ0 will lie between these extremes since adjustment to the
desired stock of capital is likely to be incomplete for several reasons.
5.3 Hypotheses and Data
To determine how observed short run fluctuations of the capital buffer (∆bufit) impact on
short run changes in bank risk (∆riskit), we estimate our model derived in the previous
section. It is important to note that the target levels of capital (buf∗it) and risk (risk
∗
it)
cannot be observed and hence are approximated by various cost and revenue variables
discussed in detail in Section 5.3.1 below.
∆bufit = α1 − ξ0bufit−1 + ξ1Yit + ξ2∆riskit + κit (5.9)
∆riskit = α2 − ϕ0riskit−1 + ϕ1Zit + ϕ2∆bufit + φit (5.10)
where ∆bufit and ∆riskit are the observed changes in capital buffers and risk respec-
tively, i = 1,2. . .N is an index of banks and t = 1,2,. . .T , is the index of time observation
for bank i at time t. The Yit and Zit vectors capture the bank specific variables that de-
termine the target buffer and risk levels respectively. κit and φit are assumed to consist
of a bank specific component and white noise.
Our null hypothesis can be presented as:
H0 : Short term adjustments in the capital buffer and bank risk have no impact on one
another. The alternative hypotheses to be tested are then as follows:
H1A: The coefficients ξ2, and ϕ2, are positive and significant. Adjustments in capital
buffer and risk are positively related for banks with large capital buffers. This hypothesis
is in line with the theory that well capitalized banks will manage their desired probability
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of default, by maintaining an target capital buffer through positive adjustments in risk.
and
H1B : The coefficients ξ2, and ϕ2, are negative and significant. The adjustments of
buffer capital varies systematically, but negatively, with adjustments in risk taking. ie.
Riskier banks will hold less capital in their buffer stock. This hypothesis is in line with
the notion that banks with buffers near the regulatory minimum will build up their buffers
of capital by reducing risk taking.
5.3.1 Sample Selection
As per chapter 4, we create an unbalanced panel of US commercial bank and bank holding
company (BHCs) balance sheet data covering the period between 1986q2 and 2008q2. All
commercial bank data is obtained from the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income
(referred to as the Call Reports) published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.7 Since
all insured banks are required to submit Call Report data to the Federal Reserve each
quarter we are able to extract income statement and balance sheet data for a large number
of commercial banks.8 In addition, we obtain balance sheet data for BHCs from the Fed
Funds Y-9 form. By identifying the high holder to which the individual commercial banks
belong, we merge the two datasets to obtain balance sheet, income as well as risk based
variables for publicly traded bank holding companies.9 See Appendix 5.B for further
information on data manipulations.
In general the BHCs in the sample have been well capitalized throughout the sample.
The average bank has exceeded the minimum required capital ratio by a comfortable
margin. The average10 tier one (total) capital stood at 7.55(9.55) percent of risk weighted
assets11 in 1986 but reached 9.88(13.44) percent by 1994 and has remained relatively stable
since.
Figure 5.1 documents the evolution of both tier one and total capital ratios over time.
In 1992 both tier one and total capital ratios rose substantially. Several reasons can be
put forward as possible explanations of this. First, this may simply reflect an unusual
period of inflated bank profitability and share price appreciation during the 1990s. BHC
capital ratios might thus have risen passively, simply because bank managers failed to
raise dividends or repurchase shares. Second, this was around the time that the Basel I
rules were introduced in the US. The Federal Deposit Insurance Committee Improvement
Act (FDICIA) subsequently sought to impose greater credit risk on uninsured bank lia-
bility holders and consequently introduced a mandatory set of prompt corrective actions
(PCA) that increased the cost of violating the capital standard. Hence, direct supervisory
pressure may have contributed to the capital buildup. Although PCA does not directly
apply to BHCs, it is relevant, because it applies to their bank subsidiaries and therefore
7This data is publicly available at www.chicagofed.org.
8In 1976 we have data for 14,000 banks which diminishes to around 8,000 banks by the end of the
sample.
9Once the initial dataset is obtained, we further clean the data by keeping only those bank holding
companies for which we have three consecutive quarters of data.
10Weighted by market capitalization.
11Risk weighted assets are defined as the total of all assets held by the bank, weighted for credit risk
according to a formula determined by the countries regulator.
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may affect the amount of excess capital held at the holding company level.
Dependent and Explanatory Variables
Bank Capital Buffers In this chapter, as per Chapter 4, we acknowledge that the
capital to asset ratio that regulators define and monitor is the ratio of regulatory capital
to risk weighted assets. There is however, no reason to expect that this is the same
ratio that banks target internally when making risk decisions. Banks for example might
consider the market value of capital, targeting a market value of equity below which the
bond market starts charging a risk premium. Alternatively, banks may actively manage
capital so as to remain within a desired range of economic capital12 hence targeting the
level of either book or market equity needed to carry our future acquisition strategies.
We define dependent variable ∆bufit, as the observed change in the amount of capital
the bank holds in excess of that required by the regulator. We adopt this measure of
capital since we assume that banks will manage their capital in such a way as to avoid,
or minimize, costs associated with a breach of regulatory requirements. Since individual
subsidiary banks seldom issue independent equity and are rather wholly owned by a
holding company, equity financing generally occurs at the BHC level. To capture changes
in the buffer of capital, we focus solely on the BHCs.
Regulatory requirements placed on banks have undergone several changes throughout
the sample period. At the beginning of our sample, US regulators employed a simple
leverage ratio to assess capital adequacy: primary capital had to exceed 5.5 percent of
assets, while the total amount of primary plus secondary capital had to exceed six percent
of assets. Consequently, in the period between 1986 and the end of 1990, we consider
a ratio of total capital equal to seven percent as the regulatory minimum with which
we calculate the capital buffer. This criterion is based on the Federal Reserve Boards
definition of zones for classifying banks with respect to supervisory action.
Effective December 31, 1990, banks were required to hold at least 3.25 percent of
their risk weighted assets as tier one capital and a minimum of 7.25 percent of their
risk weighted assets in the form of total capital (tier one + tier two). Finally, Basel
I was introduced at the end of 1992. The minimum tier one and total capital ratios
were subsequently raised to four and eight percent respectively. In addition to the Basel
regulations, US banks are restricted by an additional leverage ratio of primary capital
to total capital requirement imposed by the FDICIA. Current regulations therefore state
that in order to be adequately capitalized, a BHC must have a tier one capital ratio of at
least four percent, a total capital ratio of at least eight percent and a leverage ratio of at
least four percent.
The tier one ratio of a bank is defined as tier one capital over the banks total assets,
where tier one capital gives the ratio of a banks’ core equity capital to its total risk
weighted assets. Due to reporting changes, data on risk weighted assets are not available
as far back as 1986. We therefore create proxy series for these variables prior to this time.
We adopt the methodology put forward by Beatty and Gron (2001) to estimate risk
12Economic capital is the amount of risk capital, assessed on a realistic basis, which a firm requires to
cover the risks that it is running or collecting as a going concern, such as market risk, credit risk, and
operational risk. It is the amount of money which is needed to secure survival in a worst case scenario.
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weighted assets prior to 1990. Our estimated risk weighted assets variable, (erwa) is
calculated as follows:
total loans + (0.2 ∗ agency securities) + (0.5 ∗ municipal securities) + (corporate
securities)
Moreover, we proxy missing values of tier one capital with the series for total equity.
We can then compare pre- and post- Basel periods. The correlations for both series are
good. We find that between 1990 and 2006, the correlation between the erwa to total
assets series and the true risk weighted assets to total assets is around 83 percent. The
correlation between the ratio of common equity to total assets and the tier one capital to
total assets ratio is around 97 percent.
Risk From a regulators point of view, banks with a relatively risky portfolio, ie.
with a high credit risk, should hold a larger capital buffer. Otherwise, these banks will
be more likely to fall below the minimum capital ratio, increasing the probability of
bankruptcy and likelihood of facing costs associated with failure.13 Measuring bank risk
is not a simple task since each alternate proxy has its own characteristics and limitations.
Consequently no single proxy provides a perfect measure of bank risk. Several varying
measures of risk have been adopted in the literature however, no consensus on which is
most suitable exists.
In this study we are concerned with portfolio risk, the proportion of risky assets in the
bank’s portfolio. This is the measure of risk on which bank regulators base their capital
guidelines. Even though the proportion of certain risky assets in a bank’s portfolio may
not exactly reflect the overall asset risk of a bank, it may reflect project choice by bank
managers and, thus, to some degree the overall asset risk. Several authors have therefore
used the composition of a bank’s portfolio to capture asset risk (See Godlewski, 2004;
Berger, 1995; McManus and Rosen, 1991; Gorton and Rosen, 1995). Recent literature
has shown that banks are steadily moving towards reliance on non traditional business
activities that generate fee income, trading income and other types of non interest income
and that consequently, bank risk is now largely found off balance sheet (DeYoung and
Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004). Given the objective of this study, our aim is to correctly
estimate risk in a manner that captures changes in management policy with regard to the
risk profile of the bank over a twenty year history. Therefore, several asset based measures
centered on existing literature are adopted, all of which come from the commercial bank
side of the balance sheet of the unbalanced panel created in Section 5.3.1.
Our first measure of risk (risk) corresponds to the measure of risk adopted in Chapter
4. Here, we create an index as per Chessen (1987), Keeton (1989) and Shrieves and Dahl
(1992). The index, constructed from accounting data, is calculated as follows:
(0.25 ∗ interest bearing balances) + (0.10 ∗ shortterm US treasury and government
agency debt securities) + (0.50 ∗ state and local government securities) + (0.25 ∗ bank
acceptances) + (0.25 ∗ fed funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to
resell) + (0.75 ∗ standby letters of credit and foreign office guarantees) +
13See Ancharya (1996).
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(0.25 ∗ loan and lease financing commitments) + (0.50 ∗ commercial letters of
credit) + (all other assets)
The weighted sum of these asset amounts is then divided by total assets.
In addition to the risk measure described above, we consider the risk weighted assets
to total assets ratio rwa/ta. The risk weighted assets are calculated in accordance with
the Basel I rules. The rationale for this proxy is that the allocation of bank assets among
risk categories is the major determinant of a bank’s risk.14 This measure of risk however
does not account for market risk and therefore serves to capture credit risk only. As a
consequence, it captures only one part of the true asset risk. Moreover, the relative weights
assigned to each portfolio category may not correspond to the actual risk involved. Since
there are only four kinds of relative weights (0, 20, 50 and 100 percent), each category
within the portfolio may consist of assets with varying levels of risk.15 Therefore, it is
likely that two banks with the same rwa/ta ratio in fact have different levels of risk
exposure.
An additional proxy for risk adopted is the ratio of non-performing loans16 to total
loans and credits, npl. This measure of loan portfolio quality is an ex-post measure of
risk since banks with non-performing loans are obliged to make provisions for loan losses.
In order to affectively capture risk through this methodology, we need to acknowledge
that the risk of loans originated in a given year will not be reflected in past due and non
accrual classifications until the subsequent period. Therefore the quality of loans must
be measured as those past due or non accruals recorded the following year. Finally, we
calculate the ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total assets (c&iratio). This
measure is adopted since commercial and industrial loans are generally riskier than the
other categories of loans.17 Empirical studies (Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Samolyk, 1994)
find evidence that banks with a c&iratio also have higher levels of non performing assets.
The rwa/ta ratio is generally considered to be a better ex-ante indicator of overall
risk than the c&iatio, since it is a more comprehensive measure. Thus, while the c&iratio
focuses only on a specific portfolio item, the Basel Accord guidelines group all assets into
different portfolio categories and assign different risk weights according to the perceived
riskiness of all of the portfolio categories. In contrast to the other two measures (the
c&iratio and the rwa/ta), the npl ratio is an ex-post measure of risk. Thus, the npl ratio
inherently depends on luck or chance in addition to other factors, in addition to ex-ante
risk. The npl ratio may contain information on risk differences between banks not caught
by the rwa/ta ratio, and thus is used as a complementary risk measure to the rwa/ta
ratio.
14See Chessen (1987) and Keeton (1989). Jacques and Nigro (1997) argue that the rwa/ta captures
the allocation as well as the quality aspect of portfolio risk. Avery and Berger (1991) and Berger (1995)
show that this ratio is positively correlated with risk.
15For instance, all commercial loans have the same weight (100 percent) regardless of the creditworthi-
ness of the borrower.
16Non-performing loans are those that are 90 days or more past due or not accruing interest.
17The major loans made by U.S. commercial bank lending activities can be segregated into four broad
categories. These are real estate, commercial and industrial, individual, and others. Commercial and
industrial loans includes credit to construct business plants and equipment, loans for business operating
expenses, and loans for other business uses. It is the second largest loan category in dollar volume among
the loan portfolio of U.S. commercial banks.
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If banks consider the true credit risk of their portfolios when deciding on the total
amount of capital, one would expect the buffer capital to vary positively with any risk
measure included as a regressor. Essentially replicating the true risk profile of banks’
portfolios rather than the risk weights in Basel I.
In addition to the influence that risk will have on the capital buffer formation, and vice
verse, our model assumes that the target levels of both risk and capital will depend on a
set of bank specific characteristics, captured in equations (5.9.) and (5.10.) by the Xit and
Yit vectors respectively. Different corporate finance theories produce a long list of factors
that drive non-financial firms’ capital structures (see Harris and Raviv, 1991; Frank and
Goyal, 2003; Frank and Goyal, 2007). The empirical corporate finance literature has
converged towards a set of variables that reliably predict leverage of non-financial firms
in the cross section.18 Recently, a set of authors developing models of target bank capital
have confirmed the validity of these variables for a set of firms in a slightly different legal
and institutional environment (Diamond and Rajan, 2000; Allen et al., 2006; and Gropp
and Heider, 2008). Hence, variables included in the Xit and Yit vectors above are drawn
from the corporate finance literature and can be defined as follows:
Charter value: A more satisfactory account of bank risk taking emerges when
allowance is made for the charter value of the bank. The larger the charter value, the
greater the incentive to reduce risk taking and to maintain a capital buffer that is not
in danger of falling below the regulatory minimum.19 The charter value thus acts as a
restraint against moral hazard in banking (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Demsetz et al.,
1997) and can explain the relationship between capitalization and risk appetite (Demsetz
et al., 1997).
Defined as the net present value of its future rents, the charter value can hence be
thought of as being the market value of assets, minus the replacement cost of the bank
(Keeley, 1990; Demsetz et. al., 1997 and Gropp and Vesala, 2001). As is commonly done





Where bva, bvl and mve depict the book value of assets, the book value of liabilities
and the market value of equity respectively. The benefit of using Tobins q to capture
charter value is that it is a market based measure meaning greater market power in
both asset and deposit markets are reflected in a higher q value. Moreover, it allows for
comparability among banks of varying sizes in our analysis.
All market data is obtained from the Center for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP).
We would expect to observe a positive relationship between q and the capital buffer; such
that banks with higher charter values will hold larger capital buffers as a means to protect
the valuable charter. Moreover a negative relationship between q and risk is expected,
indicating that banks with higher charter values have a greater incentive to reduce their
risk. Moreover, we would expect to observe a positive relationship between q and the
18See Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; and more recently Frank and Goyal, 2007.
19Banks with larger charter values will want to protect this value by lowering their risk taking.
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capital buffer; such that banks with higher charter values will hold larger capital buffers
as a means to protect the valuable charter.
Bank size: It is usually argued that larger firms are safer, better known in the
market, and more exposed to agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) explaining
why larger firms generally have lower degrees of capitalization. The size of a bank may
additionally play a role in determining risk appetite through its impact on investment
opportunities and diversification possibilities as well as access to equity capital. Large
banks might be covered by the too-big-to-fail phenomenon whereby any distress will be
bailed out by government assistance. Therefore, to capture size effects on both buffer and
risk adjustments, we include the log of total assets (size) with an ambiguous expected
sign in both cases.
Return on assets: Bank profitability may have a positive effect on bank capital if
the bank prefers to increase capital through retained earnings rather than through equity
issues. This might be the case since equity issues may convey negative information to
the market about the banks value in the presence of asymmetric information. Return on
assets (roa) is included as a measure of bank profits. The expected sign on the coefficient
is positive since the level of buffer capital would, in this case, be expected to move in line
with the level of bank profitability.
Loan loss provisions: A bank’s current loan losses will have an impact on the risk
level of a bank since a bank with a higher level of loan losses will tend to exhibit lower
levels of risk adjusted assets in the future. We proxy these losses (loanloss), by the ratio of
new provisions to total assets. The effect of loan losses on the capital buffer is expected to
be positive since banks with greater expected losses can be assumed to raise their capital
levels in order to comply with regulatory requirement and to mitigate solvency risk. We
include the loanloss variable in the risk equation based on the assumption that banks
with higher level of loan losses will exhibit lower future levels of risk adjusted assets. As
a result, a negative relation should exist between target risk and loan loss provisions.
Liquidity: Banks with more liquid assets need less insurance against a possible
breach of the minimum capital requirements. Moreover, the non zero risk weight associ-
ated with liquid assets means that banks can increase their capital buffers by liquidating
assets. Therefore banks with more liquid assets generally have smaller target capital
buffers and may also be willing to increase their levels of risk. We therefore expect a
negative relationship between liquidity, calculated as the ratio of bond holdings, share
holdings, and interbank assets to total assets, and the bank’s capital buffer.
Dummy variables: The model presented in equations (5.9.) and (5.10.) assumes
that the target level of both capital and risk depends on a set of bank specific character-
istics including its charter value, size, profitability and liquidity. The speed at which the
bank adjusts back to the target level however is assumed to be constant.
The capital buffer theory predicts that banks with small capital buffers will try to
build capital towards an internally defined target buffer while banks with large buffers
will maintain their buffer at the target level. Hence, adjustments in capital buffers and
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risk are expected to be positively (negatively) related for banks with larger (smaller) than
average capital buffers. Moreover, banks with smaller (larger) capital buffers are expected
to adjust both capital and risk faster (slower) than than well capitalized banks.
To allow for variations in capital and risk management to depend on the degree of
bank capitalization, we create a set of dummy variables Dcapl and Dcaph. The dummy
Dcapl is set equal to one if the capital buffer of a bank is less than two percent; and zero
otherwise. Similarly, the dummy Dcaph is equal to one if the capital buffer of a bank is
greater than three percent; and zero otherwise.20
To test the predictions outlined above, we interact the Dcap dummy variables with
the variables of interest. For example, in order to capture differences in the speeds of
adjustment of low and high buffer banks, we interact Dcapl and Dcaph with the lagged
dependent variables bufit−1 and riskit−1. Moreover, to assess differences in short term
adjustments of capital and risk that depend on the degree of capitalization, we interact the
dummy variables with ∆riskit and ∆bufit in the capital and risk equations respectively.
Bank fixed effects and a full set of time dummies are included in all the regressions.21
5.4 Estimation: Methodology and Results
Our model, as outlined in equations (5.9.) and (5.10.) is estimated for a variety of
combinations of risk measures outlined in Section 5.3.1. All variables adopted in the
study are defined in Table 5.1. Table 5.2 presents correlations of our main variables in
levels and in differences. Since theory suggests that banks with low risk aversion will
choose high leverage (low capital) and high asset risk (see Kim and Santomero, 1988),
we would expect to find a negative correlation between the level of portfolio risk and
and bank capital ratios simply due to the cross sectional variation in risk preferences.
The capital buffer theory suggests that there will be a positive time series correlation
between adjustments in capital and risk. Banks with larger capital buffers reduce their
endogenous risk aversion and increasing risk taking while increased opportunities to take
on risky exposures lead banks to increase capital. Only the correlation between bufit and
riskit is negative. All other measures of risk appear to be positively correlated with the
capital buffer.
The observed negative relationship is in line with previous findings. However, most
of the authors to date have proxied risk by non performing loans (see Shrieves and Dahl,
1992; Jacques and Nigro, 2001 and Aggarwal and Jaques, 1998 for evidence of this for
the US market). We are unable to replicate this negative finding with our nplit measure
of risk. By calculating correlations in various time periods, we are however, able to show
that the correlations between the buffer of capital and most risk variables are negative
prior to 1993. This relationship becomes positive after this time, driving the complete
sample correlation presented in Table 5.2.
These simple correlation studies do not allow other variables to affect the relation-
ship and therefore do not clarify whether the correlations noted are due to simultaneous
20The three percent threshold is consistent with the 25th percentile of buffer capital in the sample. It
also corresponds to the FDIC definitions of adequately and well capitalized banks.
21Most important determinants of capital ratios are time invariant firm specific characteristics according
to recent research (see Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008).
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changes in the variables. Moreover, they do not allow for the numerator/denominator
interactions in bufit. Our dynamic estimations therefore serve to account for various
additional factors that could affect the level of capital and risk held to provide a deeper
understanding of the relationships.
Since we estimate a dynamic model, including the lagged endogenous variables, we
employ the the one and two step Blundell-Bond system GMM estimators (Blundell and
Bond ,1998). However, since they produce quite similar estimates, we present only the
(asymptotically) more efficient two step estimates. However, the two step estimates of the
standard errors tend to be severely downward biased (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell
and Bond, 1998). To compensate, we use the finite sample correction to the two step
covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005). Applying this methodology rather than
the three stage least squares (3SLS) approach that is common in this literature22, al-
lows us to account for possible bank specific effects, providing unbiased estimates.23 The
methodology uses lagged levels as instruments in the first difference equations and lagged
first differences (∆bufit (∆riskit)) in the levels equations. Moreover, in the simultaneous
equations estimation, we include lags of riskit (bufit) as instruments for ∆riskit (∆bufit)
to account for the simultaneity of capital and risk adjustments in the bufit (riskit) equa-
tion. The number of instruments chosen in each model was the largest possible, for which
the Sargan -statistic for over identification restrictions was still satisfied.
5.4.1 Full Sample GMM:
We begin by estimating our model with different risk measures outlined above. As a first
step, equations (5.9.) and (5.10.) are estimated as separate equations.
Single equation estimations
Capital equation: The results from estimating variations of equation (5.9.) are
presented in Table 5.3. ∆riskit, ∆rwa/tait, ∆nplit, ∆c&iratioit are adopted as the risk
measures in Model I, Model II, Model III and Model IV respectively. Model V, introduces
a combination of ∆nplit and ∆rwa/tait. Model VI uses the risk index, ∆riskit, together
with ∆rwa/tait. Finally, in Model VII, ∆riskit and ∆nplit are considered together. In
each case, the risk measure is taken to be the observed change in risk as discussed in
detail in Section 5.3.
In general, observed changes in buffer capital are positively related to changes in
risk. We do however, observe a negative relationship when ∆c&iratioit is included. The
positive finding indicates that the target capital buffer is adjusted in accordance to the
varying risk profile of the bank. A bank experiencing a positive (negative) shock to risk
will therefore respond by increasing (reducing) its capital buffer.
In addition to the risk variables, the estimated coefficients for the bank specific vari-
ables generally carry the expected sign with mostly significant coefficients. The reported
coefficients on the lagged dependent variable bufit−1 are highly significant. They show
22see among others Schrieves and Dahl, 1992; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Aggarwal and Jacques, 2001;
Rime, 2001; and Heid et al., 2004.
23As a robustness check, we additionally pool the cross sectional data over the entire sample and
estimate using the 3SLS methodology. For our key variables, the findings are unchanged and are therefore
not presented here for the sake of brevity.
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the expected positive signs and lie within the required interval [0; 1]. Hence they can be
interpreted as speeds of capital adjustment. The significance of the speeds of adjustment
are in line with the view that the costs of capital adjustment are an important explana-
tion of the holding of large capital buffers. The fastest speed of adjustment is noted in
Model I, where the composite ∆riskit measure is adopted. Here on average banks close
the gap between their actual and desired level of capital by around nine percent each
quarter, corresponding to a 36 percent adjustment in the year period following a shock.
This speed of adjustment is in line with findings of Flannery and Rangan (2006) who
show that the mean firm acts to close its gap at the rate of more than 30 percent per
year.
The expected positive sign on the qit coefficient is found in all of the six models indicat-
ing that banks with higher charter values hold larger capital buffers. sizeit is consistently
negative, but only significant in two of the seven cases Model II and Model VI. The neg-
ative coefficient is in line with the too-big-to-fail hypothesis as well as with the notion
that smaller banks experience greater difficulty in accessing the capital markets. Fur-
thermore, this finding could provide evidence in favor of scale economies whereby larger
banks will generally enjoy a higher level of screening and monitoring than their smaller
counterparts resulting in a reduction excess capital held as insurance. Moreover, the neg-
ative coefficient is consistent with the notion that smaller banks are less diversified than
their larger counterparts and therefore hold larger capital buffers. roait is consistently
positive and mostly significant, indicating the importance that BHCs place on retained
earnings to increase their capital buffers. loanlossit is positive and significant in five of
the seven cases, indicative that banks with greater expected losses raise capital buffers
in order to comply with regulatory requirements and to mitigate solvency risk. Finally,
the liquidityit variable shows that banks with higher liquidity ratios generally hold less
capital. While the estimates have the correct sign, the results are only significant in two
of the seven models Model I and Model VII.
Risk equation: Similarly to above, equation (5.10.) is estimated as a single equa-
tion, in this case varying the dependent variable. ∆riskit, ∆rwa/tait, ∆nplit, ∆c&iratioit
are adopted for Model I, Model II, Model III and Model IV respectively.
The coefficients on ∆bufit are generally positive and highly significant. The only
exception being the coefficient associated with Model IV, where we observe a negative
coefficient significant at the ten percent level. The positive relationship indicates that
BHCs respond to a positive (negative) capital shock by increasing (reducing) risk taking.
This finding is in line with the notion that banks aim to maintain an internally defined
level of risk by either increasing or decreasing the size of the capital buffer.
The speed of adjustment captured by riskit−1 is substantially slower than that noted
in the buffer equation above. Again, we find that the speed of adjustment for Model I is
the fastest. Here, banks generally close around three percent of the gap between desired
and actual risk each quarter. This is equivalent to a reduction of around twelve percent
of the gap within the year following an exogenous shock.
qit is negative and significant for all of the models. This is in line with our expectations
and with previous studies showing that charter values act as a disciplining mechanism
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with regard to risk taking. Similarly, banks with low charter values have little to lose
and therefore may adopt riskier strategies. sizeit is positive in all case but significant
only for Model III and Model IV. As above, this is consistent with the notion that larger
banks have higher target levels of risk than smaller banks. The loanlossit coefficients
are positive and significant indicating that contrary to expectations, banks with higher
loan losses are riskier. Finally, the liquidityit coefficient is positive as expected, but not
significant in any of the four cases.
Our findings indicate that the relationship between observed changes in capital and
risk appears to be positive. BHC’s that have increased their risk taking over our sample
period, have similarly increased their capital buffers and vice verse. These estimations
have however failed to account for the fact that short term adjustments to capital and
risk are simultaneously determined and therefore should be interpreted with caution. The
main purpose of these estimations was rather to determine how the relationships change
with the various measures of risk used. In general, we see that regardless of the risk
measure adopted, except for ∆c&iratioit, the results are qualitatively unchanged. For
the rest of this chapter, we therefore adopt ∆riskit as our measure of risk. We chose the
composite risk index ∆riskit for several reasons. First, it appears to be the most accurate
measure of risk for this study since it estimates risk in a manner that captures changes
in management policy with regard to the risk profile of the bank at any point in time.
Moreover, the expected negative correlation between risk and capital (see Table 5.2) is
only evident when the ∆riskit measure is adopted. Hence, we assume that this measure
dominates others as discussed previously.
We therefore proceed to estimate equations (5.9.) and (5.10.) as a system of equations,
acknowledging the simultaneity associated with decisions taken in this regard.
Simultaneous equation estimations
For the simultaneous estimations of equations (5.9.) and (5.10.), three varying specifica-
tions are considered. Specification I, is our baseline model defined in equations (5.9.) and
(5.10.). Specification II allows the speed of adjustment back to the target level to interact
with the degree of bank capitalization. Finally, Specification III allows for further inter-
action between capital and risk management and bank specific characteristics. In this
specification, both the speed of adjustment, together with the management of short term
adjustments in capital and risk interact with the size of the capital buffer. The results
are presented in Table 5.5.
Under Specification I, the impact of capital buffer adjustments on risk and vice verse
are both positive and highly significant. This is in line with the results obtained for the
single equation estimations. The fact that simultaneous adjustments of capital and risk
are positively related to each other can be associated with a number of theories of bank
behavior. First, if banks manage their capital in such a way as to avoid, or minimize, costs
associated with a breach of regulatory requirements, then banks would tend to increase
(decrease) capital when they increase (decrease) portfolio risk, and conversely. This is
the case since the value of expected bankruptcy costs increase with the probability of
bankruptcy (see Orgler and Taggart, 1983). Through simultaneous adjustments of both
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capital and risk, banks are able to manage an internally optimal probability of default,
defined as a function of both capital and risk. Moreover, the theory of managerial risk
aversion in the context of banking (Saunders et al., 1990) views managers as agents of
stockholders that may have an incentive to reduce the risk of bank insolvency below
the level desired by stockholders. Managers, who are assumed to be compensated with
risky fixed claims on the bank, and who have firm and industry specific human capital,
have a great deal to lose personally in the event of a bank failure. In this case, the
marginal cost associated with increases in risk or decreases in capital, is the incremental
disutility experienced by bank managers. Thus, banks that have high risk portfolios may
compensate for increases in risk by increasing capital and vice verse. Each case gives
rise to a positive relationship between adjustments in risk and capital; and adjustments
in capital and risk. The positive relationships between capital and risk are noted under
all three specifications. The speeds of risk and capital adjustment under Specification I
are in both cases positive and highly significant. As per the single equation estimations,
the speed of risk adjustment is significantly slower than the capital adjustment over the
sample period.
The interaction terms, Dcapxbufit−1 and Dcapxriskit−1 introduced in Specification
II, shed further light on how the speed of adjustment towards the target level depends
on the size of the capital buffer. Coefficients for both Dcaplxbufit−1 and Dcaphxbufit−1
are positive as expected. The magnitudes of the coefficients, together with their degree
of significance imply that banks with small capital buffers, those with capital buffers not
larger than two percent, adjust their buffers faster than their better capitalized coun-
terparts. This is in line with the recent literature which allows the speed of adjust-
ment towards targets to vary with firm specific characteristics (see Berger at al., 2008).24
For the risk equation, coefficients, and degrees of significance, of DCAPlxriskit−1 and
DCAPhxriskit−1 indicate that low buffer banks do not adjust their risk any faster than
highly capitalized banks.
Under Specification III, we introduce a further interaction between the degree of
bank capitalization and management of short term risk and buffer adjustments. Both
Dcaplx∆riskit and Dcaplx∆bufit are negative and highly significant. This finding has
two possible interpretations (i) lower capitalized banks reduce their risk taking (capital
buffers) when capital (risk) is increased, thereby moving towards their target probability
of default in the long run; or alternatively, (ii) banks with capital approaching the reg-
ulatory minimum will increase risk taking, gambling for resurrection in order to rebuild
their capital buffer. As a consequence, buffers may temporarily fall even further. Both
versions are consistent with the capital buffer theory. In contrast, banks with capital
buffers substantially above the requirement increase (reduce) risk taking when capital in-
creases (falls), thereby maintaining a target probability of regulatory breach as predicted
by theory. Our findings with regard to interacted speeds of adjustment confirm those
noted under Specification II.
With regards to the bank specific variables, qit is consistently highly significant in all
24Their findings suggest that BHCs adjust toward their target levels of capital relatively quickly; and
that adjustment speeds are faster for poorly capitalized BHCs, but slower (ceteris paribus) for BHCs
under severe regulatory pressure.
102
cases, regardless of the specification adopted. This is in line with predictions made by
the capital buffer theory. Banks with a relatively high charter value will hold a larger
capital buffer and will have a greater incentive to reduce risk taking. As per the single
equations, larger banks will hold less capital and take more risk. The effect of size on
risk is however, insignificant.
In addition, we note that BHCs will generally rely heavily on retained earnings in order
to increase their capital buffers. This is in line with Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) who
conduct a similar study for the US, however their sample is limited to commercial banks as
well as to a much shorter time frame. Banks with greater expected losses appear to raise
their capital buffers to comply with regulatory requirements and to mitigate solvency risk,
while banks with higher loan losses, surprisingly, tend to exhibit higher levels of portfolio
risk. The coefficients on the liquidityit variables carry the expected signs but are not
significant at any level.
The most important findings can be outlined as follows: Short term adjustments in
capital and risk are positively related and the relationship appears to be two way ie. large
buffer banks maintain a target probability of default through positive adjustments in both
capital and risk taking. Small buffer banks on the other hand, reach a target probability
of default through negative adjustments. This finding is in line with the notion that
banks with capital buffers approaching the regulatory minimum either (i) reduce their
risk taking until the target capital level is reached or (ii) increase risk taking as a means to
gamble for resurrection consequently reducing the capital buffer even further. Moreover,
we find that BHCs adjust their capital buffers towards a target level faster than they
adjust their risk. Banks with smaller capital buffers adjust significantly faster than larger
buffer banks.
5.4.2 Further Investigation
Our findings above indicate that observed short term capital buffer and risk adjustments
is a positive and significant two way relationship throughout the sample period. While
these findings are broadly in line with previous research in this field (see Shrieves and
Dahl, 1992; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Aggarwal and Jacques, 2001; Rime, 2001; Heid
et al., 2004) the driving force behind this relationship still remains unclear. It is not
clear whether simultaneous adjustments in risk and capital is a universally adopted phe-
nomenon among banks in the sample, neither can we be sure whether that relationship
remains consistent over time. The remainder of the analysis therefore focuses on deter-
mining whether simultaneous adjustments are dependent on institutional characteristics
among banks in our sample, and whether or not the relationship uncovered above has
varied significantly over time.
Sub sample Approach
The effect that loan loss provisions has on adjustments in capital buffers and risks has
largely varied between studies undertaken. One group of authors, (see among others
Rime, 2001 and Heid et. al, 2004) are able to uncover only very little significant impact
of loan losses on these variables of interest. Other authors, for example Aggerwal and
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Jacques (2001), find that US commercial banks with higher loan loss provisions have
higher risk weighted assets. Moreover, Peura and Keppo (2006) show that for a sample
of US banks between 1983 and 200225, those banks with higher than average loan loss
provisions have; (i) on average lower expected returns; (ii) on average higher standard
deviations in expected returns; (iii) a positive and highly significant correlation between
capital levels and the standard deviations of returns. The last observation is important
since the standard deviations of returns should be the key parameter driving capital levels
in the model. Their analysis suggests that for banks that have suffered below average loan
losses, the capital buffer theory seems irrelevant. We test this finding here empirically by
splitting our sample into two groups. Those banks with above average loan losses and
those with below average loan losses. For each quarter, we take the mean value of loan
loss provisions as a threshold and separate the sample accordingly.
Results for estimating equations (5.9.) and (5.10.) by these sub samples are presented
in Table 5.7 and 5.8. Empirical results for those banks with above average loan loss
provisions are broadly unchanged from the full sample GMM estimations presented above.
Here we see that adjustments in capital and risk remain positively related. For banks with
lower than average loan losses however, adjustments do not appear to have any significant
impact on one another. This is verified through the insignificant coefficients on ∆riskit in
the buffer equation, and on ∆bufit in the risk equation. With respect to the interaction
terms, we are able to confirm the findings from our previous estimations. Banks with
low buffers of capital appear to adjust their capital towards the target level significantly
faster than higher buffer banks. Moreover, the coordination of short term adjustments in
capital and risk is dependent on the size of the buffer of capital. Small capital buffer banks
rebuild an appropriate capital buffer by raising capital while simultaneously lowering risk.
In contrast, larger buffer banks try to maintain their capital buffer by increasing risk when
capital increases.
Rolling GMM
Under the GMM approach adopted above, fixed coefficients are estimated so as to capture
an average effect that each regressor will have on the dependent variable over the time
period analyzed. Here, any changes to economic structure, such as changes in a policy
regime etc. will not be captured directly, but rather effects will be averaged out to provide
a single estimate over time. During much of the 1990s, (a large portion of the time frame
during which we conduct this analysis), the regulatory restrictions imposed on BHC’s
underwent significant transformation. Basel I was initially introduced in 1990 which, for
the first time in history, defined a numerical minimum amount of capital that banks were
required to hold. These rules were subsequently amended slightly in 1992. Moreover, the
FDIC improvement act came into force in 1991 which included a set of correctative actions
that increased the cost of violating the regulatory minimum. Moreover, restrictions on
permissible bank activities were removed allowing BHC’s to select from a broader array
of potential risk exposures. The typical BHC’s risk exposure consequently increased, as
the diversification effects of new business activities were outweighed by the higher risks
25Particularly in the years 1987, 1990, and 1991.
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associated with the new lines of business.
In addition, the US economy faced several periods of change in terms of economic
growth and prosperity as well the removal of restrictions placed on permissible bank
activities, increasing the array of potential risk exposures. Therefore, to capture the
changing environment in which BHCs have been operating and to assess the effects on
the capital buffer risk relationship, we obtain a set of rolling coefficients for equations
(5.9.) and (5.10.). We achieve this by estimating a series of rolling GMM equations over
our sample period providing a continuous picture of the buffer risk relationship. We begin
with windows of one year, including four time period observations in each window.26 This
gives us one coefficient for each year. These estimations are conducted only on the above
average loan loss provision banks.
Results for the buffer and risk equations under Specification I are presented in Tables
5.9 and 5.10 respectively.27 The relationship between risk and capital adjustments appears
to have changed significantly over time.
In particular, the relationship between buffer and risk adjustments appears to be
driven by the management of shocks to the capital buffer. Banks have consistently main-
tained their desired probability of default by reducing (increasing) risk taking following
a negative capital (positive) shock. We do however see a slight shift in the relationship in
the years directly post regulation. Between 1994 and 1997, we note that a capital shock
has a negative impact on the adjustment of risk. Banks with an increase in capital reacted
by reducing their risk taking, building up their capital buffers to meet requirements by
adjusting their risk taking downwards. This build up of capital is reflected in Figure 5.2.
On the other hand, shocks to risk have started significantly influencing capital buffer
adjustments only since 1999. Banks faced with riskier portfolios reacted by simultaneously
increasing their capital buffers. Similarly, banks that experienced a decline in portfolio risk
reduced their capital buffer in order to maintain their internally defined target probability
of default. Interestingly, we do see a change in this relationship too, after 1993. Moreover,
in the three years between 1993 and 1997, an increase in risk taking induced a build up
of capital. Here it seems that banks tried to build up their capital buffers to new target
levels through a positive risk capital strategy. That is, by increasing capital when risk was
high, and reducing capital when risks were low. The coefficients of interest are presented
in Figure 5.2.
From the time varying analysis conducted, it seems that from around 1999, banks
have started to manage an internally optimal probability of default defined as a function
of both capital and risk. Several theories can be put forward to try to explain the
visibly increased importance that risk adjustments have on capital adjustments. First,
the removal of restrictions on permissible bank activities, allowing BHC’s to select from
a broader array of potential risk exposures,28 has consequently increased BHC’s risk
exposures. Moreover, as regulation moves towards becoming more risk sensitive, it is
26Both 1986 and 2008 are dropped from the sample since we only have two quarterly observations in
each of these years.
27We additionally estimate time varying equations for Specification II and II however, we do not report




possible that banks merely recognize the increased importance to be placed on managing
risk taking.
Robustness
In order to verify the results obtained, several additional robustness tests have been
conducted. First, we re-estimate equations (5.9.) and (5.10.), substituting ∆bufit with
total capital over total assets (∆capit). The results are qualitatively unchanged from
the findings presented. The only notable difference is the speed of adjustment which
appears much slower than the adjustment back to the target buffer level. When ∆capit is
estimated as the dependent variable, we find the gap between actual and target capital is
closed by around two percent per quarter, when compared to nine percent for the buffer.
In this framework, the gap between actual and target risk is closed by around one percent
per quarter compared to three percent under the buffer capital framework. The speed of
adjustment of ∆capit is therefore still significantly faster than that of ∆riskit, but the
difference is not as extreme as in the results presented. Second, we estimate equations
(5.9.) and (5.10.), substituting ∆riskit (∆bufit) with a lagged ∆riskit−1(∆bufit−1).
While the effects of the control variables do change somewhat, the sign and the magnitude
of the key variables remain unchanged. Third, we experimented with the use of buf as
an absolute level, again without qualitative changes to the relationships of key variables.
Other tests involved including additional lags of ∆riskit and ∆bufit in equations (5.9.)
and (5.10.) respectively. Furthermore, we adopted different thresholds of low versus high
capital. Finally, we introduce a saw tooth in the capital ratios by allowing for the fact that
dividend payments are made only every second quarter. This was done by introducing a
dummy variable set equal to one when dividends were paid and zero otherwise.
5.5 Discussion
Building an unbalanced panel of US commercial bank and BHC data between 1986 and
2008, this chapter examines the relationship between short term adjustments in bank
capital buffers and risk. Controlling for various determinants of capital buffers and risk
levels put forward by the theoretical and empirical literature in this field, we find that
the relationship appears to be positive and two way during the sample period. Moreover,
we show that the management of short term adjustments to capital and risk is dependent
on the degree of bank capitalization.
Our results identify a positive and significant relationship between capital buffer and
risk adjustments over time. Our findings are broadly in line with the capital buffer theory,
predicting that well capitalized banks adjust their buffer capital and risk positively. The
relationship is negative for low buffer banks. These results are confirmed by a set of
single equations as well as by simultaneous GMM equations. In addition, we note that the
management of short term adjustments in capital and risk are dependent on the amount of
capital the bank holds in excess of the required minimum. Banks with small capital buffers
rebuild an appropriate capital buffer by raising capital while simultaneously lowering risk.
In contrast, well capitalized banks maintain their capital buffers by increasing risk when
capital increases. Our estimations further indicate that the speed with which banks
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adjust towards the desired level is also dependent on the size of the buffer. We show that
small buffer banks adjust capital buffers significantly faster than their better capitalized
counterparts. However, we are unable to find significant evidence of a similar trend for
risk adjustment.
By splitting the sample and analyzing banks by degree of loan loss provisions, we show
that the buffer theory holds only for high loan loss banks. Capital and risk adjustments for
low loan loss banks on the other hand, do not appear to impact one another significantly.
In addition, the relationship between capital and risk appears to have changed significantly
over time. Shocks to the capital buffer have consistently, positively, affected adjustments
in risk. For example, a bank faced with a reduced capital ratio (for example resulting
from the recent collapse of the asset backed commercial paper as a source of funding),
have reacted with a simultaneous reduction in their risk taking. On the other hand, short
term shocks to risk have only really become important for buffer capital adjustments
post-1999.
Despite the lack of parameters capturing the return towards the long run equilibrium,
our results do provide substantial support for the buffer view that capital is not an exoge-
nous decision, but rather determined simultaneously with internal risk choices. Moreover,
we find that the relationship between capital and risk is not stable over time. Rather, it
can be driven by either exogenous changes to risk aversion or, by shocks to either capital
or to risk opportunities. Both of these underlying factors may have a cyclical compo-
nent. In economic upturns, banks become more risk loving as they understate their risk
relative to the objective measure of risk. Moreover, shocks to either capital or risk can
also have a cyclical component, however this should not affect the buffer risk relationship
significantly.
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5.A Tables and Figures












Table 5.1: Variable Descriptions.
Expected sign
Variable Description Buffer capital equation Risk equation
∆buf Change in the total capital ratio minus regulatory required minimum.
∆risk Change in the weighted sum of assets amounts as defined in Section
∆rwa/ta Change in the ratio of risk weighted asets to total assets.
∆npl Change in the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans and credits.
∆c&iratio Change in the ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total loans.
q Tobins q. + -
size Log of total assets. ambiguous ambiguous
roa Return on assets. +
loanloss Ratio of new provisions to total assets. + -
liquidity Ratio of bond holdings + share holdings + interbank assets to total assets. - +
Dcapl Dummy variable equal to 1 for low buffer banks and 0 otherwise . ambiguous ambiguous
Dcaph Dummy variable equal to 1 for high buffer banks and 0 otherwise . ambiguous ambiguous
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Table 5.2: Correlation Matrix.
buf risk rwa/ta npl c&iratio ∆buf ∆risk ∆rwa/ta ∆npl ∆c&iratio
buf 1
risk -0.29*** 1
rwa/ta 0.21** 0.42*** 1
npl 0.17** 0.39* 0.33*** 1
c&iratio 0.12** 0.37** 0.29*** 0.22*** 1
∆buf -0.12*** 0.27*** -0.25*** -0.14** -0.22*** 1
∆risk 0.34* 0.13*** 0.41*** 0.41** 0.36*** 0.26*** 1
∆rwa/ta 0.25 0.22*** 0.43** 0.22** 0.38* 0.19* 0.34* 1
∆npl 0.19** 0.19*** 0.34** 0.34*** 0.24** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.38** 1
∆c&iratio 0.45* 0.25*** -0.44*** -0.33*** 0.21*** 0.18* 0.19** 0.29** 0.27* 1
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five and one percent levels of significance respectively.
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Table 5.3: Single Equation GMM: Capital Buffer Equation.
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII
bufit−1 0.09 (9.74)*** 0.05 (9.56)*** 0.04 (12.99)*** 0.06 (13.22)*** 0.06 (12.96)*** 0.07 (10.73)*** 0.08 (17.94)***
∆riskit 0.55 (14.76)*** 0.65 (10.11)*** 0.55 (12.76)***
∆rwa/tait 0.34 (2.98)*** 0.27 (1.97)** 0.29 (0.95)
∆nplit 0.24 (2.14)** 0.19 (1.95)** -0.11 (4.87)***
∆c&iatioit -0.28 (2.87)***
qit 0.34 (1.23) 0.46 (3.23)*** 0.34 (2.06)** 0.32 (3.09)*** 0.29 (1.98)** 0.39 (2.18)** 0.35 (2.79)***
sizeit -0.22 (1.10) -0.35 (1.74)* -0.29 (0.99) 0.33 (1.06) -0.34 (1.16) -0.18 (2.32)** 0.45(0.88)
roait 0.18 (1.96)** 0.12 (2.11)** 0.16 (3.42)*** 0.14 (0.99) 0.12 (2.76)*** 0.15 (2.49)** 0.16 (2.01)**
loanlossit -0.43 (1.88)* 0.23 (2.01)** 0.19 (1.93)* 0.22 (0.93) -0.42 (2.00)** 0.19 (1.14) 0.40 (2.34)**
liquidityit -0.32 (1.99)** -0.42 (0.09) -0.33 (0.58) -0.56 (1.20) -0.55 (0.73) -0.45 (1.32) -0.33 (5.11)***
Sargan 19.87 (1.77) 25.73 (2.89) 54.78 (2.74) 16.79 (1.37) 27.77 (1.66) 31.51 (2.33) 22.06 (2.98)
a(1) -1.97 (0.00) -1.02 (0.00) 2.34 (0.00) -1.43 (0.00) 2.04 (0.00) -3.22 (0.00) -1.20 (0.00)
a(2) -2.01 (0.99) 1.92 (0.83) 1.23 (1.12) 2.65 (0.52) 1.02 (0.23) -1.05 (0.68) -1.18 (0.87)
Note: All regressions include bank fixed effects together with a full set of time dummies as control variables (not reported here). Dependent variable is ∆bufit. Other
variables as defined in Table 5.2. t-values presented in parentheses. a(1) and a(2) represent first and second order residual tests. *, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five
and one percent levels of significance respectively.
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Table 5.4: Single Equation GMM: Risk Equation.
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
riskit−1 0.03 (5.55)*** 0.01 (10.34)*** 0.02 (9.45)*** 0.02 (9.34)***
∆bufit 0.55 (10.23)*** 0.65 (7.04)*** 0.48 (5.33)*** -0.77 (1.66)*
qit -0.44 (4.34)*** -0.61 (2.31)** -0.34 (2.49)** -0.48 (6.99)***
sizeit 0.22 (1.02) 0.19 (0.63) 0.21 (1.92)* 0.26 (2.07)**
loanlossit 0.14 (1.00) 0.25 (2.28)** 0.24 (3.96)*** 0.10 (3.02)***
liquidityit 0.19 (0.34) 0.14 (0.41) 0.15 (1.99)** 0.15 (1.73)*
Sargan 15.34 (0.92) 32.34 (0.83) 21.31 (0.79) 12.43 (0.68)
a(1) -1.32 (0.00) 1.23(0.00) 2.12 (0.00) 2.30 (0.00)
a(2) 1.21 (0.87) -2.12(0.64) 1.98 (0.92) -2.34 (0.76)
Note: All regressions include bank fixed effects together with a full set of time dummies as control
variables (not reported here). Dependent variable is ∆riskit ∆rwa/tait, ∆nplit and ∆c&iratioit for
Model I, II,III and IV respectively. Other variables as defined in Table 5.2. t-values presented in
parentheses. a(1) and a(2) represent first and second order residual tests. *, **, *** denote significance
at the ten, five and one percent levels of significance respectively.
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Table 5.5: Simultaneous Equation GMM Estimations.
Specification I Specification II Specification III
ceofficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
Buffer capital equation
bufit−1 0.09 (10.87)***
Dcapl∆bufit−1 0.09 (12.87)*** 0.08 (7.98)***
Dcaph∆bufit−1 0.14 (2.51)** 0.12 (4.87)***
∆riskit 0.42 (9.54)*** 0.35 (8.54)*** 0.38 (11.86)***
Dcapl∆riskit -0.15 (2.50)**
Dcaph∆riskit 0.50 (7.52)***
qit 0.32 (4.87)*** 0.27 (1.72)* 0.42 (3.08)***
sizeit -0.39 (1.91)* -0.44 (1.69)* -0.37 (1.83)*
roait 0.09 (2.01)** 0.10 (2.19)** 0.09 (1.82)*
loanlossit 0.05 (2.47)** 0.12 (2.49)** 0.09 (4.87)***
liquidityit -0.45 (1.42) -0.37 (1.56) -0.42 (0.98)
Sargan 27.79 (2.99) 29.78 (3.45) 17.79 (2.87)
a(1) 2.15 (0.00) 1.98 (0.00) -2.65 (0.00)
a(2) 1.11 (0.54) 2.65 (0.21) 2.88 (1.05)
Risk equation
riskit−1 0.02 (7.54)***
Dcapl∆riskit−1 0.05 (1.98)** 0.04 (2.03)**
Dcaph∆riskit−1 0.06 (3.68)*** 0.05 (2.48)**
∆bufit 0.43 (13.46)*** 0.48 (4.27)*** 0.51 (12.45)***
Dcapl∆bufit -0.22 (5.24)***
Dcaph∆bufit 0.36 (8.35)***
qit -0.21 (3.98)*** -0.13 (4.98)*** -0.15 (6.87)***
sizeit 0.25 (0.85) 0.26 (1.02) 0.32 (0.84)
loanlossit 0.21 (1.75)* 0.15 (1.23) 0.25 (2.47)**
liquidityit 0.67 (0.96) 0.47 (1.21) 0.44 (2.52)**
Sargan 26.87 (3.28) 32.15 (3.11) 16.98 (2.55)
a(1) 2.30 (0.00) -1.98 (0.00) -2.15 (0.00)
a(2) -2.05 (1.05) 1.98 (0.98) 1.87 (1.12)
Note: All regressions include bank fixed effects together with a full set of time dummies as control
variables (not reported here). Dependent variables are ∆bufit and ∆riskit for the buffer and risk
equations respectively. Other variables as defined in Table 5.2. t-values presented in parentheses. a(1)
and a(2) represent first and second order residual tests. *, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five
and one percent levels of significance respectively.
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Table 5.6: Summary Statistics and Correlations by Sub-Sample.
Total Sample BHCs with above-avg loan loses BHCs with below-avg loan loses
buf roa std. dev roa buf roa std. dev roa buf roa std. dev roa
Minimum 2.55 0.00 0.47 3.32 0.00 0.29 2.46 0.00 0.45
Median 6.11 0.03 0.68 5.61 0.04 0.95 6.37 0.98 0.58
Maximum 11.29 0.07 1.11 8.35 0.09 1.01 11.52 0.08 0.86
variable correlations
buf roa std. dev roa buf ROA std. dev roa buf ROA std. dev roa
buf 1 0.23*** 0.19*** 1 -0.32*** 0.25 1 0.42*** 0.10***
roa 1 -0.29*** 1 -0.38*** 1 -0.23
std. dev roa 1 1 1
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Table 5.7: Sub-Sample Estimations: Capital Buffer Equation.
BHCs with above-avg loan loss provisions BHCs with below-avg loan loss provisions
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification I Specification II Specification III
bufit−1 0.05 (4.87)*** 0.09 (1.99)**
Dcapl∆bufit−1 0.05 (9.54)*** 0.06 (8.79)*** 0.07 (1.24) 0.08(1.92)*
Dcaph∆bufit−1 0.10 (4.78)*** 0.11 (2.53)** 0.17 (1.35) 0.11 (0.95)
∆riskit 0.64 (7.87)*** 0.35 (0.35)
Dcapl∆riskit -0.29 (1.69)* -0.31 (3.15)*** -0.10 (0.95) -0.32 (1.21)
Dcaph∆riskit 0.39 (8.44)*** 0.29 (3.05)*** -0.09 (1.24) 0.21 (1.79)*
qit 0.33 (4.80)*** 0.39 (5.78)*** 0.36 (2.87)*** 0.29 (1.84)** 0.30 (1.99)** 0.42 (2.07)**
sizeit -0.35 (1.54) 0.22 (0.64) -0.35 (1.97)** -0.28 (2.98)*** -0.15 (3.12)*** -0.28 (4.15)***
roait 0.11 (2.01)** 0.14 (1.71)* 0.13 (1.97)** 0.11 (2.05)** 0.14 (1.84)* 0.09 (0.95)
liquidityit -0.34 (1.25) -0.36 (0.98) -0.38 (1.06) -0.35 (1.75)* -0.40 (1.87)* -0.52 (2.01)**
Sargan 25.78 (2.98) 15.97 (4.50) 29.87 (3.02) 16.87 (9.78) 29.78 (3.60) 32.55 (5.54)
a(1) -1.57 (0.00) 1.98 (0.00) 2.36 (0.00) 2.98 (0.00) 2.78 (0.00) 3.05 (0.00)
a(2) -2.36 (0.97) 1.54 (1.11) -2.05 (0.85) 1.87 (0.88) 1.78 (1.02) -2.45 (0.78)
Note: All regressions include bank fixed effects together with a full set of time dummies as control variables (not reported here). Dependent variable in buffer equation is
∆bufit. For the risk equation we make use of ∆riskit. Other variables as defined in Table 5.2. t-values presented in parentheses. a(1) and a(2) represent first and second
order residual tests. *, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five and one percent levels of significance respectively.
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Table 5.8: Sub-Sample Estimations: Risk Equation.
BHCs with above-avg loan loss provisions BHCs with below-avg loan loss provisions
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification I Specification II Specification III
riskit−1 0.03 (7.87)*** 0.01 (1.74)*
Dcapl∆riskit−1 0.05 (1.96)** 0.01 (2.50)** 0.04 (1.11) 0.06 (1.52)
Dcaph∆riskit−1 0.06 (2.45)*** 0.05 (3.23)*** 0.07 (1.96)** 0.09 (2.01)**
∆bufit 0.56 (6.78)** 0.74 (8.62)***
Dcapl∆bufit−1 -0.15 (3.64)*** -0.12 (2.35)** -0.19 (1.24) -0.20 (1.97)**
Dcaph∆bufit−1 0.30 (2.27)** 0.27 (5.78)*** 0.34 (1.23) 0.39 (2.41)**
qit -0.32 (3.78)*** -0.57 (4.78)*** -0.39 (2.13)** -0.42 (1.66)* -0.44 (2.37)** -0.28 (0.93)
sizeit 0.25 (1.85)* 0.32 (2.25)** 0.19 (1.02) 0.36 (0.88) 0.18 (0.96) 0.29 (1.34)
liquidityit 0.21 (1.04) 0.23 (1.15) 0.31 (0.95) 0.32 (1.26) 0.26 (1.96)** 0.23 (1.23)
Sargan 19.87 (2.65) 26.87 (2.68) 27.89 (4.11) 25.69 (2.94) 15.87 (4.87) 19.87 (3.63)
a(1) -1.25 (0.00) 2.65 (0.00) 1.68 (0.00) -1.58 (0.00) 2.69 (0.00) -3.02 (0.00)
a(2) -1.64 (0.77) 1.47 (0.32) -1.78 (0.54) 2.02 (0.69) -1.06 (0.61) -2.23 (0.94)
Note: All regressions include bank fixed effects together with a full set of time dummies as control variables (not reported here). Dependent variable in buffer equation is
∆bufit. For the risk equation we make use of ∆riskit. Other variables as defined in Table 5.2. t-values presented in parentheses. a(1) and a(2) represent first and second
order residual tests. *, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five and one percent levels of significance respectively.116
Table 5.9: Time Varying Coefficients Estimation: Capital Buffer Equation (Specification I).
bufit−1 ∆riskit qit sizeit roait liquidityit Sargan a(1) a(2)
1987 0.15 (1.02) 0.47 (0.96) 0.42 (1.02) -0.49 (1.80)* 0.04 (1.34) -0.23 (1.64)* 32.45 (2.36) -2.55 (0.00) -1.98 (1.02)
1988 0.12 (1.64)* 0.63 (0.74) 0.43 (1.73)* 0.32 (1.04) 0.02 (1.23) -0.32 (1.70)* 27.89 (3.54) 1.25 (0.00) -2.36 (1.05)
1989 0.14 (0.69) 0.62 (1.20) 0.39 (2.34)** 0.38 (0.84) 0.07 (2.24)** -0.28 (1.96)** 19.56 (2.98) -1.23 (0.00) -2.56 (1.11)
1990 0.13 (1.11) 0.79 (0.83) 0.32 (2.01)** -0.25 (1.48) 0.10 (1.87)* -0.24 (1.75)* 32.45 (1.87) -3.54 (0.00) 3.05 (0.87)
1991 0.12 (1.72)* 0.30 (0.85) 0.34 (1.84)* -0.22 (1.73)* 0.01 (1.94)* -0.29 (1.76)* 27.65 (2.69) -2.00 (0.00) -2.11 (1.15)
1992 0.11 (1.74)* 0.54 (0.56) 0.49 (2.10)** -0.19 (0.75) 0.12 (2.23)** -0.33 (1.67)* 33.33 (2.86) 1.67 (0.00) -2.08 (0.86)
1993 0.09 (2.00)** -0.31 (1.06) 0.49 (3.03)*** -0.19 (1.74)* 0.04 (0.64) -0.03 (1.15) 41.32 (3.05) -4.03 (0.00) 2.00 (1.67)
1994 0.05 (2.97)*** -0.29 (1.77)* 0.32 (2.39)** -0.26 (1.89)* -0.05 (0.79) -0.21 (1.26) 52.78 (2.89) 3.15 (0.00) -2.78 (1.14)
1995 0.07 (2.85)*** -0.12 (2.76)*** 0.27 (0.85) -0.25 (1.85)* 0.04 (1.99)** -0.30 (1.92)* 42.45 (3.05) -3.21 (0.00) -2.99 (0.96)
1996 0.06 (1.77)* -0.13 (1.64)* 0.29 (1.11) 0.23 (0.99) -0.11 (0.94) -0.35 (2.00)** 32.12 (4.56) 2.05 (0.00) -1.69 (0.36)
1997 0.09 (2.76)*** -0.25 (1.96)** 0.36 (2.32)** 0.28 (0.86) 0.08 (1.78)* -0.29 (1.99)** 19.87 (3.68) -2.58 (0.00) -2.45 (1.00)
1998 0.09 (2.13)** -0.15 (1.03) 0.30 (2.01)** -0.19 (1.69)* 0.11 (1.95)* -0.27 (1.65)* 19.87 (3.78) -2.12 (0.00) -2.65 (0.96)
1999 0.07 (2.18)** -0.12 (1.30) 0.32 (3.59)*** -0.31 (2.03)** 0.10 (1.74)* 0.34 (1.79)* 35.69 (5.45) -3.25 (0.00) -12.64 (0.61)
2000 0.08 (4.30)*** 0.14 (0.39) 0.25 (5.00)*** -0.16 (1.51) 0.08 (2.10)** -0.18 (0.88) 16.55 (2.14) -2.54 (0.00) 2.68 (1.06)
2001 0.09 (2.97)*** 0.29 (1.95)* 0.37 (4.30)*** -0.18 (1.71)* 0.10 (1.37) -0.16 (1.86)* 18.66 (6.54) 1.96 (0.00) -3.02 (1.11)
2002 0.08 (3.12)*** 0.44 (2.17)** 0.20 (1.99)** 0.19 (0.99) 0.06 (1.94)* -0.26 (1.78)* 17.68 (3.25) 2.55 (0.00) 1.25 (0.34)
2003 0.07 (2.94)*** 0.36 (4.30)*** 0.48 (1.86)* 0.19 (0.67) 0.06 (1.79)* -0.21 (1.07) 32.56 (4.25) 1.25 (0.00) -1.26 (0.65)
2004 0.06 (4.12)*** 0.30 (5.40)*** 0.36 (5.40)*** 0.29 (0.22) 0.03 (2.19)** -0.25 (2.62)*** 35.68 (3.36) 2.65 (0.00) -3.22 (0.87)
2005 0.09 (3.85)*** 0.32 (3.11)*** 0.30(5.30)*** 0.29 (0.75) 0.05 (1.78)* -0.32 (2.47)** 37.25 (4.87) 2.65 (0.00) -1.87 (1.19)
2006 0.07 (4.02)*** 0.33(1.99)** 0.59 (3.99)*** 0.32 (0.84) 0.06 (1.52) -0.26 (1.09) 16.87 (5.47) -3.65 (0.00) -3.25 (1.23)
2007 0.06 (3.13)*** 0.43(5.34)*** 0.45 (4.23)*** 0.31 (0.12) 0.02 (1.82)* -0.18 (1.98)** 25.65 (3.02) 2.65 (0.00) -2.56 (0.87)
Note: All regressions include bank fixed effects. Dependent variable is ∆bufit. Other variables as defined in Table 5.2. t-values presented in parentheses. a(1) and a(2)
represent first and second order residual tests. *, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five and one percent levels of significance respectively.
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Table 5.10: GMM Time Varying Coefficients Estimation: Risk Equation (Specification I).
riskit−1 ∆bufit qit sizeit liquidityit Sargan a(1) a(2)
1987 0.02 (2.01)** 0.43 (1.73)* -0.25 (1.73)* 0.22 (0.96) 0.32 (0.98) 19.64 (3.98) -1.54 (0.00) -2.45 (1.06)
1988 0.01 (2.11)** 0.45 (2.23)** -0.29 (2.11)** 0.15 (0.98) 0.21 (1.86)* 32.15 (4.55) -3.25 (0.00) -2.15 (0.96)
1989 0.00 (1.11) 0.46 (3.05)*** -0.23 (1.03) 0.22 (1.06) 0.25 (1.52) 27.89 (3.58) -2.36 (0.00) -1.58 (0.86)
1990 0.01 (1.99)** 0.42 (0.95) -0.27 (1.05) 0.21 (2.11)** 0.27 (1.68)* 19.58 (6.54) -1.99 (0.00) 2.54 (1.17)
1991 0.04 (3.00)*** 0.54 (1.99)** -0.24 (1.85)* 0.28 (1.64)* -0.27 (0.85) 35.68 (3.69) 4.12 (0.00) -2.67 (1.19)
1992 0.03 (2.49)** 0.55 (4.13)*** -0.23 (2.74)*** 0.27 (2.27)** 0.26 (0.95) 35.65 (2.98) 1.15 (0.00) -1.99 (0.98)
1993 0.04 (1.98)** 0.46 (2.06)** -0.26 (3.11)*** 0.27 (1.15) 0.26 (1.23) 36.89 (2.98) 1.59 (0.00) 2.64 (1.00)
1994 0.02 (2.31)** -0.26 (2.38)** -0.23 (2.07)** 0.26 (1.09) 0.35 (1.69)* 237.89 (6.25) -2.13 (0.00) -2.98 (0.96)
1995 0.03 (1.83)* -0.27 (4.95)*** 0.25 (0.98) 0.29 (1.95)* 0.36 (1.67)* 19.78 (7.86) -2.21 (0.00) 3.25 (0.96)
1996 0.02 (1.86)* -0.32 (5.72)*** 0.24 (0.74) 0.24 (1.73)* 0.29 (0.94) 26.98 (4.68) 1.56 (0.00) -1.98 (1.04)
1997 0.03 (4.00)*** 0.39 (2.01)** -0.25 (0.84) 0.32 (2.22)** 0.31 (0.74) 26.56 (2.89) -2.69 (0.00) -1.98 (1.22)
1998 0.05 (3.96)*** 0.43 (3.63)*** -0.26 (1.20) 0.35 (1.96)** 0.34 (1.85)* 39.68 (6.54) 2.33 (0.00) -2.36 (0.96)
1999 0.04 (5.93)*** 0.47 (2.96)*** -0.28 (1.78)* 0.27 (1.55) 0.37 (1.73)* 35.68 (6.87) -3.25 (0.00) -2.11 (0.68)
2000 0.03 (2.99)*** 0.53 (1.06) -0.25 (1.99)** 0.27 (1.64)* 0.34 (2.39)** 52.14 (2.88) -1.54 (0.00) -2.56 (1.06)
2001 0.06 (2.38)** 0.55 (6.94)*** -0.25 (2.04)** 0.26 (1.63) 0.26 (3.07)*** 19.86 (3.67) 2.65 (0.00) -1.56 (0.96)
2002 0.04 (1.84)* 0.48 (3.74)*** -0.31 (2.23)** 0.25 (1.13) 0.26 (7.96)*** 38.97 (5.64) 1.89 (0.00) -2.45 (0.67)
2003 0.02 (3.06)*** 0.46 (3.85)*** -0.36 (1.85)* 0.14 (1.33) 0.31 (3.97)*** 17.89 (3.62) -1.68 (0.00) -3.02 (1.01)
2004 0.01 (7.05)*** 0.48 (6.00)*** -0.37 (2.00)** 0.19 (1.99)** 0.34 (4.97)*** 44.56 (3.68) -2.69 (0.00) -2.56 (1.03)
2005 0.03 (6.14)*** 0.48 (7.94)*** -0.36 (3.48)*** 0.24 (1.74)* 0.38 (8.64)*** 56.98 (4.65) 2.68 (0.00) 2.06 (0.86)
2006 0.01 (5.96)*** 0.43 (3.07)*** -0.36 (1.97)** 0.25 (2.01)** 0.35 (4.23)*** 29.87 (2.78) 1.26 (0.00) -1.25 (0.73)
2007 0.02 (2.94)*** 0.50 (4.33)*** -0.33 (2.50)** 0.26 (1.78)* 0.34 (7.87)*** 29.45 (6.45) 4.32 (0.00) 1.26 (0.93)
Note: All regressions include bank fixed effects. Dependent variable is ∆riskit. Other variables as defined in Table 5.2. t-values presented in parentheses. a(1) and a(2)
represent first and second order residual tests. *, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five and one percent levels of significance respectively.
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5.B.1 Commercial bank dataset
All bank level data is obtained from the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income
(referred to as the Call Reports) published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Since
all insured banks are required to submit Call Report data to the Federal Reserve each
quarter we are able to extract income statement and balance sheet data for around 14,000
commercial banks. The dataset spans from 1976Q1− 2006Q2.
This particular dataset poses several problems for us to deal with in terms of
cleaning the data and obtaining a consistent set of data series. There are several reasons
for this. First, through time, definitions change for some of the variables of interest,
therefore, looking merely at the Report documentation that that banks are required to
fill in is not always sufficient. Therefore it is necessary, on some occasions, to join series
together in order to yield sensible series through time. Moreover, most of the large banks
only provide data on a consolidated foreign and domestic basis requiring the exploration
of which series to use.
RCON vs. RCFD series In general, larger banks only provide data on a consolidated
foreign and domestic basis. Therefore, it is necessary to use the RCFD series rather
than the RCON series for each variable. For banks that do not have foreign operations
however, it is possible to assume that the two series (RCON and RCFD) will be identical,
although it is necessary to bear in mind that foreign deposits in this case are not available.
The definition for total securities changes several times through our sample. It is
therefore necessary for us to combine various individual series through time to create a
consistent variable to work with. Prior to 1984, it is not possible to combine all of the
items that are now considered as investment securities. We therefore need to approxi-
mate the securities variable. Pre-1984 we combine RCFD0400 (US Treasury securities),
RCFD0600 (US Government agency and corporation obligations), RCFD0900 (obliga-
tions of states & political subdivisions) and RCFD0380 (other bonds, stocks and securi-
ties). In 1984q1 however, we are able to separately add up the items making up investment
securities because a) trading account securities for sale at book value (RCFD1000) is re-
placed by securities for sale at market value (RCFD2146) and b) there is no guarantee
that the securities are held to maturity match across the break in 1984. i.e. there is
no guarantee that RCFD0402 (securities issued by states and political subdivisions in
the US) + RCFD0421 (other domestic securities) + RCFD0413(foreign securities) =
RCFD0900 (obligations of states and political subdivisions) + RCFD0950(other secu-
rities). For the pre and post 1984 series to be consistent, these two summations must
be equal. We therefore combine the series RCFD0390 (book value of securities) and
RCFD2146 (assets held in the trading account) for the period 19841 to 1993q4. After
this time, RCFD0390 (book value of securities) is no longer available. From 1994q1 we
therefore proceed by summing up RCFD1754 (total securities held to maturity), and
RCFD1773 (total securities available for sale). Moreover, RCFD1754 (total securities
held to maturity), and RCFD1773 (total securities available for sale) excludes securi-
ties held in the trading account, which is part of RCFD3545 (total trading assets). We
120
therefore create an additional securities variable (securties2) which is the summation of
RCFD1754 (total securities held to maturity), RCFD1773 (total securities available for
sale) and RCFD2146 (assets held in trading accounts). We generally make use of the
securities2 variable since this eliminates a break in the series in 1993.
For total loans, we again see that there is a break in the series in March 1984. In
the third quarter of 1984, the series includes the variable RCFD2165 (lease financing
receivables). From March 1984 we adopt RCFD1400 (total loans & leases, gross) as our
total loans variable. Prior to this however, we replace the series with a sum of RCFD1400
(total loans & leases) and RCFD2165 (lease financing receivables). Similarly for net loans
we have RCFD2122 (total loans, net of unearned income) for the period between 1984q1
and 2006q2. Prior to this, we again combine RCFD2122 (total loans, net of unearned
income) with RCFD2165 (lease financing receivables).
Commercial and Industrial loans has a change in definition as well. From 1976 until
1984q3, we make use of the RCFD1600 (commercial and industrial loans). Here, each
bank’s own acceptances are included. From 1984q3 however, the series starts to include
holdings of bankers’ acceptances which are accepted by other banks. We therefore re-
place this series with a combination of the RCFD1755 (acceptances of other banks) and
RCFD1766 (commercial and industrial loans, other). It remains impossible to create a
consistent series here that would exclude banker’s acceptances.
A further change in definition occurs with the Fed Funds series. Considering first the
Fed Funds Sold series. From 1976 until 2002q1 we are able to make use of RCFD1350
(Fed Funds Sold). However, the series discontinues thereafter. We subsequently form a
continuation by summing RCONb987 (Fed Funds sold in domestic offices) and RCFDb989
(securities purchased under agreement to sell).
Similarly, for Fed Funds Purchased, the series RCFD2800 (Fed Funds Purchased)
discontinues at the end of 2001. We are then able to replace the series in 2002q2 with
RCFDb993 (Fed Funds purchased in domestic offices) summed with RCFDb995 (securi-
ties sold under agreement to repurchase).
Other issues in the commercial bank dataset In most of the graphical analysis we
find a kink in the series in 1997q1. Looking closer at the cause of this disturbance in the
data, we find that the number of institutions falls in 1997q1 to 8,648 from 9,772 in 1996q4.
The number subsequently rises again in 1997q2 when the number of reporting institutions
jumps again to 9,248. Investigating the issue further, we find that there appears to be
a fault in the dataset for this period. It seems that information reported for around 800
banks are all returned with 0 values. We therefore correct the data by setting values
equal to those of the previous period where data is missing.
Dealing with mergers With respect to the treatment of bank mergers in the data,
several possible alternative approaches are considered: Option 0 : All observations affected
by a merger are simply dropped from the sample. Note however,if using any lagged growth
rates or differences in the model, this means dropping future observations as well as the
observation when the merger takes place. This option is applied by many existing studies
in the banking literature (see for example Kashyap and Stein, 2000). Option 1 : This
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option is preferable when a large bank acquires a very much smaller bank. Here, all
past balance sheet and income observations are rescaled, using a constant ratio, from the
beginning of the sample up to the quarter preceding the merger. This ratio is equal to
the increase in total assets triggered by the merger. Option 2 : This option is preferable
to Option 1 when two merging banks are of similar size. Here, the merged entities are
reconstructed backwards as the sum of the merging banks. In this case a new new bank
id, different from any existing id, is created and applied to all subsequent observations.
In this chapter, we adopt a mixture of Options 1 and 2; When merging banks are of
different sizes we adopt Option 1 while for a small number of mergers where the merging
banks are of similar size, we create a new bank id as per Option 2.
Merging the Commercial and BHC datasets The following steps were undertaken
to merge the holding company data with with commercial bank data from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago. We start with the commercial bank data set and start by
identifying those banks that belong to foreign call family:
1. We start by generating a foreign call identity as follows:
gen fgncall ind = 0
replace fgncall ind = 1 if fgncallfamily > 0 & fgncallfamily ˜ = .
We then created a variable called identifier which tells us the name of the financial
high holder. (this is equal to the rssd9348 variable in the dataset:
gen identifier = high holder /∗ = rssd9348 ∗ /
If however, the high holder is a foreign call family, the variable gives the number of it
instead:
replace identifier = fgncallfamily if fgncall ind == 1
2. We then make use of the identifier variable to collect holding company data from
the BHC data.
By changing the name of rssd9001 to identifier in BHC data. Moreover, we drop all
observations equal to 0.
3. Finally we merge this dataset back to the commercial bank data. First we copy
the commercial bank dataset and the BHC data into the same directory. Opening the
commercial bank data, we type the following:




The work undertaken in this study serves to address some of the key issues that have
arisen since the proposal to modify the Basel I regulatory requirement framework.
One of the primary aims of the new accord, Basel II, is to align bank capital more
closely with risks inherent in the system at any point in time. Several concerns relating to
the potential broader effects that the requirements can have on the economy have however,
been raised. One key issue relates to the potential cyclicality effects that could arise from
the adoption of the new framework. Due to the closer link between capital and risks, the
new requirements will become more dependent on the business cycle, requiring banks to
hold larger amounts of capital during economic downturns. Since capital is particularly
costly during a recession, banks might be forced to reduce their loan portfolios even
further in order to meet rising requirements. As a consequence, the downturn of the cycle
is more likely to be accentuated, creating an undesired effect on banking system stability.
Questions regarding the meaningful distinction between disclosure and market disci-
pline have additionally been posed. Regulators have long emphasized market discipline as
a means to improve the safety and soundness of the banking system since their inability
to effectively discipline financial institutions has been deemed as an important compo-
nent of several crises over the last decades. However, if banks have already identified
an internal disciplining mechanism to curb risk taking and drive capital management,
it remains unclear how the third pillar will affect this. In addition, policy makers have
become concerned with banks’ attitudes towards risk taking under an increasingly risk
sensitive regulatory accord. However, if banks already risk adjust their capital levels,
more than implied by Basel I, then the new framework may be less harmful than feared.
This study serves to answer some of these outstanding questions relating to the possible
effect that Basel II might have on the global banking system.
In Chapter 3, we asked whether European bank capital buffers are procyclical un-
der the Basel I framework. We show that comovement between the capital buffers of
European banks and the cycle does in fact highlight a cause for concern in this regard.
Our estimations indicate that under the Basel I regime, larger banks, notably the com-
mercial and savings banks, have increased capital cushions significantly during economic
downturns. Given the countercyclical nature of credit risks, this could be interpreted
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as evidence of shortsightedness on the part of the banks, such that banks expand their
portfolios during economic upturns without anticipating future downturns. Under the
Basel I framework, capital requirements remained constant over the cycle. Under the
new framework however, requirements will increase during a recession, when more banks
are likely to be downgraded than upgraded. The new rules will therefore require banks
to increase capital even further in the trough of the cycle, when it is difficult and costly
for them to do so.
In Chapter 4, we focused on understanding the long run relationship between bank
capital and charter values. We note that a high charter in itself does have a significant
disciplining effect on bank capital management. Banks appear to manage capital in such
a way so as to protect their valuable charter. Only once their charter value has fallen
below a median threshold do banks change their behavior and become significantly more
risk loving. Contrary to predictions however, we show that higher charter value banks do
not necessarily hold more capital. The existence of government safety nets, or the ease of
banks with larger charters to access capital markets might serve as explanations for this
finding. Our findings show that adjustments to capital regulations over the years have
removed many of the moral hazard incentives from the banking system.
In our final research chapter, Chapter 5, we assessed bank capital management deci-
sions with regard to the simultaneous adjustment of capital and risk. Our results indicate
that introducing a more risk sensitive capital regulation (Basel II) is unlikely to affect US
bank holding companies to a large extent since they appear to account for the true value
of their risk when managing their capital buffers. These findings are in line with the hy-
pothesis that financial institutions throughout the world have been developing frameworks
for economic capital management in response to the diversification of banking businesses,
rapid progress in financial engineering, and the implementation of Basel II.
In each chapter of this thesis, we acknowledge the endogenous nature of the capital
decision of a bank, and assume that banks will define an internally optimal probability
of default (a function of risk and capital) to be managed over the long term. Adjustment
costs, illiquid markets, as well as consequences of a regulatory breach together affect a
banks’ internal decision when setting a target capital ratio. Treating capital in this way,
we note that it is the amount of capital held above the requirement that determines
a banks attitude towards risk. Importantly, this work has shown that excessive risk
taking is rarely a consequence of insufficient capital. It is worth noting that the findings
documented in each of the three research chapters correspond to capital management
under the Basel I framework. There have been two major changes since the time period
on which this research was conducted. First, Basel II has since been agreed and is
now applied to most banks in Europe. Second, and more importantly, there has been
a major global disturbance to the banking industry. While the results presented in this
thesis do provide evidence on how banks managed capital and how relationships between
key variables looked in the run up to the crisis, the widespread problems associated
with the US sub-prime and structured securities have completely changed what were
previously stable relationships between bank exposures and risks. Banks worldwide are
now struggling to cope with substantial loan losses and write downs, together with ongoing
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uncertainty about their future business. The management of bank capital in these new
and challenging circumstances has to be a subject for future research.
The work undertaken in this thesis has important policy implications for bank reg-
ulators and supervisors. Since bank capital management is endogenous by nature, it
is essential that regulation is structured in such a way as to evolve with inherent risks
and exposures. While the introduction of a more risk sensitive approach to capital man-
agement is welcomed at a time of considerable turmoil, the question of whether this will
adequately capture unknown risks that are continuously evolving remains to be seen. It is
vital to acknowledge the ever changing complexity of the financial system and to capture
this aspect in modern day bank regulation.
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